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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates issues relating to two aspects of unemployment 
tha t has gained importance in recent years. 
The first aspect concerns the growing numbers of hidden unemployed in 
the economy. The implications of this phenomenon for economic analysis is 
demonstrated by its impact on the macroeconomic analysis of the 
unemployment-vacancy relationship. A simple stock-flow model is used to 
predict the effect of hidden unemployment on the UV loci. A systematic 
approach to estimation of the UV curve is adopted and the empirical results 
confirm the a priori predictions of this model. 
The second aspect concerns the state dependence interpretation of 
unemployment behaviour. A search-theoretic framework is adopted to provide 
the basis for specification of the models to be estimated. The determinants 
of transition from unemployment of Australian youths are investigated at the 
micro level using an Australian labour market longitudinal data set. Survival 
modelling techniques are applied to estimation of the hazard functions. 
Structural estimation of the job search model which involves the estimation of 
the reservation wage function is also undertaken. Positive duration 
dependence in unemployment is implicated by the results from these analyses. 
A novel approach to the modelling of recurrent unemployment is also 
introduced in this thesis. These models, based on the stochastic counting 
processes theory, allow the pattern of occurrence of employment events and 
duration of successive unemployment spells to be determined. Evidence of 
positive occurrence dependence are found from this analysis. 
Finally, some issues relating to targeted employment susbsidies are also 
investigated. The costs of this policy intervention are compared with the 
al ternative of providing only unemployment benefits. It is shown tha t the 
na ture of duration dependence is vitally important for the economic 
justification of the subsidy policy. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
The analysis of unemployment has undergone several distinct phases 
over the last few decades. Before the 1960's, the debate over the causes of 
unemployment was usually conducted in terms of the familiar Keynesian 
(cyclical) versus the classical (frictional) or neoclassical theories. Both schools 
of thought regarded unemployment as a stock concept which was empirically 
investigated primarily at a macroeconomic level. This phase was followed by 
the disequilibrium approach [Glower (1965) and Leijonhufvud (1968)] which 
offered a reappraisal and reinterpretat ion of Keynes' theory, with emphasis on 
the individual quant i ty-constrained ad jus tmen t process arising from imperfect 
information flows. 
The emphasis on costly information and behaviour of individuals at the 
microeconomic level provided new st imulus to subsequent development of 
labour market models which sought to provide rigorous theoretical 
underpinning of the behaviour of par t ic ipants in the labour market . This 
new microeconomics l i terature, generally associated with the works contained 
in Phelps et. al. (1970), sought to develop aggregate dynamic relations f rom 
microeconomic models of rat ional optimising behaviour of workers and firms. 
The outcome of this development was the growing acceptance of the belief 
t h a t the causes of frictional unemployment were primarily voluntary in 
mot iva t ion , with some chosing unemployment as a form of productive 
inves tment to enhance fu ture lifetime earnings. Concurrently, it became clear 
t h a t empirical analysis of unemployment would be more f rui t ful , if carried out 
in a framework with unemployment t reated as a flow rather than a stock 
concept . The early empirical turnover analysis of unemployment were however 
under taken a t the aggregate level relying mainly on labour force gross flows 
d a t a . [ Hall (1972), Perry (1972) ]. Results of these analyses generally 
suppor ted the hypothesis t ha t unemployment consisted mostly of flows of 
people who were voluntarily unemployed for short periods. 
However with the persistence of high unemployment levels which 
dominated the major economies and Austral ia in the 1970's and into the 
1980's, two aspects of the unemployment problem became apparent . First ly, 
the emphasis given to the efflux of unemployed individuals highlighted the 
fact t h a t in many instances, the terminal s ta te of a spell of unemployment 
may not necessarily be in employment . Instead, af ter a prolonged spell of 
unemployment or faced with the prospect of such a spell, potential workforce 
par t ic ipan ts may opt to move into the ranks of the discouraged workers or 
the hidden unemployed. These refer to the category of individuals who are 
potent ia l workers and who al though able to work, have not sought work 
because they think jobs are not available. In the United States, for example, 
Finegan (1981) est imated tha t the number of discouraged workers, which 
represents the lower bound of the total number of hidden unemployed, 
total led more than one million persons in 1977 or one percent of the labour 
force. Strieker and Sheehan (1981) gave an es t imate of the level of hidden 
unemployment in Austral ia in August 1979 to be at 340,000 persons which is 
about the same order of magni tude as the number officially recorded as 
unemployed. There is therefore the realisation t ha t the conventionally used 
measure of the stock of unemployment does not give an accurate picture of 
the to ta l unutilised labour supply in the economy. This has implications for 
all empirical analyses which presuppose tha t recorded unemployment figures 
cap tu re all changes in the stock of unutilised labour supply in the economy. 
Second, new evidence emerged [ Clark and Summers (1979) and Akerlof 
(1979) ], which indicated t ha t unemployment was disproportionately 
concentra ted among a relatively small number of individuals who experienced 
long spells of unemployment . This new picture of the unemployment 
s i tuat ion contradicted the turnover view held for almost a decade, and 
provided a new impetus to analyse unemployment behaviour empirically a t 
the individual level to resolve the ambiguities generated by al ternat ive 
in te rpre ta t ions of aggregative analyses. One popular view of unemployment 
behaviour t ha t emerged is based on the s ta te dependence hypothesis. This 
hypothesis s ta tes t ha t past unemployment experiences have real and lasting 
impact on the probabili ty of a person leaving his or her current unemployed 
s t a t e or the liability of suffering unemployment spells in the fu ture . The 
ra t ionale for this hypothesis is based on the a rgument of deterioration of 
work skills and the loss of human capital investments during unemployment . 
An opposing view, however, argues t h a t it is the presence of certain 
unmeasured characteris t ics of individuals which, when not properly taken into 
cons idera t ion in analyses , gives the impression t h a t pas t experience is a 
cr i t ical f ac to r in de t e rmin ing f u t u r e e m p l o y m e n t p robab i l i ty . T h e relat ive 
i m p o r t a n c e of these f ac to r s in de t e rmin ing l abour m a r k e t t r ans i t i on have 
i m p o r t a n t bea r ing on t he design of labour m a r k e t policies. Evidence of 
d o m i n a n t s t a t e dependence effects , for example , would provide a s t rong case 
for j o b c rea t ion policies a imed a t p reven t ing long or mul t ip le spells of 
u n e m p l o y m e n t . 
The a d v a n t a g e of microeconomic empir ical analys is of u n e m p l o y m e n t lies 
in the abi l i ty to de t e rmine the re la t ive i m p a c t of m a r k e t forces, past 
experiences and personal charac te r i s t i c s on the labour force t r ans i t iona l 
behav iour of individuals . Research in th is a rea has relied extensively on the 
use of longi tud ina l or panel d a t a which conta in comprehens ive collect ions of 
i n fo rma t ion on a pa r t i cu la r sample of ind iv iduals over a period of t ime. 
Pane l d a t a combines the f ea tu res of t ime series and cross sect ional d a t a and 
allow the labour m a r k e t ana lys t to cons t ruc t more complex d y n a m i c labour 
m a r k e t models and to tes t hypo theses t h a t would not have been possible 
using only cross sect ional or t ime series d a t a ^ These d a t a sets have 
increasingly been ga thered and m a d e avai lable in t he Uni ted S t a t e s and in 
Europe . In t he U.S. for example , the Na t iona l Longi tud ina l Survey of Labour 
M a r k e t Exper ience (NLS) has been avai lable since 1966. In Aus t r a l i a , the 
collection of a l abour m a r k e t longi tudina l d a t a set on a na t iona l level began 
only in 1984. Resul t s f r o m the f irs t phase of t he Aus t r a l i an Longi tudina l 
Survey (ALS) were avai lable only in mid-1985. T h e analys is of th is new d a t a 
set is expected to provide fresh ins ights in to the opera t ion of the Aus t ra l i an 
labour m a r k e t . Th i s thesis is in p a r t a con t r ibu t ion to th is l i t e ra tu re . 
1.1 P lan of Thes is 
This thesis looks a t issues re la ted to the two aspects of t he analysis of 
u n e m p l o y m e n t raised above. T h e t r e a t m e n t of these issues invar iably 
represen t i m p r o v e m e n t s over those found in the l i t e r a tu re . 
C h a p t e r 2 of the thesis deals wi th the impl ica t ions of hidden 
u n e m p l o y m e n t on one pa r t i cu la r aspect of macroeconomic analys is , namely the 
theory and e s t ima t ion of t he u n e m p l o y m e n t - v a c a n c y ( U V ) re la t ionsh ip . Th is 
c h a p t e r offers a new analys is of the U \ ' loci and pe r fo rms an econometr ic 
l e s t t o d e t e r m i n e the val idi ty of the basic causal r e la t ionsh ip under ly ing the 
^See Hs i ao (1985) for a good e x p o s i t i o n on t h e b e n e f i t s of l o n g i t u d i n a l d a t a 
specification and est imation of this curve. Tlie impact of hidden 
unemployment on the stability of the UV is also highlighted. 
Chapte r 3 to 6 is concerned with the microeconometric analysis of 
labour market t ransi t ion behaviour using da t a from the ALS da t a set. In 
Chap te r 3, we present the survival analysis techniques tha t are used in the 
est imat ion of labour market transit ion models. This is followed by the 
est imat ion of the reduced form hazard function models of unemployment in 
Chap te r 4. A search-theoretic framework is used as the basis for the 
specification of these models. In this chapter , we also conduct tests of lagged 
and mean occurrence dependence and perform diagnostic tests on the 
es t imated models, leading to some interesting conclusions. Chapter 5 focusses 
on the analysis of reservation wages of the unemployed youths in Austral ia. 
S t ruc tura l models tha t are est imated allow direct testing of some predictions 
of the theoretical job search model. Identification of both the s tructural 
equat ions have been made possible by imposition of appropr ia te restrictions. 
In es t imat ion, allowance is also made for the possible effects of sample 
selectivity bias. The work contained in these chapters represent the first 
systematic analysis of the ALS da t a using techniques of survival analysis and 
using modern diagnostic tools. 
The analysis of the t iming of occurrence of unemployment spells or 
employment events is the main focus of interest in Chapter 6. Here we 
introduce the counting process approach to the modelling of employment 
events. Although such models have been suggested in the l i terature, the 
work reported here represent the first serious application of these methods to 
labour market da ta . The est imated models permit us to make inferences 
concerning the incidence of recurrent unemployment spells among the 
Austral ian youths and the testing of the occurrence dependence hypothesis. 
In Chapter 7, we look at some policy issues relating to employment-
t ra ining subsidies for the unemployed. This is a topic of considerable interest 
and importance in public debate , especially in Austral ia where youth 
employment policies have been given top priority in recent government budget 
considerations. The economic just if ication of these subsidies is considered in 
t e rms of the relative cost of providing subsidies to employers to hire from the 
pool of long-term unemployed persons compared with the provision of 
unemployment benefits alone. Expected costs and benefits of the two 
al ternat ives are modelled and a numerical simulation of the problem is 
provided to highlight the na ture of the trade-offs and the information 
required for efficient policy design. The nature of duration dependence is 
shown to be of crucial importance. 
Finally, Chapter 8 contains sonne concluding remarks and suggestions for 
future research in the issues examined in this thesis are also provided. 
CHAPTER 2 
HIDDEN UNEMTIOYMENT AND THE UV CURVE 
2.1 Introduction 
The relationship between unemployment and vacancies has been the 
subject of interest especially in relation to the generalised excess demand 
theory of the Phillips curve. See, for example, Phelps (1968) and Hansen 
(1970). This theory postulates a direct relation between the rate of wage 
increases and the excess demand for labour usually proxied by the 
unemployment rate . The need for a proxy for excess demand arises from the 
lack of suitable direct measures such as job vacancy da ta and the justification 
for the choice of the unemployment ra te as a proxy rests primarily on the 
observed inverse relationship between unemployment and vacancies. Empirical 
analysis of the stability of the unemployment-vacancy (UV) curve have 
received the a t tent ion of numerous studies in the U.K. [e.g., Taylor (1972), 
Gu ja ra t i (1972), Foster (1974), Evans (1977) and Duffy (1984)] , in Australia 
e.g., Hughes (1975) and Harper (1980)] , and more recently in the U.S. [e.g., 
Medoff (1982) and Medoff and Abraham (1983)]. 
In this chapter , we will re-examine some of the assumptions implicit in 
the explanations for the cyclical behaviour of unemployment and vacancies, 
and consider the impact of hidden unemployment on the stabili ty of the UV 
curve. In Section 2.2, we review and highlight the general assumptions under 
which the theoretical UV curve is derived. Section 2.3 reappraises the 
a rgument for the cyclical behaviour of vacancies and unemployment and 
presents a simple model to analyse the effect of hidden unemployment . 
Section 2.4 of this chapter discusses the econometric issues in the estimation 
of the UV curve and assesses the adequacy of assumptions underlying the 
conventional approach to est imation. In Section 2.5, we present the empirical 
UV curves for Austral ia est imated using disaggregated da t a and taking into 
account the hidden unemployment effect. 
2.2 Tlieoretical Founda t i ons of the U V Curve 
Tlie derivalioii of the inverse relationship between vacancies and 
unem[)l()yinoiit centers on (he existence of frictions either within or between 
ind iv idua l labour sub-markets. These frictions take the form of positive 
in format iona l , re-location or re-training costs which prevent the market from 
clearing either on the demand curve or the supply curve of labour. Instead, 
actual employment occurs at [)oints to the left of the demand and supply 
curves along the employment locus EE (see Figure 2-1 ). 
F i g u r e 2-1: Existence of the UV Curve 
qd.q^ 
As we move uj) along the wage axis, it is apparent that an inverse 
relat ionship between unemployment which ecjuals the horizontal distance 
between E E and SS, and vacancies which equal the the horizontal distance 
between E E and D D , will be observed. However, in a market with sticky 
wage rates, the inverse reUition would be observed primari ly as a consequence 
of shifts in the labour demand or supply schedules. For example, in Figure 
2-2, if the demand curve shifts to D ^ D j , then at the same wage rate W, the 
level of unemployment falls while vacancies increase^, giving us another point 
on the UV locus. 
The existence of frictions within individual subrnarkets however, is not a 
prerequisite for an aggregate UV curve to be observed. Hansen (1970) lias 
shown that even when frictions are absent, that is, if each labour sub-rnarket 
T h a i vacancies increase rests on the assumpt ion that the resultant rise in employment is less 
tha t the increase in demand for labour. 
F i g u r e 2-2: Wage IMcxibillt.y and UV Curve 
dears on Ihc deinand curve at wages below W, the inverse relation between U 
and V in the aggregate still exists if a rigid wage structure and distribution 
of demand and supply across the labour sub-markets is assumed. Init ial ly, 
some markets experience excess demand for labour (vacancies) while others 
have excess supply (unemployment) . Exogenous and proportionate shifts of 
the demand curves in all the submarkets will then reduce aggregate 
unemployment and increase aggregate vacancies. 
Whatever assumptions are made concerning imperfections in the labour 
market , it is obvious from the above discussion that the existence of an 
inverse relation between unemployment and vacancies requires the assumption 
(not usually explicitly stated) of wage inflexibility. If wages are flexible and 
respond quickly to excess demand or supply of labour, then in our analysis 
il lustrated in Figure 2-2, the wage rate will increase to W^ where U = V 
when the demand curve for labour shifts to U^D j . W h a t will be observed 
therefore, is not an inverse relation between U and V, but a series of points 
around the 45 degree ray emanat ing from tlie origin in the U-V plane. 
Therefore, the existence of an UV curve is consistent wi th an implicit-
contract based explanation of wage inflexibility in employment and/or the 
importance of wage relativities in wage determinat ion in the economy. 
The existence of the UV curve also depends on assumptions concerning 
the responsiveness of the labour supply schedule to changes in the demand for 
labour in each submarket . Hansen (1970), for example, assumed a fixed 
labour supply curve. However, Bowden (1980) has shown that this idea of 
an invar iant labour sijp[)ly function cannot be sustained in tlie der ivat ion of a 
stable U V locus, particular! } ' when the labour market is in a state of 
d isequi l ibr ium. Wh i l e shifts of the labour supply curve may not normally 
occur so frequently in resjjonse to demand variat ions, the existence of a pool 
of hidden unemployed who enter and leave the labour force according to the 
s tate of demand suggests that such shifts are not implausible. There fo re , in 
our example i l lustrated in F igure 2-3, g iven that wages are inf lexible , if an 
init ial upsurge in labour demand is quickly fo l lowed by a compensat ing shift 
of the sui)ply curve to S^ S^ , the inverse relation between IJ and V wil l not 
be recorded. 
F i g u r e 2 -3 : Supply Shifts and U V Curve 
\\ s jy 
S 
s . D D, 
In the study of the dynamics and stabil i ty associated wi th the U V 
curve, a dist inction therefore must be made between the measured labour 
force and the actual unutilised labour force deHned to include the pool of 
hidden unemployed. T h e awareness of hidden unemployment arose f r om the 
observat ion that the recorded size of the labour force was lower in t imes of 
recession than it would be under condit ions of full emp loyment [Dernburg and 
Strand (l 'JG4), Bowen and Finegan (1969) ] . Th i s led to the conclusion that 
exist ing reported unemployment figures understate the true extent of 
unemployment by an amount known as the hidden unemployed. By hidden 
unemployed , we refer to the category of potent ial work force part ic ipants who 
wou ld be in the labour force, if condit ions characterist ic of full emp loyment 
were to prevai l in the labour market . These people have not act ive ly sought 
work because they think that j obs are not avai lable . Others have commi t t ed 
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themse lves to non-pecuniary ac t iv i t ies such as schooling or child minding 
which prec lude t h e m f rom looking for jobs or t ak ing up j ob offers in the 
i m m e d i a t e f u t u r e . Only a sus ta ined i m p r o v e m e n t in the avai labi l i ty of jobs 
will d r a w these people back in to the labour force. 
2.3 The D y n a m i c s of the U V Curve 
Theore t ica l models of the UV locus in Phe lps (1968) and Hansen (1970) 
descr ibe the m o v e m e n t of u n e m p l o y m e n t and vacancies induced by exogenous 
cyclical va r ia t ion in demand in t e r m s of ant i -c lockwise loops a round the 
s t e a d y - s t a t e UV locus. These resul ts rely on the implici t a s sumpt ion t h a t 
vacancies a d j u s t fas ter t h a n u n e m p l o y m e n t in response to changes in 
agg rega t e d e m a n d . Hansen (1970, p .18) , for example , wri tes 
in a recession a sudden u p t u r n in d e m a n d does not affect 
e m p l o y m e n t , and t h u s u n e m p l o y m e n t , immedia te ly ; but it may work 
immedia te ly on vacancies. At the lower t u rn ing point , the UV curve 
should tend to move vert ically upwards . As emp loymen t 
subsequent ly ca tches up, the curve will bend to the N\V. When 
d e m a n d s t a g n a t e s a t the end of the upswing, vacancies will s top 
increasing and even fall, wi th emp loymen t still increasing and 
u n e m p l o y m e n t fall ing. 
T h e a s sumpt ion t h a t vacancies respond more rapidly may not necessarily 
be correct in the con tex t of measured vacancies, especially dur ing t imes of 
high u n e m p l o y m e n t . The reasoning is as follows: At any point in t ime, the 
s tock of measured or notified vacancies may be expressed as 
n = + < -
where V^  denotes the number of notif ied vacancies a t end of period t , V^ 
deno te s the add i t ion to the stock of vacancies over the period t , and V'^  
deno tes the deplet ion of the stock of vacancies over the period t . 
If the cu r r en t level of u n e m p l o y m e n t is high, then wi th any increase in 
agg rega t e d e m a n d , will con t inue to be high since employers have more 
c a n d i d a t e s to choose f rom the pool of unemployed . T h e componen t s of 
v | include new vacancies genera ted by the expans ion of o u t p u t and those 
ar is ing f r o m qui t s by exist ing employees. High u n e m p l o y m e n t ra tes would 
m o r e likely reduce the incent ive to qui t and a t the same t ime permi t 
employe r s t o easily engage in direct in take of new workers w i thou t the 
ass i s t ance of the i n t e rmed ia t e g o v e r n m e n t e m p l o y m e n t agency. In any case, 
if l abour u t i l i sa t ion is low or hoard ing is p reva len t , new vacancies may not 
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move in step with any upsurge of aggregate demand since t}ie increase in 
labour demand can be absorbed by the current level of employed labour. 
Therefore, any resurgence of demand in times of high unemployment need not 
necessarily cause an immediate rise in the number of vacancies V^. 
2.3.] Stability of the UV Curve 
Studies of the UV curves for U.K., U.S.A. and Australia have all 
established outward movements in the UV relationship over time. 
Theoretically, such shifts are regarded as indicative of greater maladjustment 
or structural imbalance in the labour market, attributable to one or more of 
the following factors: 
i. Introduction of redundancy payments or changes in unemployment 
benefit schemes which increase the incentives for the unemployed 
to maintain or adopt more discriminating job search behaviour and 
hence remain unemployed for longer periods e.g. Gujarati (1972), 
Evans (1977), Harper (1980) and Bowden (1980); 
ii. Structural shifts in demand due to increased dispersion of demand 
or skills across industries, e.g. Foster (1974) and Bowden (1980); 
iii. Changes in immigration policies, e.g. Hughes (1975), Harper (1980) 
and Warren (1982) or the demographic composition of the labour 
force, e.g. Bowden (1980) and Medoff (1983); 
iv. Rate of growth of employment, e.g. Medoff (1983) or the extent of 
labour hoarding as in Taylor (1972). 
Essentially, any change that hinders a worker from taking up existing 
vacancies or makes him less willing to do so will cause an outward shift of 
the UV curve. 
2.3.2 The Hidden Unemployment Factor 
Even if we were to accept the argument that measured vacancies are 
more responsive than unemployment to changes in aggregate demand, any 
reasonable explanation of the cyclical loops and shifts associated with the UV 
curve is still dependent on the implicit assumption that the measured labour 
force data provide a true indication of the labour supply conditions in the 
economy. This assumption has been challenged by studies which have 
uncovered the existence of increasingly large numbers of hidden unemployed in 
the economy. See, for example, Strieker and Sheehan (1981) for some 
Australian evidence. 
The influence of hidden unemployment on the cyclical dynamics and 
stability of the UV curve has been studied in Bowden (1980), where it is 
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conjectured tliat the effect uf discouraged workers, by \va_v of variation in 
labour force parlici[)at ion rates, is to amplify tlie cyclical deviations of 
unemployment and vacancies from the steady-state UV locus. The analysis 
by Bowden , iiowever, is not particularly transparent. Here, we present a 
simple d iagrammatic exposition of the possible effects of hidden unemployment 
on the dynamics and stability of the UV locus. 
Consider the argument by Hansen (1980) referred to earlier regarding 
the existence of cyclical loops around the steady-state UV locus, illustrated in 
Figure 2-4. 
F i g u r e 2 - 4 : Dynamics of the UV Curve 
In Figure 2-4 the region around A corresponds to the end of the 
upswing wlien vacancies have stopped increasing and unemployment is steadily 
falling causing movement in the direction A B . If the upsurge in demand 
induces many of the hidden unemployed to re-enter the labour force at this 
point , it may turn out that unemployment may not fall but remains intact 
or may even increase. If this increased inflow of previously discouraged 
workers into the unemployment pool is sustained, the result may not be a 
cyclical loop but a permanent outward shift of the steady state locus. 
Similarly, any sustained exodus of the unemployed into the ranks of the 
hidden is expected to cause a downward shift of the the UV curve. The 
j)resence of hidden unemployment also has implications for the slope of the 
UV locus. T o examine this in more detail, we will make use of a simple 
s tock- f low model of labour market dynamics. 
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Consider the fol lowing model which d is t inguishes between the ac tual and 
measu red labour supply quant i t ies :^ 
Let U"^, U'^ deno te the ac tual and measured u n e m p l o y m e n t level, 
respect ively, 
pA^ pM ac tua l and measured labour force, respectively, 
H the level of h idden u n e m p l o y m e n t , 
E the e m p l o y m e n t level and 
V the n u m b e r of vacancies. 
T h e re la t ionship between these var iables are 
F^ = E + U^ 
F^ = F^ - H 
H = d < 0. 
T h e specif icat ion of the last re la t ionship may be rat ional ised within a 
search- theore t ic f r amework of labour marke t dynamics where job search 
involve f irs t searching over firms to find a vacancy and then searching over 
the vacancies to find an acceptable wage offer. We would expect t h a t the 
higher the level of vacancies, the greater will be the expected re tu rns to 
search which will then make job search ac t iv i ty more a t t r a c t i v e relat ive to 
n o n - m a r k e t ac t iv i ty . Therefore , this makes it less likely for potent ia l 
workforce pa r t i c ipan t s to join the ranks of the hidden unemployed either by 
ra t iona l ut i l i ty maximis ing choice or th rough d i scouragement in job search. 
T h e measured u n e m p l o y m e n t level U'^ is defined as 
U^ = U^ - H 
= U^ - d(V)U^ 
T h e inflow of new e n t r a n t s in to the labour force, Np, which consist 
main ly of school leavers would be propor t iona l t o the size of the popula t ion 
P . Th i s p ropor t ion is also expected to be an increasing funct ion of the degree 
of excess d e m a n d in the economy, since higher wage levels arising f rom the 
excess d e m a n d provide added incentives to these y o u t h s to leave school earlier 
in search of jobs . There fo re we may wr i te 
^ T h e f o r m u l a t i o n of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n a c t u a l u n e m p l o y m e n t , m e a s u r e d u n e m p l o y m e n t a n d 
h i d d e n u n e m p l o y m e n t is s i m i l a r t h a t p o s t u l a t e d by M c C a f f e r t y ( 1 9 8 0 ) . 
N 
= t ' > 0. F 
Assume also tha t the number of re t i rements f rom the labour force is 
equal to a cons tan t proport ion 6 of the employment level. Then the rate of 
change of the actual labour force is 
F^ = 7(V'- - SE 
= i ( V ~ \ \ ~ d{V)\U^P - SE. 
Let Z = F^. 
J,-A dV 
VV(> want ot find when Z = 0 
dV 
dZ 
= - Y P 
dU^ 
dZ . , 
— = Y \ i + d U ^ p 
By the implicit function rule, 
dU^ dZldV 
dZ/dU^ 
= 1 + d-(V]U^ 
= 1 + + H] 
We see t h a t — < 0 iff I + + H\ < 0. 
Assuming this condit ion is satisfied, then an increase in 11 will increase 
the magni tude of the slope of the UV curve and cause it to be steeper. 
2 .4 Econometr i c . E s t i m a t i o n of t h e U V C u r v e 
2.4.1 Vacancy Da ta 
In Austral ia , the notif ication of vacancies by employers to the 
Commonwea l th Employment Service (CES) is voluntary . The propensity of 
employers to notify depends therefore, not only on the existing level of 
unemployment but also on the intensity with which CES staff canvass for 
vacancies and the employers ' perception of the efficacy and efficiency of the 
C E S mechanism in match ing correct persons with the requisite skills to their 
jobs . The extent of this report ing bias can clearly be seen if comparison is 
m a d e between CES vacancy d a t a and the Austral ian Bureau of Sta t i t ics 
(ABS) vacancy d a t a which is based on a sample survey of employers. This 
is shown in Table 2.4.1. 
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T a b l e 2-1: Compar ison of Job Vacancies, Aus t ra l ia 
Vacancies ( '000) 
Mar 74 Mar 75 Mar 76 Mar 77 Mar 78 
C E S 87.55 34.49 22.98 23.47 19.52 
ABS'^ 165.20 55.20 50.80 49.60 35.60 
A B S / C E S Rat io 1.89 1.60 2.21 2.11 1.82 
May 77 Aug 77 Nov 77 Feb 78 May 78 May 79 Aug 79 
C E S 19.89 20.38 20.26 22.26 17.90 18.34 18.23 
ABS^ 39.30 41.00 36.40 36.00 32.20 34.30 33.00 
A B S / C E S Rat io 1.98 2.01 1.80 1.62 1.80 1.87 1.87 
Notes : 
a. Annua l survey by mail. Source: J o b Vacancies ABS 6218.0 
b. Quar te r ly survey by telephone. Source: J o b Vacancies ABS 6231.0 
Between 1974 and 1978, the number of vacancies recorded by the ABS 
surveys is, on average a lmost twice (about 1.92) the number of vacancies 
notif ied a t the CES.^ Unfor tuna te ly , the availabil i ty of quar ter ly ABS 
vacancy d a t a only f rom May 1977 onwards has precluded its use for any 
meaningfu l es t imat ion of the UV curve. While CES unfilled vacancies 
s ta t i s t ics may not cap tu re all avai lable vacancies in the economy, nevertheless 
, as noted by the Hancock C o m m i t t e e (1973), it still provides an useful 
indica tor of movemen t s in aggregate economic ac t iv i ty , a t least in orders of 
magn i tude . 
2.4.2 Econometr ic Es t imat ion Technique 
The convent ional approach to modell ing the UV curve consist of 
specifying an equat ion with the unemploymen t r a t e as the dependent variable 
e.g. 
= a + + b(L)V^ + Z^V + e^ ^ (2.1) 
where L is the lag opera tor defined by L-'V == ^ t - j ' 
^ T h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g f igu re for t h e A B S q u a r t e r l y t e l e j i hone s u r v e y is only s l ight ly lower a t 1.84 
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HL) = 6 , 
m and n arc parameters optimally chosen to accommodate the underlying 
dynamics'^; U and V are the unemployment and vacancy rate respectively, 
and Zj is a vector of predetermined variables. 
However, it is clear from the discussion in the preceding sections that 
the 
vacancy rate V may not necessarily be predetermined in relation to the 
unemployment rate. From an econometric viewpoint, both U^ and V^ may be 
jointly determined within a simultaneous equation system. Failure to take 
into account, this simultaneity aspect of the relationship will give rise to 
biased and inconsistent estimates.^ 
It is therefore imperative that tests of the predeterminedness of V^ 
should be conducted at th(; preliminary stage of estimation, to ascertain 
whether the implicit assumption that V causes U, but U does not cause V, is 
justifiable. Trivedi and Baker (1982), using CES vacancies and 
unemployment data, tested for causality in the Granger's sense and have 
concluded that U does not cause V. But, as shown by Wu (1983), the 
finding that U does not Granger cause V, in the context of a dynamic 
simultaneous equation framework, is neither a necessary nor sufficient 
condition for using least squares regression methods to obtain consistent 
parameter estimates. Therefore, in our estimation procedure, we have 
incorporated tests of the econometric exogeneity of V in the unemployment 
equation using the methods mentioned in Pagan (1984).® 
2.4.3 Unemployment Equation 
The UV equation in (2.1) was estimated using different functional forms 
and lag structures for U and V. The log-transform model was chosen on the 
basis that it ensures positivity in the predicted values of the dependent 
variable. In choosing the optimal lag structures for U and V, an initial 
" 'xhe approach taken in choosing the opt ima l max imum lag and other lower lagged values of U 
and V consist of specifying an init ial unrestricted lag and then determin ing the appropr ia te lag 
order through a sequence of nested hypothesis tests. 
^Since the actual vacancy rate is unobservable, the presence of measurement errors associated 
wi th the reported vacancy rate is also expected to cause serial correlation in the error term in 
equat ion (2.1). 
^These are essentially specification error tests of Hausman (1978) and W u (1973) which 
N a k a m u r a and Nakamura (1981) have shown to be equivalent tests. 
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maximum lag order of 5 was maintained for U and V. Through a sequence of 
ordered nested hypothesis tests against the maintained model, using the log 
likelihood ratio tests as criterion,^ we arrive at a model with logU^ j, logV^ 
and logV^^ as regressors. 
Initially, the list of variables in Zj includes the level and rate of growth 
of real non-farm G D P to capture demand growth effects; an index of 
employment dispersion^ to model the effects of structural shifts in demand; 
the labour force participation rate of women, the rate of growth and 
proportion of population of working age to capture the influence of changing 
demographic composition; real average weekly earnings for wage effects; the 
real unemployment benefits level for the disincentive effects on work; net 
migration rate for the effects of immigration; the level and rate of change of 
real government expenditure to model the effects of fiscal policies, and the 
rate of growth of money supply \43, to capture the growing importance of 
monetary policy on demand management of the economy in the 1970's. 
However, out tests indicate that only the real unemployment benefits, real 
average weekly earnings, Stoikov and rate of growth of money supply 
variables have consistently significant estimates. The migration variable was 
found to be highly insignificant and was excluded from the regression. This 
is similar to the results of Withers and Pope (1985) who found no significant 
association between immigration and unemployment in Australia. Our final 
specification of the UV equation is thus 
log U^  = /( log log log log B^, S^^, log ER^) (2.2) 
^The likelihood rat io statistic which takes the form 
L R = 2[logL(>/') - = -2 l o g ( S S E ^ / S S E j 
,-T/2 
2 
is asymptot ica l ly distr ibuted as Xj j , under H^ , where m is the number of restrictions needed to 
define the nul l hypothesis , and LC^*^) are the maximised likelihood funct ions under H j and 
Hq respectively. See Harvey (1981). 
Q 
This is an index of employment dispersion defined by Stoikov (1966) as 
where E^ denote tota l employment in n industries in period t, 
E j j emp loyment in industry i in period t, 
E*" the proport ionate rate of change of employment , 
E the weighted average t ime rate of change 
of emp loyment for all industries defined as: 
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where B is the level of real unemployment benefits, 
5 p S^ are the Stoikov variables,® 
AM-^ is the rate of change of money supply M3, 
ER is real average weekly earnings. 
2.4.4 Vacancy Equation 
If we do not make any assumption concerning the exogeneity of V in 
relation to U, then it is valid for us to specify an equation with U^ as 
regressor and V^ as the regressand, such as 
logV^ = /3 + c(L)logV;_j + d[L)\o^U^ + Z^e + (2.3) 
where c(L\ = y^ c .L\ 
\ J ^ 1 = 0 I 
d{L) ^ 
p and q being optimally chosen through a sequence of ordered nested 
hypothesis tests. 
The specification of the vacancy equation is based on a composite model 
which incorporates both the neoclassical and the Keynesian theories of labour 
demand. Labour demand is assumed to be translated into vacancies which is 
specified as a function of real minimum wage, the cost of capital, real output, 
technological change (represented by the time trend variable), structural 
demand shift (Stoikov variable) and policy related demand shocks are 
captured by the money growth rate and the rate of change of government 
spending. A series of significance tests of the estimates lead us to this final 
specification of the vacancy equation: 
log V^; = 3(log J, log V ; ^ , log log U ,^ log RW^, (2.4) 
log log T) 
where RW is the real minimum wage, 
Q is the level of real non-farm product, 
T is the time trend. 
= 0 prior to 1972(4) and S j = 0 from 1972(4). Two separate variables are used to 
represent the employment dispersion index because of d iscont inui ty in the series in 1972(4) arising 
from changes in the official disaggregated employment da ta used in the index 's construction. See 
Trivedi and Baker (1982) for details of the construction. 
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2.4.5 Exogeneity Test 
The structural equations (2.2) and (2.4) form a simultaneous equation 
system. To test for the exogeneity of log V^ in equation (2.2) we began by 
estimating the reduced form equation of log V^. The residual r^ ^ from this 
reduced form is then included as an additional regressor in equation (2.2). 
The null hypothesis that \' is exogenous is equivalent to H^: coefficient of r^ ^ 
= 0 in the augmented form of equation (2.2). (See Appendix A). 
Similarly, in testing for the exogeneity of U in the vacancy equation 
(2.4) we include r,,^. the residual from the reduced form equation for 
unemployment as an additional regressor and test Hgi coefficient of = 0 . 
The results of the tests are as follows(t ratios in parenthesis): 
Hypothesis Estimated Coeff. 
V^ Exogenous H^ : Coeff of rj^^O -0.0159 [0.09] 
Uj Exogenous : Coeff of r2^=0 -0.4364 [2.19 
As the t ratio of the coefficient of rj^ is not significant, the null 
hypothesis is not rejected and therefore we may conclude that the vacancy 
variable can justifiably be treated as an exogenous variable in the 
unemployment e q u a t i o n . T h e coefficient of r^^ the residual from the 
reduced form for the unemployment rate, is significantly different from zero. 
Hence we can reject the null hypothesis that U^ is exogenous in the vacancy 
equation. This result reinforces the previous finding and allows us to 
conclude that "causality" is un i d i r ec t i ona l from V^ to U^. 
2.4.6 Stability Tests 
CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests of stability applied to the estimated form 
of equation (2.2) indicated departure from stability around the 1975/76 
period. This finding differs from those of Harper (1980) whose results did 
not show any positive evidence of instability after the inclusion of the real 
unemployment benefit variable in his UV equation. The different result is 
probably due to the different equation specification and time period used and 
more likely, the possibility that that even though instability existed, this was 
not detected by the tests because of the presence of lagged dependent 
' ^ T h e exogeneity test is val id only if the structural equations are correctly specified. For 
example , it was found that when the money supply variable was omit ted from the unemp loyment 
equa t ion , the coefficient of r j ^ became significant 
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var iables and serial correlat ion in the error t e r m . " 
2.4.7 T h e Hidden Unemploymen t Effect 
It is well known t h a t between 1974 and the early 1980's, the 
pa r t i c ipa t ion r a t e of the Aust ra l ian labour force has fallen below its t rend . 
Str ieker and Sheehan (1981, p.3, 134) for example , noted t h a t between 1973 
and 1979, the par t ic ipa t ion ra te for males fell more t h a n 5 percentage points 
while t h a t of females dropped by 4 percentage points . Th is suggests t h a t the 
n u m b e r of hidden unemployed dur ing this period would have increased, a 
phenomenon which, according to the model presented earlier, would have 
affected the position and slojje of the l^V curve and hence may explain some 
of the ins tabi l i ty in the re la t ionship found to occur dur ing this period. 
T h e defini t ion of hidden unemploymen t t h a t we have adopted 
encompasses a broader group of non- labour marke t pa r t i c ipan t s t han is 
usually associated with the subgroup of non-par t i c ipan t s called the 
discouraged workers^^. It is not necessary t h a t a person has expressed a 
desire to work or is avai lable to work in order to be classified as hidden 
unemployed . Like Strieker and Sheehan, our a rgumen t is t h a t many of the 
hidden unemployed have been so ut ter ly discouraged t h a t they have given up 
t h o u g h t of f inding a job and have taken up non-pecuniary activit ies which 
prevent t h e m f rom tak ing a job immedia te ly or expressing a desire to look 
for work in the immedia te fu ture . Hidden unemployment is therefore more 
appropr i a t e ly described as the manpower or labour force gap which indicates 
how much larger the labour force would be if the economy was opera t ing a t 
some specified lower level of unemployment or higher level of o u t p u t . 
T o model the impac t of hidden unemployment on the UV curve, an 
e s t ima te of the order of magn i tude of the number of hidden unemployed 
needs to be ob ta ined . We assume this to be equal to the difference between 
the full capaci ty labour force and the observed ac tual values. A regression 
model of the labour force is first es t imated for the period 1964 to 1973 wi th 
o u t p u t , popu la t ion , t ime t rend and lagged dependen t var iable as regressors. 
Th i s model is specified as 
' ^ T h e p r e s e n c e of lagged d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e a n d ser ia l c o r r e l a t i o n i n v a l i d a t e t h e b o u n d s of t h e 
C U S U M a n d C U S U M S Q tes t s . H o w e v e r , whi le a c c e p t a n c e of t h e n u l l - h y p o t h e s i s does no t al low 
a n y d e f i n i t e conc lus ion t o be m a d e a b o u t t h e s t a b i l i t y of t h e e s t i m a t e d r e l a t i o n s h i p , r e j ec t ion of 
t h e n u l l - h y p o t h e s i s does p r o v i d e an i n d i c a t i o n of t h e p r e s e n c e of i n s t a b i l i t y . 
^ ^ T h e A u s t r a l i a n B u r e a u of S t a t i s t i c s de f ines d i s c o u r a g e d w o r k e r s as p e r s o n s w h o w a n t a j o b b u t 
a r e n o t a c t i v e l y look ing for work b e c a u s e they be l ieve t h e y would no t be ab l e t o f ind a j o b for 
a n y of t h e fo l lowing r ea sons : c o n s i d e r e d too y o u n g or t oo old by e m p l o y e r s ; l a n g u a g e or rac ia l 
d i f f i cu l t i e s ; i n s u f f i c i e n t skills or e x p e r i e n c e or no j o b in t h e i r loca l i ty or l ine of work . 
LF^ = a l F ^ j + PQ^ 
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(2.5) 
where LF^ is the actual labour force, 
Q j is the real non-farm product, 
Pj is the size of the working age population and 
t is the time trend variable. 
Since the extent of hidden unemployment prior to 1974 is relatively 
insignificant, the estimated equation (2.5) gives us the relationship for the 
true labour force. To estimate the number of hidden unemployed from 
1974 onwards, we first replace Q^ in the estimated labour force model with 
the potential full employment output^^ Q^  in each period from 1974. The 
predicted values obtained by dynamic simulation give the full employment 
labour force for each period. Since the hidden unemployed are those who are 
not in the labour force but would have been if full employment existed, the 
difference between the predicted full employment labour force and the actual 
values reflects the order of magnitude of the hidden unemployed. 
Tab l e 2-2: Labour Force Equations 
Dependent 
Variable 
Regressors 
Total 
Labour Force 
1964(2) - 73(4) 
Male 
Labour Force 
1964(2) - 73(4) 
Female 
Labour Force 
1964(2) - 73(4) 
CONST 35.963 [ 0.02;'' -362.480 [ 0.74] 154.860 [ 0.12] 
0.476 [ 3.18 0.315 [ 2.001 0.589 4.11 
Qt -0.013 [ 0.94] -0.004 [ 0.76] -0.009 [ 0.79] 
Pt 0.312 1.37] 
0.351 1 3.37] 0.050 [ 0.27] 
T 7.721 1 0.74] -4.281 [ 1.25 8.078 0.90] 
w 0.99'i '4 0.998 7 0.9937 
Reg. Std. Err. 22.122 7.476 18.045 
Notes: 
a. t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
Table 2-2 gives the estimated labour force equations and in Figures 2-5 
^^The variable Q is the potent ia l gross non-farm product which is a l inked peaked value used 
in the Treasury 's NIF-10 model . See Append ix B for the description of the da ta used in the 
est imat ion. 
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the predicted values from these equations are plotted.''' 
We are now in the position to analyse the impact of hidden 
unemployment on the UV curve. This involves the inclusion of two variables 
, the logarithm of the number of hidden unemployed log HID, and an 
interaction term VHID , given by the product of log HID and V, to capture 
the impact on the slope of the l]\' curve. Disaggregated data are used to 
estimate separate UV curves for males and females and the impact of hidden 
unemployment on these relationships are tested. The estimated equations are 
presented in Table 2-3. 
2.5 Est imat ion Results 
The estimation results presented in Table 2-3 confirm the significant 
role of unemployment benefits on the unemployment rate. Although many 
studies on unemployment, for example, Maki and Spindler (1975, 1978), 
Junankar (1981) and Nickell (1982), have used the replacement ratio( i.e. the 
ratio of unemployment benefits to average earnings) as regressor, we prefer to 
adopt a less restrictive specification which allows for the differential impact of 
benefits and earnings on the incentive to work. The advantage of this 
approach is confirmed by regression results which show significantly different 
responses of the unemployment rate across sex group to these two variables. 
The regression results show that an increase in the benefit rate has a 
greater impact on the unemployment rate for males than for females. This 
may be expected in view of the fact that many of the female unemployed 
who are married do not usually qualify to receive benefits. On the other 
hand, while changes in average weekly earnings has no effect on male 
unemployment, the response of female unemployment is highly significant. If 
we regard the female weekly earnings as highly correlated with the male 
weekly earnings, this result seem to suggest a backward bending supply curve 
for female labour. It is also consistent with the additional worker hypothesis 
which states that many women are essentially secondary workers in an 
household unit, and their participation in the labour force is inversely related 
to the primary income of the predominantly male household heads. 
Monetary policy captured by the quarterly rate of change of the real 
money supply(M3) is found to have a significant impact on the UV 
^ ' 'Our estimates compares favourably with those of Strieker and Sheehan (1981). For example, 
Strieker andd Sheehan predicted a total of 337,000 hidden unemployed in August 1979. Ou r 
est imate for this period is 304,000. 
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Figure 2-5: Actual and Predicted Labour Force 
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Table 2-3: Unemployment-Vacancy Equations 
Dependent 
Variable 
Regressors 
Total 
Unemployment 
1965(2) - 79(3) 
Male 
Unemployment 
1965(2) - 78(4) 
Female 
Unemployment 
1965(2) - 78(4) 
Const -0.3419 [ 1.04'^ -1.5295 3.16; 1.3239 ] 4.21 
Log U^., 0.5435 [ 6.82] 0.5683 12.21 0.4917 [ 8.42] 
Log V^ -0.4596 [ 5.93 -0.4073 i 8.09; -0.4531 [ 8.57] 
Log V .^^  0.1973 ; 5.76j 0.2332 1 7.72] 0.1805 i 5.56] 
Log B^ 0.4292 ; 5.89^ 0.4892 i 6.60; 0.3546 i 7.30] 
Stoikl^ 0.0063 [ 0.58^ 0.0081 ; 0.58; -0.0215 2.51] 
Stoik2^ 0.0301 1.98^ 0.0623 i 0-91: 0.0340 2.01] 
-0.0148 [ 3.38; -0.0104 i 2.55] -0.0258 1 6.52 
Log ER^^ -0.1642 [ 1.62J 0.0623 1 0.46] -0.4631 5.01] 
Log HID^ -0.0100 0.69] -0.0246 1.46] -0.0743 [ 4.34] 
VHID^^ -0.0306 ; 1.78 -0.0540 [ 3.43 -0.0727 4.06] 
W 0.9935 0.9926 0.989 7 
Reg. Std. Err. 0.058 7 0.0650 0.0589 
F Test F , " 2.03 3.49 4.62 
RESET Test^ x^ 5.0000 5.4033 2.787 4 
Error^Cj 0.3784 [ 2.90] 0.3962 ; 3.01 0.2083 2.60; 
Scheme e. , t-4 -0.6763 [ 6.02 -0.6601 I 6.28] -0.8266 ] 7.94] 
N o t e s : 
a. In brackets are t-statistics acijusted for heteroscedasticity by the 
method in \Vhite(1980) 
b. Quarterly rale of change of real money supply (M3 deflated by CPI) 
c. Log of (Male average weekly earnings deflated by CPI) 
d. Product of log V^ and log HID^ 
e. Joint F test of significance of Log HID and VHID where n=44 for total 
and n=41 for males and females. 
f. RESET test of Ramsey (1969). F-test of H^: (log u j ^ and 
(log u j ^ do not contribute to explanation of the residuals. 
g. These are moving average serial correlation coefficients. 
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re la t ionsh ip . T h e inclusion of this var iable was designed to cap tu re demand 
shocks to the sys tem due to exogenous changes in policy ini t ia t ives which are 
not reflected in o ther demand variables. These results concurs with those of 
P i t ch fo rd (1983) in t h a t t igh t mone ta ry condi t ions since 1974/75 is seen to 
c o n t r i b u t e to sus ta in ing a cont inuing high ra te of unemploymen t . 
T h e hidden u n e m p l o y m e n t var iables are joint ly significantly in the male 
equa t ion , and both coefficients are found to be very significant in the female 
equa t ion where the ex ten t of hidden unemploymen t was predicted to be 
s u b s t a n t i a l . T h e signs of the coefficients suppor t the predict ions of our model 
where increase in hidden unemployment, causes a inward shift of the UV 
curve and increases the slope of the curve. 
2.5.1 Steady S t a t e UV Curve 
In the s i tua t ion where the labour force is constant and labour demand 
equals labour supply , i.e. when vacancies and unemployment are equal, no 
u n e m p l o y m e n t ascr ibable to deficient demand is said to exist . Instead, all 
u n e m p l o y m e n t t h a t exist are a t t r i b u t a b l e to marke t imperfect ions. See, for 
example , Dow and Dicks-Mireaux (1958) and Brown (1976). The more severe 
imper fec t ions and fr ic t ions are in the m a r k e t , the higher would be the level of 
' n o n - d e m a n d def ic ient ' or zero excess demand unemployment and vice versa. 
There fore , m o v e m e n t s in th is level of zero excess demand unemployment in 
the s teady s t a t e have invariably been ascribed to changes in the degree of 
m a l a d j u s t m e n t or s t ruc tu ra l imbalance in the labour marke t . 
In Figures 2-6 , the s teady s t a t e UV curves, condit ional on the values 
of the exp lana to ry variables, are p lo t ted . ' ^ 
Table 2-4 gives the s teady s t a t e unemploymen t ra tes U* corresponding 
to the zero excess demand s i tua t ion , t ha t is when U^ = U^ j = = V^ = 
V^ J = = U*. In the absence of unemploymen t benefi ts and hidden 
unemploymen t ( i . e . when the level of unemploymen t benefi ts and hidden 
u n e m p l o y m e n t are set equal to zero), the unemployment ra tes of males and 
females due purely to the existence of f r ic t ions in the m a r k e t are abou t 
0 .14% and 0.42% respectively. Wi th the unemploymen t benef i ts system 
ope ra t ing , the corresponding figures are 1.51% and 1.65% respectively. The 
presence of u n e m p l o y m e n t benefi ts has significantly increased the degree of 
m a l a d j u s t m e n t in the labour marke t as measured by the s teady s t a t e 
' ^ S t e a d y s t a t e h e r e r e fe r s t o t h e s i t u a t i o n w h e r e t h e r a t e s of c h a n g e of t h e u n e m p l o y m e n t a n d 
v a c a n c y r a t e s a re zero 
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Figure 2-6 
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Table 2-4: Steady State Equilibrium Unemployment Rates 
No Benefits'' With Benefits'' With Benefits 
No Hidden Unempl. No Hidden Unempl. With Hidden Unempl.^ 
Males 0.14% 1.51% 1.21% 
Females 0.42% 1.65% 1.29% 
Notes: 
a. The unemployment benefits variable Log B and hidden 
unemployment variables Log HID and VHID set equal to zero 
while the other explanatory variables are set equal to their 
average values over the period 1965-78. 
b. Log B set equal to its average value over the period 1965-78. 
c. Log HID and VHID set equal to their average values over the 
period 1974-78. 
unemployment rate. When we allow for the presence of hidden 
unemployment by fixing the hidden unemployment variables at their average 
predicted values over the 1974-1978 period, the corresponding steady state 
unemployment rates U* are reduced to 1.21% and 1.29%.^® The presence of 
hidden unemployment has, predictably, produced a fall in the measure of 
structural imbalance in the economy as reflected by by the value of U . 
Therefore, failure to take into account the extent of hidden unemployment 
can lead to an underestimate of this measure of structural imbalance in the 
economy by as much as 20%. 
^^Ear l ier , we noted tha t the CES vacancies generally understate the A B S vacancies by a factor 
of abou t 1.9 on average. If the ABS figures do in fact provide ^a more accurate account of the 
ac tua l number of vacancies in the economy, then the values of U would best be regarded as the 
lower bound values of the steady state unemp loyment rates. 
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2 . 6 S u m m a r y 
We began by re-examining the implicit a s sumpt ions in the derivat ion of 
the UV curve and the dynamics associated with it . An impor t an t assumption 
concerns the relat ive responsiveness of measured vacancies and measured 
unemploymen t to aggregate demand . Exogeneity tes ts conducted in this 
s tudy have shown t h a t the conventional approach to the es t imat ion of the 
U \ ' curve is indeed just i f iable . This obviates the need to resort to es t imat ion 
of supply-based version of the UV relat ionship or the use of complicated 
es t imat ion techniques as in Par ikh (1983) and Par ikh and Allan (1982). 
The possible impact of hidden unemployment on the stabil i ty of the UV 
curve was the next focus of a t t en t ion . The existence of hidden 
unemploymen t implies tha t the measured unemployment ra te no longer 
cons t i tu te a consis tent measure of the ac tual unused labour supply. Any 
change t h a t leads to a movement of the measured unemployed into the 
hidden unemployed pool meant a decrease in the measured unemployment 
ra te associated with any given vacancy ra te and therefore a shift of the UV 
curve and an increase in its slope. Using disaggregated da t a , we es t imated 
the UV curves for Aust ra l ia and have found hidden unemployment to be 
significant in de te rmin ing the position and shape of the UV curves. Failure 
to consider this effect of hidden unemployment will lead to an 
underes t imat ion of the t rue extent of s t ruc tu ra l imbalance in the economv. 
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APPEND IX A 
E X O G E N E I T Y TEST 
Consider the model 
yj = Y^p + Zj7 + e 
where y^ is a Nxl vector of observations on y^^ 
Y^ is a NxG matrix 
Zj is a NxKj matrix of instrumental variables. 
The reduced form for Y2 may be written as 
Y2 = ZjTT^  + I^t:^ + w 
(AT 
where Z^ is a NxK^ matrix of instrumental variables. 
Assume each row of (e,w) is independently distributed with mean zero 
and covariance matrix 
= 
a 
6 S. 
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where 6 = E[ew] and E is the expectations operator. 
Assume also that E'Zje] = EjZ^e] = 0 
If Y2 is exogenous in equation (A l ) , 
- EleY^] = 0 
^ E[eZj7rj + eZ27r2 + ew] = 0 
E[ew] = 0 
since E[eZj = E[eZ2] = 0 
Nakamura and Nakamura (1981) provides proof of the equivalence of 
Hausrnan (1978) and Wu (1973) specification error tests which are tests of 
H^: (5=0. The equivalent tests of H^: 5=0 are 
(i) yj = Y2/?, + w/?2 + ZjT H^: 
(ii) y, = + w^2 + Z,-r 
. s • 
J i i i ) - - n . : 
v : 
:5() 
• J 
M ^ i j ' 
ft- . ' 
— , a s s - j , ' 
• S - r - L . 
J 
_ > "vl' ' " ii^iieiL'^- _ _ ' ' i ^ _ ' r ' J 
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APPEND IX B 
THE DATA AND THEIR SOURCES 
Average Weekly Earnings. Average weekly earnings per employed male 
uni t . Source: various issues of Average Weekly Earnings. Australia 
Austral ian Bureau of Stat ist ics(ABS) Cata log No. 6302.0. 
Consumer Price Index. Index constructed for use in the Australian 
Treasury NIF-10 model. Source: Austral ian National Universi ty(ANU) 
Economic Time Series Databank . 
Labour Force. Source: 1964(l)-66(2) Labour Report No. 55(1970) ABS 
6.7; 1966(3)-79(3) The Labour Force, Australia 1978, 1979 ABS 6204.0. 
Money Supply M^. Total of demand deposits, currency held by public 
and savings, t ime and other deposits. Source: A N U Economic Time Series 
Databank . 
Population. Populat ion over 15 years of age(NAP) . Source: A N U 
NlF-10 Time Series Da tabank . 
Output. Gross Non-Farm Product at market pr ices(GNM) and potential 
G N M . Source: A N U NIF-10 Time Series Da tabank . 
Real Minimum Wage. M i n i m u m weekly award wage rates(persons) 
deHated by CP I . Source: A N U NIF-10 Time Series Databank . 
Unemployment. Commonwea l th Emp loyment Service(CES) registered 
unemployment series. Quarterly figures are taken at the end of February, 
May , August and November. Disaggregated figures available to 1978(4). 
Source: A N U Economic Time Series Databank . 
Unemployment Benefit Rate. Weekly rate of unemployment benefits 
for married couple. Source: Department of Social Security Annua l Reports. 
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CHAPTER 8 
SUHVTVAL MODELS OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
3.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n 
In this chapter we will examine the statistical problems involved in the 
analysis of unemployment duration using the methods of survival analysis. 
The statistical issues are essentially similar to those involved in other 
applications using survival times such as the analysis of lifetimes of medical 
pat ients in biostatistics and the time until failure of machinery and 
equipment in reliability analysis.^ The particular application we are concerned 
with is the duration of time of an individual in the unemployed state until 
his or her re-entrance into employment. Survival in this context refers to the 
individual's stay in unemployment. Failure refers to the termination of his 
unemployment spell. 
The plan of this chapter is as follows. In Section 3.2 we will review 
some of the basic concepts of survival analysis. Section 3.3 considers the 
construction of the likelihood function for estimation and in Section 3.4 we 
review some of the common distribution functions used in estimation of 
survival models. The t reatment of heterogeneity and its effect on the 
specifications of the components of the likelihood function is the topic of 
Section 3.5. In Section 3.6 we will consider some methods of testing for 
model misspecification. 
3.2 Bas i c Surv iva l Ana lys i s Concepts 
3.2.1 Survivor and Hazard Functions 
Let T > 0 be a continuous variable representing the lifetimes of 
individuals in unemployment with probability density function (pdf) f(t) and 
distribution function 
^See for e x a m p l e Lawless (1982) , K a l b n e i s c h a n d P r e n t i c e (1980) , C o x a n d O a k e s (1984 ) , E l a n d t -
J o h n s o n a n d J o h n s o n (1980) , M a n n et. at. ( 1974) , B a r l o w a n d P r o s c h a n (1975) a n d Mi l le r (1981) 
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F(t) = Prob(T < t) = [ f{x)dx. 
Jo 
The survivor function S( t ) is the probability of the unemployed 
individual surviving till time t, i.e. 
5(0 ^ P r ( T > t ) = 1 - F(t), 
where 
5(0) = 1 
5(oo) = lim S[t) = 0. 
t — oo 
The hazard function or hazard rate h( t ) from unemployment is the 
instantanteous rate of exit from unemployment given that the individual is 
unemployed or surviving till time t. 
Pr(t < T < t+6t/ T > t) 
h(t) = lim — 
l - F [ t \ 
Integrating h( t ) gives the cumulative or integrated hazard function, 
H{t) = f h(x)d 
Jo 
Jo 1 -
X] 
dx 
F[x) 
= -\og\l-F{t)] = ~\og S(t). 
Therefore an alternative expression for S( t ) is 
5(0 = exp\- f h(x)dxl 
Jo 
and 
m = h(t)s(t) 
= h{t)exp[- [ h(x)dx]. 
Jo 
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3.2.2 Censoring 
Censoring of survival time is a common feature associated with survival 
analysis where the variable of interest is observed for only part of its range. 
In unemployment duration analysis, the sample usually consist of individuals 
who are unemployed at one point in time and reinterviewed at a later date. 
At the point of interview however, not everyone would have returned to 
employment and hence for these individuals their exact unemployment 
lifetimes are not known. All we know is that their unemployment lifetimes 
exceed the recorded unemployment duration to date. Obviously such 
information must be taken into account in the analysis of the data. The 
way in which censoring arise will affect the type of adjustments necesary in 
estimation and the inferences associated with the estimates obtained. In 
general, three types of censoring schemes may be distinguished: Type I, Type 
II and random censoring. 
Let T j , T 2 , T^ be independently, identically distributed lifetimes with 
distribution function F. 
Let Cj be a specified time period in which the individual i is observed. 
A sample of observations Y. is said to be Type I censored if 
y = T. if T. < C. 
I X ' I ~ I 
= t if T. > C.. 
C ' I t 
If all the C. are equal, the sample is singly Type I censored. 
Type II censoring occurs when an experiment or test is set to terminate 
at a time of a particular(say the rth) failure , so that in a random sample of 
size n, only the rth smallest observations are observed. In Type I censoring , 
the number of failures and the failure time are random whereas in a Type II 
censoring situation, only the failure times are random. 
When the censoring times C. are independent of T. and are random, 
censoring is said to be uninformative or random. This occurs when an 
experiment or study is terminated at a preassigned date but the entrance of 
individuals into the sample are not all equal unlike the case of Type I and 
Type II censoring. This is the most common type of censoring encountered 
in the collection of economics data. With the data of unemployed persons 
for example, the survey is taken (terminated) at a fixed point or interval of 
time and the respondents do not all enter the unemployed state at the same 
point in time in the past. While the nature of censoring may not affect the 
specification of the likelihood function, it usually complicates the distributional 
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theory for statistical inference. This complication often leads to reliance on 
large sample asymptotic likelihood procedures for inference about the 
estimated parameters.[See Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) and Lawless (1982)] 
3.3 Cons t ruc t ion of the Likel ihood Func t i on 
The Australian Longitudinal Survey (ALS) is an annual survey of young 
people designed to examine the pattern of youth labour force experience in 
Australia, especially those who have been unemployed for long periods(over 
six months). The information recorded in interviews of each respondent in 
the survey include the basic demographic data of the respondent and family, 
educational background, labour force status, job search methods, income, and 
retrospective information on employment histories for the twelve months 
preceding the survey. This retrospective data on employment/unemployment 
history allows us to compute the duration of all censored and complete 
unemployment spells experienced by the individual during the reference period 
of one year from September 1983. 
A person who has a complete spell of unemployment of length t and an 
associated vector of characteristics X contributes a term f(tj:X), the 
probability of failure at t, to the likelihood. However, if his unemployment 
spell is censored, the contribution is 1 - F(t. X ) , the probability of survival 
beyond t. The full likelihood for a sample of N independent observation is 
.\E mJ 
j=l 
where N = NE + NU, 
NE is the number of persons who found jobs at the interview date, 
NU is the number of persons who are still unemployed at the 
interview date, and 
t is the duration of unemployment. 
If all individuals have the same lifetime distributions, then 
NE NU 
.=1 j=i 
Using the relation between h(t) and S(t) we can write the likelihood 
function as 
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= 
A" 
1 - c . 
1 = 1 
where c = 0 if i e XE 
= 1 if i e NU. 
This is the typical fo rmula t ion of the likelihood found in the l i te ra ture 
on survival analys is and is based on the a s sumpt ion t h a t censoring t imes and 
l i fet imes are con t inuous independen t r a n d o m var iables . Th is likelihood 
func t ion is appl icable for analys is if ei ther 
i. all persons in the sample in the sample are unemployed a t the 
same t ime and their labour force experience followed th rough t ime; 
o r 
ii. the renewal process is s t a t i ona ry and hence the func t iona l form of 
the l i fet ime d is t r ibu t ion under lying the renewal process is 
independent of t ime. In o ther words the u n e m p l o y m e n t dura t ion 
of a person sampled is p a r t of an infini te sequence of such spells 
with d i s t r ibu t ion F ( t ) . A person who becomes unemployed a t t ime 
t have the same reemployment probabi l i t ies as ano the r person of 
identical charac ter i s t ics who becomes unemployed a t ano the r point 
in t ime. Th i s a s sumpt ion is reasonable if the t ime span of the 
analysis is relatively shor t so t h a t exogenous fac tors which 
de te rmine the funct iona l specification of the l ifet ime d is t r ibut ion 
can be assumed to remain unchanged . 
Lancas t e r ( l 979 ) has suggested the following specification of the likelihood 
func t ion for analys is of u n e m p l o y m e n t dura t ions . 
L„ = 
^^ 1-F(t X ) ^^ l~F{t X ) 
1=] ^ ' ' ' j=i ^ J y 
where h = r^ - is the difference in t ime between the interview da t e 
T^  and the d a t e of selection in to t he sample 
s is the length of t ime between the selection d a t e and the point when 
the individual leaves u n e m p l o y m e n t , and 
t is the du ra t i on of u n e m p l o y m e n t a t the t ime of selection. 
The ra t iona le for adop t ing this specif icat ion is t h a t individuals enter the 
s amp le ( t he s t a t e of u n e m p l o y m e n t ) a t d i f ferent t imes and hence the likelihood 
m u s t be condi t ioned on the en t rance t imes of each individual . If the 
en t r ance t imes were the same for all, t he l oga r i t hm of L^ and L^ would differ 
by a cons tan t and likelihood es t ima tes of the p a r a m e t e r s would be the same. 
For example, t can be set equal to 0 so that selection occurs at the point of 
entry into unemployment and thus L^ = L^. 
The disadvantages of this specification in its application to the ALS 
data are twofold. First ly , although all individuals in the sample are supposed 
to have been unemployed and looking for full-time work at the point of 
selection, post-survey examinat ions of the data revealed tha t about 2 5 % of 
the respondents in the ALS sample were actually employed at the time of 
selection. This is at tr ibuted to false declarations by the respondents or their 
failure to notify the Commonwealth Employment Service ( C E S ) of changes in 
labour force status. 
The other point is that the formulation of L^ implicitly assumes that 
between the selection date and t ime of interview, the respondent has 
experienced at most one change in their labour force status. Individuals who 
have multiple spells of unemployment or employment are therefore also 
excluded from the sample used in est imation. Thus, the consequences of 
adopting L., are a substantially reduced estimation sample, the loss of 
information and the risk of introducing biases as a result of this selective 
process. Under these circumstances and given the short reference period of the 
survey, the alternative of assuming a t ime independent renewal process would 
seem to be more plausible for estimation using the ALS sample. 
3.4 Some Common P a r a m e t r i c Distribution Functions 
Once the specification of the likelihood function is decided, the next step 
involve the choice of suitable parametric distribution for the duration of 
unemployment. As in other analysis of lifetime data , the focus of interest is 
on the shape of the hazard function, which in this case describe the way in 
which the instantaneous probabiliy of exit from unemployment varies with 
t ime. Economic theory as we shall see in the next chapter can provide prior 
information on the likely shape of this hazard function. 
T h e shape of the hazard function can fall in one of the following 
categories: 
dh(t) 
i. constant hazard function = 0, 
at 
ii. monotone increasing when > 0 V 
dt 
dh[t) 
monotone decreasing when ^^  < 0 V t, 
iii. ' b a t h u b ' or inverted bathub shape. 
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In the analysis of unemployment desation, the dependence of the hazard 
function on the duration of unemployment is described as duration 
dependence. Wi th a constant hazard function, no duration dependence is said 
to exist while positive duration dependence is associated with a increasing 
hazard and negative duration dependence is characterised by a deceasing 
hazard. 
Lifetime distributions which produce the various hazard shapes are well 
documented in the statistical literature. [Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980), 
Lawless (1982), Cox and Oakes (1984) ]. One specification of the the hazard 
function that is used widely in the analyses is the multiplicative or 
proportional hazard model [Cox (1972)] in which (ignoring the i subscript for 
clarity of notation) 
Mi|X) = v(t)M(X), 
where V(t) is called the baseline hazard function and X is a vector of 
concomitant variables, covariates or regressors which act multiplicatively on 
the hazard function. 
The proportional hazard model has the property that the ratio of the 
hazard function of two individuals r = is independent of duration time 
if we assume that the X ' s are time independent or have a common trend. A 
flexible lifetime distribution which possesses this property is the Weibull 
distribution where 
f[t) = q > 0, A > 0. 
If covariates are present, we assume that the scale parameter A is a 
function of X where A"^  = /i(X) and hence 
/(tlx) = 
h(t\X) = /x(X)at 
a- l 
If a < 1 the hazard is monotone decreasing and if q > 1 it is 
monotone increasing. When a = 0, we have the exponential distribution 
with constant hazard. 
Cox (1975) has proposed a semi-parametric method which allows the 
effects of the X variables to be estimated independently of the specification of 
the functional form of i>{t). However, the usefulness of this method of 
estimation is limited. The reason, as we shall see later in the next section, 
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is that once allowance is made for unobserved heterogeneity, the unconditional 
lifetime distribution is no longer of the proportional hazard type and hence 
the estimation method of Cox (1975) is no longer applicable. 
A second class of survival models is the accelerated life [Cox and Oakes 
(1984)] or accelerated failure time model ( A F T ) [Kalbfleisch and Prentice 
(1980)] or also known as location-scale model [Lawless (1982)]. In the 
specification of the proportional hazard model, no direct relationship between 
X and T is postulated. The A F T model is based on the premise that a log-
linear relationship exists between failure time T and X , that is 
log T = r,(X) + aw (3.1) 
or T = e^*, 
where cr is a scalar scale parameter, and w is an error term with distribution 
function G independent of X . 
Suppose w has hazard function V ^ ( w ) , and let T ' = e'^ '^ . Since there 
is a one-to-one transformation between w and T ' , then by direct application of 
the transformation rule [Hogg and Craig (1980, Ch.4)], T ' will have a 
rpilogf/a) , 
baseline hazard ip{t') = which is independent of X . Similarly, we 
at' 
can express the hazard for T as 
h(t\X) = V(i) = 
and the density function as 
f(V.X) = g(t} = 
Unlike the proportional hazard model, the effect of the covariates is to 
act multiplicatively on t, rather than on the hazard rate, and thus varying 
the rate at which the individual moves along the time frame. T o see this 
more clearly, we note that in (3.1) if no explanatory variables are observed, 
T = T ' . However, if r]{X) < 0, then T < T ' . The role of X then is to 
accelerated (or decelerate if j?(X) > 0) the time to failure. Kalbfleisch and 
Prentice has shown that the only A F T model that also exhibit proportional 
hazard properties are the Weibull and Exponential models. Various survival 
models can be constructed by assuming different distributions for the error 
term w. Some of these are reviewed briefly below. 
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3.4.1 Loglogistic Model 
This model is obtained by assuming that w has the logistic distribution 
where = from which 
where a = 1/a and /i(X) = [^(X)]"'^. 
The hazard function is 
If Q < 1 the hazard is monotone decreasing and if q > 1 the hazard 
a - l , 
increases to a maximum at t = ( ) ' and decreases towards zero. 
3.4.2 Lognormal Model 
This is obtained by assuming the normal distribution for w. 
/(i|X) = - — a t \ x p \ — 
2 
1 
where a = l /a , /x(X) = [r?(X)]-'^  and 4>{z) = e x p \ — ] . 
The hazard function is written as, 
/i(t!X) = at ^ 
where ^(2) = f^^o incomplete normal integral. 
The shape of the lognormal hazard function depends on the relative 
magnitudes of q and /x(X). If q is small relative to /x, the hazard tends to 
be monotonically decreasing. Normally, however, the hazard increases to a 
maximum and then falls monotonically towards zero. 
3.4.3 Generalised Gamma Model 
The generalised gamma model is derived by assuming that the error 
term w in (3.1) has the log-gamma distribution with density function 
exp{kw- e ) 
g{w) = . The density function of t is 
1 (k) 
" r(k) 
where a = 1/(t, ^ (X ) = [»7(X)]"" and the. Gamma function r(k) = f^ z e ' dz. 
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It can be shown that a = k = 1 gives the exponential model, q = 1 
the Gamnna model, k = 1 the Weibull model and k oo produces the 
lognormal model. 
The corresponding hazard function is 
/( i lX) 
h{t\X) = 
^ ' ' 5(t|X)' 
where 
5(tlX) - 1 -
and the incomplete gamma function I is 
1 /-Mixit" 
= — I . ' - v . . 
3.5 Treatment of Heterogeneity 
The formulation of the hazard function given above assumes that 
individuals having the same vector of concomitant variables X and 
unemployment duration will behave identically. This would be true if X 
include all possible heterogenous factors which could affect the hazard rate 
from unemployment. However, despite the wideranging scope of information 
which is collected in current longitudinal surveys, there is always the 
possibility that certain unmeasurable characteristics of the individual, e.g. 
motivation to work, crucial to the analysis at hand are omitted. The 
consequences of using only a subset of the true vector of covariables is well 
known. Lancaster (1979) and Heckman and Singer (1982, 1984b) have shown 
that unobserved heterogeneity inevitably leads to a downward bias in the 
slope of the hazard function. The estimated hazard rate tends to fall more 
rapidly and rise less steeply than the true hazard rate of the individual. 
Let F(t|X,v) be the distribution function of T conditional on X and a 
random unobserved heterogeneity component v. We define a mixture of F 
with respect to some distribution of v, 6>(v) as 
F(t\X) - F^(i|X) = J F(t\X,v)de(v), 
where G belongs to a set of non-degenerate probability distributions and is 
called the mixing or compounding distribution and v may be a s-dimensioned 
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vector defined over A. F(t|x) is also called the aggregated distribution 
function. 
The parametric approach to the controlling of unobserved heterogeneity 
in estimation entails the selection of an appropriate mixing distribution of the 
unobservables and the incorporation of the effect of this distribution on the 
specification of the aggregate hazard and survival function used in estimation. 
This corresponds to the 'random effects' model (as opposed to the 'fixed 
effects' model ) where the likelihood is based on the distribution of T 
marginal on v, the unobserved heterogeneity variable. Economic theory does 
not provide insight into the probable form of the unobserved heterogeneity 
distribution and hence the choice of the mixing distribution is admittedly, 
somewhat arbitrary. However, if we adopt a general distribution that is 
capable of assuming different forms, we can ascertain to some extent the 
general shape of the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity. 
We assume that the influence of unobserved causal factors is subsumed 
in a scalar v, independent of X , with distribution ©(v). A general 
distribution which can assume a variety of shapes is the Gamma distribution 
and thus would be a prime candidate to adopt for the distribution of v. Let 
S(t X,v) be a Weibull survivor function conditioned on X and v. We 
assumed that each person in the sample has the same parameter a which is 
fixed across spells of unemployment. 
= expi - f i t ' ^ v ] , 
where fx = /i(X), 
e(v) = — — t; > 0, > 0, and A > 0. 
r(k) 
The marginal (with respect to v) or aggregate survivor function is 
5(^iX) = £i5(t|X,z;)] (3.2) 
= / exp\-fit"v] 
Jo 
— dv 
m 
The density function is 
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A s no t ed by Johnson and K o t z (1970. p .266 ) this d i s t r ibut i on of t is a 
P a r e t o d i s t r i bu t i on ( D u b e y ( 1 9 6 8 ) ) or a Burr d i s t r ibu t i on (Bur r ( 1 9 4 2 ) ) w i t h 
scale p a r a m e t e r A. 
T h e co r r espond ing hazard func t i on 
M « : X ) = (3.3) 
Lancas t e r (1979 ) and L y n c h (1985 ) use the m o r e restr ic ted vers ion w i th 
k 1 
k = A so tha t the va r iance of v . v a r ( v ) = — = - — a'^. M a x i m u m 
A 
l ike l ihood es t imates of Q , and pa rame t e r s assoc iated w i th X are then 
e s t i m a t e d j o i n t l y . 
If k = A = l , the d i s t r ibut ion of v is unit exponent ia l and the 
uncond i t i ona l a g g r e g a t e d i s t r ibut i on of u n e m p l o y m e n t dura t i on special ise t o 
the l og l og i s t i c d i s t r ibut ion . 
If V has norma l d i s t r ibut ion d i s t r ibu t i on , it can be shown tha t (see 
A p p e n d i x C ) 
= / exp\~fit uj ezpi \ dv 
and the uncond i t i ona l hazard func t i on is 
h{tX) = - r;}. 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , if log v has no rma l d i s t r ibut i on so that v is d i s t r ibuted 
l o g n o r m a l l y , then (see A p p e n d i x C ) 
5(f X ) = exp[-f,t''exp{r,+j)], 
and the a g g r e g a t e hazard func t i on is 
ft(<!X) = fiat"" exp'r, + j ] . 
T h e quest ion of the i den t i f i ab i l i t y o f 6 » ( v ) , the m i x i n g d i s t r ibu t i on of 
unobse r v ed he t e rogene i t y g i ven the empi r i ca l d i s t r i bu t i on func t i on of T has 
been s tud ied by Lancas te r and N icke l l ( 1980 ) , E lbe rs and R i d d e r ( 1982 ) and 
H e c k m a n and Singer ( 1984a ) . Suppose , w e w r i t e the surv i vo r func t i on in the 
p r o p o r t i o n a l hazard f o r m 
w h e r e ^ ' ( t ) is the in t eg ra t ed base l ine hazard . 
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Fo r th i s class of p r o p o r t i o n a l h a z a r d mode ls . E lber and R i d d e r (1982) h a v e 
e s t ab l i shed t h a t t h e c o m p o n e n t s and 0 ( v ) of t h e m i x t u r e a r e iden t i f i ab le 
if t h e fo l lowing cond i t i ons hold . 
i. V is n o n - n e g a t i v e w i th finite m e a n , 
ii. ^{ t ) is def ined on 0, cc) and is t h e in tegra l of a n o n - n e g a t i v e 
f u n c t i o n ti'(t) def ined on 0, oc), 
iii. t h e set of X e Z is an open set in R*" and the f u n c t i o n is 
def ined on Z and is non -nega t i ve , d i f f e ren t i ab le and n o n - c o n s t a n t 
in Z. 
H e c k m a n a n d Singer (1984b) ex t ended these iden t i f i ab i l i ty c o n d i t i o n s to a d m i t 
f a t - t a i l e d mix ing d i s t r i b u t i o n where the finite m e a n cond i t ion (i) is v io la ted . 
T h e cos t s of t h e new weaker cond i t ions inc lude the need t o impose 
r e s t r i c t i ons on t h e ta i l behav iou r of t he mix ing d i s t r i b u t i o n s so t h a t t he r a t e 
of decl ine is suf f ic ient ly large and a s sumed t o be known . In b o t h ins tances 
however , a necessary cond i t ion for iden t i f i ab i l i ty is t h e inclusion of some 
exogenous va r i ab l e s in t h e h a z a r d f u n c t i o n . Th i s r e q u i r e m e n t is easily 
sa t i s f ied w i th t h e t y p e of d a t a we have ava i l ab l e for ana lys i s . 
3.5.1 A d d i t i v e H a z a r d Mode l s 
A n o t h e r class of mode l s t h a t is no t so c o m m o n in economic d u r a t i o n 
ana lys i s bu t has a t t r a c t e d cons iderab le a t t e n t i o n in o t h e r fields ;Elandt -
J o h n s o n and J o h n s o n (1980) ' is t he a d d i t i v e h a z a r d mode ls . T h e haza rd 
f u n c t i o n is a d d i t i v e if 
h(t x) = v{t) + P(OM(X), 
where v ( t ) is t he basel ine h a z a r d , 
p( t ) is a f u n c t i o n of t . 
Cons ide r t h e case where p ( t ) = t . A d o p t i n g a Weibu l l d i s t r i b u t i o n for 
t h e basel ine h a z a r d , 
f ( t X ) = + 
If we al low for unobse rved he t e rogene i ty w i th genera l G a m m a 
d i s t r i b u t i o n which ac t s mu l t ip l i ca t ive ly on /^(X) a n d p roceed ing in a s imi la r 
f a sh ion as before by ' a v e r a g i n g ' over t h e cond i t i ona l d i s t r i b u t i o n over t h e 
r a n g e of poss ible va lues of v, we show in A p p e n d i x D t h a t we can wr i t e t h e 
su rv ivo r a n d h a z a r d f u n c t i o n s of t he a d d i t i v e W e i b u l l - G a m m a m i x t u r e 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of t as 
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If and v a r ( v ) = a ' . we have the addi t ive Weibull-Unit G a m m a 
mix tu re which has hazard funct ion given as 
h{t X ) = at""-^ + 
If k = A = l . this gives us an addi t ive Weibull-Unit Exponential mix ture 
with hazard function 
h(t X) = + / . { ! 
3 .6 T e s t i n g M o d e l S p e c i f i c a t i o n s 
Once a model has been es t imated , it is impor tan t to test the 
appropr ia teness of the underlying assumpt ions of the model. However, with 
the possible exception of Lancaster and Chesher (1985). the existing l i tera ture 
on unemployment durat ion analysis hardly report the conduct of such tests. 
Tes ts of the assumpt ions of a paramet r ic model is the test of the 
hypothesis H^: F( t ) = F j ( t ) . where F j is a specified dis t r ibut ion. A plethora of 
goodness of fit tests exist when da t a are not censored.• When the d a t a are 
Type II or singly Type I censored, some of the common tests such as the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) or Cramer-von Mises tests are still applicable 
subject to minor modifications. However, when censoring is a rb i t ra ry or 
r andom, the range of suitable tes ts is substant ial ly reduced. Examples of such 
tes ts are Nair (1981) who proposes non-parametr ic procedures and graphical 
tes ts for goodness of fit; Turnbul l and Weiss (1978) derive likelihood rat io 
tes ts for discrete and grouped da ta ; Koziol (1980) examines restrict ive 
modified versions of the K-S and C-M stat is t ics and Chen (1984) presents a 
correlat ion test s tat is t ic for randomly censored da t a . 
In this section, we will outl ine a simple method of assessing model 
specification which we will use in the empirical analysis in the next chapter . 
The approach involve a graphical test followed by a formal numerical test . 
Recall tha t the survivor funct ion 
" A good d i scuss ion a n d s u m m a r y of t h e v a r i o u s t e s t s t h a t can be a p p l i e d is f o u n d in Lawless 
(1982 , C h a p . 9) . 
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5 ( r X ) = p : r > f X , (3.4) 
= exp\-H{tJ^y. 
Since H(T) is a monotonic increasing function of T, this implies that 
p; r > r x j = p; h{T] > H(t] x = ejp\-H{t X ) ] . ( 3 . 5 ) 
The random variable e = H(T) is therefore indep^endent and identically 
distributed as a unit exponential variate and may be called a 'generalised 
error', a concept introduced by Cox and Snell (1968). 
If T has the Weibul l distribution, and /i(X):=exp X5 j , then 
e = eip|X/?]. 
If this distribution has been correctly specified in estimation, then in 
replacing a and (3 by their max imum likelihood estimates (MLE ) , we would 
expect e where 
; = f'^explX^], 
to behave like a random variable from the unit exponential distribution, e is 
referred to as a generalised residual as in Kay (1977), Lagakos (1980) and 
Lancaster (1983, 1985b). 
If the duration t ime is censored, how then is e defined ? For any 
exponentially distributed random variable Z with mean /c, it is easy to see 
that oo 
E[ZZ>i) = = t + /c. 
For unit exponential distribution / f= l . Therefore with a sample which 
has some censored observations, we can define the generalised residuals for 
the fitted model with the following adjustments^ 
(e if t uncensored 
le + 1 if t censored 
The above discussion suggests that we can make use of the properties of 
generalised residuals to assess the goodness of fit of the estimated model. 
From (3.5), log S(H(t)\X) = -H(t\X). Therefore, under the null hypothesis 
o 
If the ad jus tment is too severe, an alternat ive is to add the condi t ional median addi t ional 
survival which equals In 2 for the censored unit exponential variable. Crowley and Hu (1977) 
adopted this ad justment 
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tha t the model specification is correct, the logarithm of the empirical survivor 
function of the residuals ^ ( f ) when plotted against I itself should approximate 
a s t raight line with unit slope. 
The procedure to produce the graphical plot is as follows: 
i. Compute the est imates of f by using the MLE of a and ^ and the 
integrated hazard function formula for the estimated model. 
ii. If durat ion times are censored, adjust ^ = e + 1. 
iii. Reorder the ^ and t reat the sample as if it is a set of uncensored 
residuals. 
iv. Compute the empirical survivor function of f where 
where d. is the number of 'deaths ' occurring up till observation j 
i.e. the number of f such that 
V. Plot log S(f) vs. 
Alternatively, we can make use of probability plots to test the 
assumption of unit exponeniality for ^ using the following result (Lawless 
(1982) p. 120 ): 
L e m m a 1: If t^ is the rth smallest observation in a random 
sample of size N from a exponential distjTibution with mean K then 
the expected value of t , £'(i ) = • 
For the unit exponential distribution, Eit ) = = r Hence a 
* N-j+l 
plot of fj against the ordered ^ should be approximately linear with unit slope 
if the model is adequate. ' ' 
In 
view of the rather ad-hoc adjus tments made to censored residuals, 
the above methods would be valid only if the extent of censoring is not 
substant ial . Lancaster and Chesher (1985) have demonstrated, using 
artificially generated data , tha t this procedure of adjust ing the censored 
residuals has the potential of introducing noise which can lead to incorrrect 
inferences. The preferred approach is not to make any preliminary 
ad jus tments to the censored residuals but to make use of the censoring 
information to calculate the 
survivor function of the residuals at each 
uncensored e, using the product-limit or Kaplan-Meier est imator [ Kaplan and 
Meier (1958)]. The steps in this graphical test are as follows : 
"^KalbHeiBch and Pren t i ce (1980, p.43) has shown tha t this method is in fact a first order 
a p p r o x i m a t i o n to the me thod of p lo t t ing the log survivor funct ion against 
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Compute e using the MLE of q and 0. 
Reorder the e. 
Compute the product-limit estimate of S(e) at each uncensored e. 
iv. Plot log S(e) against e. 
Although visual inspection of the graphic plots can detect any glaring 
deficiencies of the estimated model, it is helpful to devise formal numerical 
tests of model specificaton. 
Lancaster and Chesher (1985) have proposed a test using the generalised 
residuals and has an Information Matrix test interpretation. 
We define 
? = e + c, 
where c = 1 if e is censored 
= 0 otherwise. 
If the probability of censoring Prob(c==l) = tt, then it can be shown 
that 
m = 1, 
yar(0 = l - r ( ^ ) . 
A consistent estimate of - is given by the proportion of censored 
observations in the sample. 
Earlier we saw that the likelihood function can be written as 
= 
N 
1 - c . 
1=1 
N 
i 
The log-likelihood 
N 
L = log i j = 
1 
Consider the proportional hazard model where / i(X)=exp;X^] contains a 
constant term exp(/?Q). We can write the hazard function as (again ignoring 
the individual subscript i for notational convenience) 
and the log-likelihood 
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N 
The score of 13^  is 
aL ^ TV 
— = ^ ( l - c ) - H[ti^) = 
° 1 1 
and 
= ^ - / / ( t j X ) = ^ - ( e - c ) . 
1 
5L 
At the MLE of q and /S, — = 0. Therefore, this implies that 
^ E ^ = 1 = 
1 
i.e. the sample mean of the generalised residuals is equal to one. 
1 1 yv " E ^ 
Also note that ^ , ^ = + c = + which is minus the 
dfi 
proportion of non-censored observations in the sample. 
The Information Matrix (IM) test of White (1982) for model 
misspecification is based on the Information Matrix Equivalence Theorem 
which states that if a model is correctly specified, the information matrix can 
be expressed in either Hessian form or outer product form. Significant 
difference between these two forms imply that the rnodel is misspecified. 
5L 
Therefore at the true estimate of E[——] + E\ ] = 0- And for a 
0 sample of size N, at the true value of 
1 5L „ 1 d^L 
Chesher (1984) shows that the IM test can be considered as a test of 
neglected heterogeneity causing random variations in the coefficient of jS .^ In 
1 aL i N ' o 
the particular case we are examining, -{ = - V (C-1) is the sample 
variance of the generalised residuals. Therefore, the application of the IM test 
of no unobserved heterogeneity involves a test of the equality of the sample 
variance of the residuals to the proportion of observations in the sample 
which are non-censored.^ 
^A different but related test of unobserved heterogeneity is given in Kiefer (1984) for the 
exponential duration model. 
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Chesher (1983) and Lancaster (1984) have demonstrated that the 
implementation of this IM test of the hypothesis of parameter constancy can 
also be effected through rather simple regression-based procedures. The 
procedure for testing for non-random variation in /J^  involve the regression of 
a column of N ones on a matrix comprising the individual elements of 
^ . aL ah 
j=l....k , , and { — } + . The sample size N multiplied by the 
uncentred R from this regression" is distributed asymptotically as a x ( l ) 
statist ic. For the general regression equation y = X/? + u , the uncentred R^ 
y'X/3 
is calculated as where the total sum of squares is defined as deviations 
y 'y 
from zero rather than from the mean of y . Most regression packages do not 
permit this to be calculated as a mat ter of routine. It can be easily shown 
tha t where the dependent variable y is a vector of ones, then y 'y = N and 
hence = y ' y = J 2 y , the cumulative sum of the predictions of the 
estimated least squares equation. We can readily see from the final expression 
tha t the calculated value of the test statistic is increasing in the sample size 
N. This is intuitively obvious since, the larger the sample size, the greater is 
the scope of having significant unobservable heterogeneity in the sample and 
hence the more likely is the test to be rejected. 
Therefore, for the proportional hazard Weibull duration model the 
testing of unobservable heterogeneity involve the following null and alternative 
hypotheses: 
H^: fi^ constant 
Hji random 
The test statistic •= = y ~ x(l) is the sum of the predictions from the 
regression of ones on the following right hand side regressors : 
dL 
5L 1 
= - ( l - c ) + ( l -e ) log t, 
da a 
If a loglogistic duration model is est imated, the regression components 
are 
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= {{1-c)-- k , dfi^ '' ' M ' J 
where the integrated hazard 
H(t) = \og\l + exp{X0)t% 
M = exp\H{t)\. 
5L 1 2(M-1) 
5L d^L (M-1) 
The test proposed here does not identify the source of misspecification 
and hence specific alternative models are not known. Rejection of the null 
hypothesis can arise from one or more of the following causes: (Lancaster 
(1985b)) 
i. presence of neglected heterogeneity with respect to 
ii. measurement error in the vector of covariates X, 
iii. measurement error in the duration variable. 
However, what the test does is that it highlights whether the estimated fixed 
effects duration model is satisfactory compared to a more complicated mixture 
or random effects model which allows for unobserved heterogeneity. The 
knowledge of this information is important since uncorrected heterogeneity can 
lead to biased predictions. 
3.7 Summary 
In this chapter we have presented some parametric survival models 
which can be used in estimation of unemployment duration models. We have 
emphasised the importance of performing diagnostic tests to detect any model 
misspecification. These methods will be applied in the next chapter using 
data from the Australian Longitudinal Survey. 
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APPENDIX C 
PROPORTIONAL HAZARD WEIBULL MIXTURES 
Assume that all unobserved heterogeneity are absorbed in the random 
variable v which has density function 6(v). Let be the survivor function 
conditional on v where 
= expl-fit'^v] 
In the following sections we derive the unconditional (with respect to v) 
survivor function 
/
oo 
dv - oc 
C . l W e i b u l l w i t h G a m m a Heterogenei ty 
We have 
A V exp\ — Xv\ 
"1-1 = 
Therefore the unconditional survivor function is 
> > fc it-1 I > 1 
, ^ A V exp —Xv\ 
5(0 = / expl-Mf'^.] —f '-dv h r[k) 
x'' r(k) 
+A) 
= A*^  (fit'^ + A)-* 
- >• -
The density function is obtained by differentiation as 
fit) = J , 
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T h e r e f o r e t h e h a z a r d funct ion is 
MO ( i + ^ r ' 
C.2 Weibull with Normal Heterogeneity 
T h e d e n s i t y f u n c t i o n of v is 
1 - { v - r ^ f 
d(v) ~ eip[ ] V ~ N(ri.a" 
T h e u n c o n d i t i o n a l survivor f u n c t i o n is 
, . a - 1 5(0 = I exp'-fit"'v,~—exp[ ^ ] dv 
exp\ ] dv 
= exp\ j / exp' ' dv 
2(7-
2, 
= exp. -rint + j. 
s ince t h e i n t e g r a n d of t h e last i n t e g r a l t e r m can be considered a s a n o r m a l 
p .d . f . wi th Tj rep laced by r j - a ' f i t ' ^ and t h e r e f o r e is equal to u n i t y . 
T h e u n c o n d i t i o n a l densi ty f u n c t i o n of t is 
2, .Qi2 
fit) = 
T h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g hazard f u n c t i o n is 
MO = M a t ' ^ ' M ' ^ V i ^ - ' ? ) 
C.3 Weibull with Lognormal Heterogeneity 
If t h e u n o b s e r v e d h e t e r o g e n e i t y c o m p o n e n t v h a s l o g n o r m a l d i s t r i b u t i o n , 
t h e n q = log v h a s n o r m a l d i s t r i b u t i o n , q ~ N(r/, a^). 
S i n c e S{t\v) = exp[-fit^v] 
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log S{t\v) = -tit'^explq] 
1 ^) ^  
^fit'^exp q] —exp[ ] dq 
= - f i t ezp:r;+— . dq 
Q ^ = -fit. exp'ri+Y\ 
- .5 ( f ) = ezp{ expjr, + y ] } 
The uncondit ional density function is 
f(t) = iiat"" ' exp[r; + y l e i p j -Mt^'eip!'? + y ] } 
and the hazard function is 
h[t) = tiat'^ exp\rf+—\. 
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APPENDIX D 
ADDITIVE WEIBULL-GAMMA MIXTURE 
T h e c o n d i t i o n a l a d d i t i v e W e i b u l l s u r v i v o r f u n c t i o n is 
w l i e r e v the u n o b s e r v e d h e t e r o g e n e i t y r a n d o m v a r i a b l e is a s s u m e d to a c t 
m u l t i p l i c a t i v e l y t h r o u g h /x(X). 
if v h a s G a m m a d i s t r i b u t i o n w h e r e 
A V expi-AV! 
fflz,} = ^ ^ t; > 0 
^ ' m 
T h e n the u n c o n d i t i o n a l s u r v i v o r f u n c t i o n is o b t a i n e d by i n t e g r a t i n g out v a s 
b e f o r e so t h a t 
r oo 
5 ( 0 = / expl-ii'' +Mtv] 
Jo 
dv 
fik) 
-—exp'.-t'"] / v'^-'exp.-vlut + A)' dv 
r(k) Jo 
• exp.-i 
= expl-t"^] A*^  (^lt + A)"*^ 
= exp-t i(l + —) 
T h e d e n s i t y f u n c t i o n is o b t a i n e d by d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n a s 
T h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g h a z a r d f u n c t i o n is 
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CHAPTER 4 
SIJRVrV AL ANALYSIS OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
4.1 Introduction 
T h e p rob l em of high you th u n e m p l o y m e n t is not a un ique phenomenon 
of t he Aus t r a l i an economy. In Br i t a in , for e x a m p l e , t he u n e m p l o y m e n t r a t e 
of young persons below the age of 18 yea r s of age has a lmos t doubled 
be tween 1976 and 1982 to a b o u t 23 .1% for males and 22.0% for 
females . Lynch (1985) . O E C D ( 1983)]. In A u s t r a l i a , t he u n e m p l o y m e n t r a t e 
of young persons below t w e n t y years of age increased f r o m 3.2% in 1966 to 
14.2% in 1976 and then soared f u r t h e r to 22.6% in 1983.[ABS(1984)] 
In t he early sevent ies , the d o m i n a n t view of t he growing u n e m p l o y m e n t 
p r o b l e m t ended to emphas ize t he d y n a m i c t u r n o v e r n a t u r e of 
u n e m p l o y m e n t . i S e e for example . Hall (1972) , M a r s t o n (1975) and Mor tensen 
(1977) . T h e length of spells of u n e m p l o y m e n t were t h o u g h t to be brief, 
a r i s ing mainly f r o m labour m a r k e t f r i c t ions , and did not impose a severe 
bu rden on those exper iencing t h e m . However , as the rise in u n e m p l o y m e n t 
con t inued u n a b a t e d , it became evident t h a t t he m a j o r p ropo r t i on of all 
u n e m p l o y m e n t was c o n c e n t r a t e d in persons wi th few long spells. See for 
example , t he s tud ies by Clark and S u m m e r s (1979), Hasan and deBroucker 
(1982) and in A u s t r a l i a , Brooks and Rob inson (1983). In Aus t r a l i a , the 
n u m b e r of l ong - t e rm unemployed (i.e. those wi th m o r e t h a n 26 weeks of 
u n e m p l o y m e n t ) has increased between five t o six t imes over t h e 1970s. A 
t i m e series m a c r o a n a l y s i s of th is p h e n o m e n o n by Tr ived i and Bui 
[forthcoming) has found evidence of s t rong assoc ia t ion be tween th i s increase 
in t r e n d of long- t e rm u n e m p l o y m e n t and t he i m p a c t of supply shocks and the 
r educ t ion in j o b ava i l ab i l i ty . T h e awarenes s of th is sh i f t ing concen t r a t i on of 
u n e m p l o y m e n t has also spur red research a t t h e micro level in to t he relat ive 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s of i n t e rpe r sona l he te rogene i ty a n d s t a t e or d u r a t i o n dependence 
or t h e t ime in u n e m p l o y m e n t , on f u r t h e r u n e m p l o y m e n t . F r o m the policy 
m a k e r ' s v i ewpo in t , such findings are i m p o r t a n t as they d e t e r m i n e t he correct 
choice of policy m e a s u r e s to remedy the p rob lem a t h a n d . Knowing w h a t 
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personal and labour market charac ter i s t ics have s ignif icant influence on the 
p robab i l i ty of finding jobs and leaving u n e m p l o y m e n t could enable the policy 
m a k e r to ident ify the more vulnerable persons in the labour m a r k e t and 
devise policies specifically directed t owards this t a rge ted group. For example , 
if employers tend to hire more freely f rom the unemployed pool, those who 
are recently unemployed ra the r t h a n those with longer unemploymen t record, 
the a p p r o p r i a t e policy to adop t may be to provide incentives which increase 
the compet i t iveness of the long- term unemployed in the labour marke t and 
reverse the process of h u m a n capi ta l de te r iora t ion . 
T h e abili ty to identify and dist inguish between the effects of 
he terogenei ty and s t a t e dependence depends on the avai labi l i ty of a weal th of 
suff iciently detai led informat ion which are normal ly not cap tured by ordinary 
surveys . For researchers in the US and Europe , the recourse has beeen to 
use longi tudinal d a t a sets which conta in comprehensive a r rays of d a t a on 
individual character is t ics and accumula t ion of l ifetime d a t a which make 
possible the direct analysis of unemploymen t spells. Such d a t a are beginning 
to be avai lable in Aus t ra l ia f rom the Aust ra l ian Longi tudinal Survey (ALS) 
conduc ted by the Bureau of Labour Research. 
In this chap te r , we will analyse the fac tors which de te rmine the 
u n e m p l o y m e n t experience of young people in Aus t ra l i a using the ALS d a t a . 
T h e method employed are similar to those used in the survival analysis of 
survival d a t a reviewed in the previous chap te r . Section 4.2 sets out a simple 
model of unemployed job search and examines the impl icat ions for the escape 
r a t e s f rom unemploymen t under var ious assumpt ions . In Section 4.3, we 
discuss the specification of the hazard funct ion to be e s t ima ted , and a 
descr ipt ion of the ALS d a t a used in the es t imat ion of the unemploymen t 
haza rd models is conta ined in Section 4.4. In Section 4.5, we present the 
resu l t s of es t imat ion and tes ts conducted and Section 4.G concludes. 
4.2 Model of Unemployed Job Search 
In this section we present the salient fea tures of a theore t ica l model of 
j o b search of an unemployed person. The behavioura l predic t ions of this 
model will provide a f ramework for the empirical model and by which we can 
f o r m u l a t e and discuss the results of es t imat ion . 
We assume t h a t an individual maximises his expected l ifetime uti l i ty 
which is equal to the discounted sum of each period ut i l i ty . Let the uti l i ty 
func t i on for each per iod, assumed linear, be denoted by U(y, l ) , where y is the 
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net income received each period and 1 is the amount of leisure hours per 
period and U ' > 0. For simplicity, we assume tha t the number of leisure 
hours consumed is fixed^ and hence U(y,l):=U(y). 
When unemployed the individual receives a constant rate of 
unemployment benefits of $B, non-wage income of $z per period and incurs 
search costs of $c at the s tar t of each period. Job offers arrive at random 
at a constant average probability of 7 per period independent of the search 
costs c. Each job offer carries a wage offer which has a known distribution 
function G(w) and the person who accepts the job offer faces the same wage 
in all future periods of employment. 
Let V'(w) denote the lifetime utility of a person who accepts a job offer 
with a wage rate w, V' > 0. Let V(t) be the maximum expected lifetime 
utility from search of an unemployed person who has been unemployed for t 
periods and who adopts an optimal job search policy in all periods after t . 
We can write V( t - l ) as, 
= [/(j/) + p^\l~G{w')\E\rP(W)\W> + (4.I) 
where p is the discount factor, w* the reservation wage and y = B+z-c. 
Differentiating (4.1) with respect to w* we have, 
- V-lw')] = 0. 
An interior solution exists if p~/g(w ) = 0. This implies, 
= (4.2) 
Therefore, given an interior solution, the optimised wage rate or 
reservation wage w is such that the return from accepting a job offer with 
wage w is equal to the expected return from remaining unemployed and 
searching for a least one more period. If we are dealing with an infinite 
t ime horizon problem, it is easy to see that V(t) = V( t - l ) = V(t-2) = = 
V. The reservation wage is therefore constant in each period. Rearranging 
the terms in (4.1), we can write, 
U(z/) + p'^\\^G{w')\E\xl>{W)\W> w*\ 
V = ; . (4.3) 
1 - p{l-^\l-G{w )!) 
^ T h e m o d e l spec i f ied h e r e is s imi la r t o t h a t used by B u r d e t t (1979) . In t h a t i n s t a n c e howeve r , 
a s in M o r t e n s e n (1977) , t h e le isure h o u r s a r e v a r i a b l e as t h e c h a n g e s in i n t e n s i t y of s ea r ch a c t i v i t y 
is one of t h e m a i n p o i n t s of i n t e r e s t . 
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Diffe ren t ia t ing with respect to y and c, we get 
dV I 
— = U ' j \ p{i ^ ] )]}] > 0. 
^ = -U'l l i _ p { i - ^ [ i _ G ( « ; ' ) ] } j < 0. 
^ , , sv d^ 
F r o m (4.2), we no te t h a t — > 0. This implies t h a t — < 0, i.e. 
dw 
an increase in the costs associated with j ob search will cause a fall in the 
rese rva t ion wage. 
Di f fe ren t ia t ing (4.3) with respect to p, 
dp 
\ i ^ p { i - r i - G { w 
du) 
This implies t h a t > 0. 
dp 
T o analyse the effect of changes in the job arr ival ra te , we note t h a t 
^ _ p\\-G{w*)\{E\i>{W)\W>w\{\~p)-U[y)] 
av . U(y) 
— > 0 if E\i>(W)\W>w ] > ^ i.e. if the expected value of the lifetime 
ut i l i ty f rom accept ing a j ob offer is grea ter t han the present value of uti l i ty 
f r o m the non-wage income received each period, a condit ion which is likely to 
be me t . Hence, we would expect t h a t 
* 
du) 
d-i 
The in tu i t ion under lying the signs of the der ivat ives above are qui te 
s imple. An increase in the non-wage income received dur ing unemploymen t 
or a fall in the direct cost of search, reduces the oppor tun i ty costs of 
con t inu ing in job search, thus making it a more acceptable form of ac t iv i ty 
t h a n before. The unemployed searcher will tend to be more choosey and 
raises his reservat ion wage. A rise in the discount fac to r p signifies a shif t 
in preference for f u t u r e income over present income. The unemployed worker 
is the re fore more ready to increase his reservat ion wage to forgo low cur ren t 
wage offers in preference for high offers expected in the fu tu re . Final ly, an 
increase in the r a t e of j o b arr ivals improves the chances of sampling a high 
wage offer for a given wage offer d i s t r ibu t ion . The unemployed searcher is 
t h u s more willing to wai t for higher wage and he does so by raising his 
rese rva t ion wage. 
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4.2.1 F in i te T ime Horizon 
Suppose t h a t tlie unemployed searcher expects his product ive life to be 
of finite length T. If the individual completes T periods of unemployment 
w i t h o u t a successful search, he w i thd raws or ret ires f rom from the labour 
force so t h a t 
Vrp = U ( y , L ) = = constant i = \ o o . 
where y is the cons tan t s t ream of non-wage income in re t i rement , and L is 
t he m a x i m u m leisure hours consumed per period. 
W i t h o u t loss of general i ty, we consider the case where there is no 
d iscount ing (/?=!). We can rewrite (1.1) as 
oo 
/ « i)(vo)g(w)dw 
w 
V { t - i ) - V ( t ) = - V ( t ) } . ( 4 . 4 ) 
oo 
J * g(w)d'w 
w 
Since i p ' { w ) > 0, it is easy to see t h a t 
oo 
/ » •lp{w)g[w)dw 
CO 
/ ' g{w)dw 
> i>(w ). 
Using (4.2), it mus t also be t rue t h a t , 
.oo 
/ » 1p(w)g(w)dw 
w 
- V(() > 0. 
oo 
/ • g(w)dw 
w 
It follows f rom ^(4.4) t h a t V ( t - l ) > V(t) and hence w ' ( t - l ) > w ' ( t ) for 
dw 
t = l , ,T or — < 0. The reservation wage of the individual is therefore 
ot 
fall ing over t ime in a finite t ime horizon model^ . The economic ra t ionale 
for th is result is intuit ively simple. When the individual ' s product ive life 
span is finite, he recognises t h a t oppor tuni t ies for be t te r wage offers and 
increased earnings are diminishing the longer he remains unemployed. 
Therefore , as t ime begins to run ou t , he becomes less fast idious abou t wage 
offers by sys temat ical ly lowering his reservat ion wage. 
T h i s fa l l ing r e s e r v a t i o n wage resu l t can a lso be de r ived in t h e in f in i t e t ime horiKon m o d e l w h e n 
t h e w a g e of fer d i s t r i b u t i o n is d e t e r i o r i a t i n g t h r o u g h t ime [ L i p p m a n a n d M c C a l l (1976)) or if cos t s 
of s e a r c h is i n c r e a s i n g t h r o u g h t ime . (Rice (1978)] 
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4.2.2 The Hazard Ra te f rom Unemployment 
We have assumed t h a t the probabi l i ty of a job offer arr iving a t any 
i n s t an t of t ime is cons t an t and equal to Therefore the ins tan taneous 
probabi l i ty of a person leaving unemploymen t is equal to the jo in t probabil i ty 
of sampl ing a j o b offer and the probabi l i ty t h a t the offered wage exceeds his 
reservat ion wage. T h a t is, the hazard ra te f rom unemployment for a person 
w h o has elapsed unemploymen t dura t ion of t periods is 
h{t) = ( 4 . 5 ) 
Posit ive dura t ion dependence is said to exist if the slope of the hazard 
func t ion is not zero everywhere and varies positively with the elapsed length 
of t ime in the cur ren t unemployment spell. In the infinite t ime horizon case, 
no dura t ion dependence exists since 
dh(t) . dw* 
dt "" ' di 
= 0. 
where the second line follows f rom the result of cons tan t reservat ion wage. 
However with the finite horizon model, 
dh[t] dw' dw 
- > 0 since — < 0 . 
I^ositive dura t ion dependence predict ions are therefore consistent with a model 
in which the individual perceives his work or search horizon as finite. 
4.2.3 Occurrence and Lagged Dura t ion Dependence 
Thus far , an implicit assumpt ion underlying the analysis is t h a t the 
hazard funct ions do not depend on the labour marke t history of the 
individual . Using the terminology of Heckman and Bor jas (1980), no 
occurrence dependence or lagged dura t ion dependence is said to exist. 
However, if the experience of a spell of unemployment affects the fu tu re 
occurrence of an employment event , i.e. th rough the subsequent probabi l i ty of 
remain ing in unemploymen t and the t ransi t ion to employment in the fu tu re , 
occurrence dependence is said to exist. The implicat ion of occurrence 
dependence is t h a t the hazard funct ion of an individual is non-s ta t ionary and 
var ies across unemploymen t spells. T h a t is, 
^ T h e effect of r e l ax ing th i s a s s u m p t i o n will be e x a m i n e d l a t e r in C h a p t e r 7. 
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w h e r e s and s ' a r e t h e n u m b e r of p r e v i o u s spells of u n e m p l o y m e n t . 
W e m a y d i s t i n g u i s h t h e fo l lowing t y p e s of occur rence d e p e n d e n c e as 
i. n e g a t i v e o c c u r r e n c e d e p e n d e n c e if h(t ) > h[t ), 
S S "I" 1 
ii. po s i t i ve occu r r ence d e p e n d e n c e if h [ t < 
If H{t)=f^h(x)dx is t h e i n t e g r a t e d h a z a r d f u n c t i o n , t hen t h e case of 
n e g a t i v e o c c u r r e n c e d e p e n d e n c e impl ies t h a t H(tJ > and hence 
r OO pco 
B u t if f ( t ) a n d F ( t ) a re respec t ive ly , t h e p robab i l i t y dens i ty and 
d i s t r i b u t i o n f u n c t i o n of T , t hen t h e expec t ed c o m p l e t e d d u r a t i o n of 
u n e m p l o y m e n t E(T) = f ^ tf{t)dt = \l-F(t)]di = f ^ exp(-H(t))dt. T h e r e f o r e 
t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of n e g a t i v e occur rence d e p e n d e n c e is t h a t t h e expec ted 
c o m p l e t e d u r a t i o n of u n e m p l o y m e n t of an i nd iv idua l increases w i t h t h e 
n u m b e r of spells in u n e m p l o y m e n t . T h e conver se ho lds for pos i t ive occur rence 
d e p e n d e n c e . A coro l la ry of t h i s resu l t is t h a t in t h e absence of occur rence 
d e p e n d e n c e , t h e expec ted c o m p l e t e d u r a t i o n s of u n e m p l o y m e n t a re equal 
ac ros s all spells . 
W e can i n c o r p o r a t e t h e occur rence d e p e n d e n c e ef fec ts in our j o b search 
a na ly s i s by a r g u i n g t h a t t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of secur ing a j o b offer d e p e n d s no t 
only on t h e j o i n t p r o b a b i l i t y of s a m p l i n g a j o b offer and t h e w a g e offer 
exceed ing t h e r e s e r v a t i o n w a g e , b u t a lso on t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of t h e employe r 
or f i r m a c c e p t i n g t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s a p p l i c a t i o n for t h e j o b . T h e f i r m ' s 
a c c c e p t a n c e p r o b a b i l i t y can be seen as d e p e n d e n t on t h e skills level of t h e 
a p p l i c a n t a n d his p r ev ious e m p l o y m e n t record ref lec ted by t h e n u m b e r of 
p r e v i o u s spel ls of u n e m p l o y m e n t . T h e r e f o r e , 
= (4 .6 ) 
w h e r e 0 is t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of t h e f i r m ' s a c c e p t a n c e of t h e j o b a p p l i c a t i o n , 
w i t h <Pj>0, q t h e skil ls level of t h e a p p l i c a n t a n d s t h e n u m b e r of 
p r e v i o u s u n e m p l o y m e n t spells . 
F i n a l l y , we say t h a t lagged d u r a t i o n d e p e n d e n c e ex is t s if t h e h a z a r d 
r a t e d e p e n d s a lso on t h e l eng th of t h e p r ev ious u n e m p l o y m e n t spells . T h e 
l e n g t h of t h e s e p r ev ious spel ls in u n e m p l o y m e n t m a y be r e g a r d e d by 
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e m p l o y e r s a s i nd i ca t i ve of t h e e x t e n t of d e t e r i o r a t i o n of t h e any previous ly 
a c q u i r e d skil ls of t h e i nd iv idua l and hence a f fec t t h e p r o b a b i l i t y <P. Hence we 
can w r i t e (4.6) as 
/i(t) = Z = 1,...S. (4.7) 
w h e r e t^ is t h e l eng th of t h e s" ' comple t ed spel! of u n e m p l o y m e n t . 
4 .2.4 M e t h o d s of T e s t i n g S t a t e D e p e n d e n c e 
T h e r e a re a t leas t t h r ee d i f f e ren t p r o c e d u r e s for t e s t i ng t h e t ypes of 
d e p e n d e n c e ou t l ined a b o v e . O n e m e t h o d which has been sugges ted [Heckman 
a n d B o r j a s (1980)] for t e s t i ng occur rence d e p e n d e n c e involve t e s t i ng t h e 
c o n d i t i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of exi t t imes f r o m u n e m p l o y m e n t us ing t h e a p p r o a c h 
f i r s t sugges t ed by B a t e s and N e y m a n (1952) . T h i s a p p r o a c h is based on t h e 
p r e m i s e t h a t t h e r e is no d u r a t i o n d e p e n d e n c e or lagged d u r a t i o n dependence 
a n d t h a t t h e c o v a r i a t e s a n d unobse rved h e t e r o g e n e i t y , if p r e s e n t , do no t va ry 
ac ros s spel ls for each ind iv idua l . T h e leng th of t i m e s p e n t in e m p l o y m e n t is 
t r e a t e d as a po in t e v e n t and under t h e null h y p o t h e s i s of no occur rence 
d e p e n d e n c e , t h e c o n d i t i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e exi t t i m e s to e m p l o y m e n t 
w i t h i n a given i n t e rva l of u n e m p l o y m e n t t i m e is a u n i f o r m d i s t r i b u t i o n . T h i s 
m e t h o d of t e s t i ng is no t pa r t i cu l a r ly i n f o r m a t i v e as t h e re jec t ion of t h e null 
h y p o t h e s i s is cons i s t en t w i t h a host of causes , o t h e r t h a n t h e presence of 
occu r r ence dependence . Because of t h e l imi ted power of t h i s t e s t p rocedure , 
we will no t a t t e m p t t o use it here . I n s t e a d , we shal l c o n c e n t r a t e on t w o 
o t h e r m a j o r a p p r o a c h e s n a m e l y , the use of regress ion t e s t s and t h e m a x i m u m 
l ikel ihood e s t i m a t i o n . 
T h e regress ion a p p r o a c h offers the a d v a n t a g e of be ing ab le to con t ro l 
for e f fec t s of cova r i ab l e s t h a t change be tween spel ls a n d to o b t a i n po in t 
e s t i m a t e s of p a r a m e t e r s used in t e s t i ng of occu r r ence , lagged d u r a t i o n a n d 
spel l -specif ic d u r a t i o n d e p e n d e n c e . 
C o n s i d e r t h e fo l lowing t e s t for occur rence d e p e n d e n c e . Let t^ be t h e 
c o m p l e t e d u r a t i o n of t h e s'*' spell of u n e m p l o y m e n t of an i nd iv idua l . Suppose 
t h a t 
I n t ^ = + (4.8) 
w h e r e E(£) = 0, E(£^) > 0 a n d X^ a re co v a r i ab l e s a s s u m e d i n v a r i a n t w i th in 
spel ls . 
T h e m o t i v a t i o n u n d e r l y i n g t e s t s of occu r r ence d e p e n d e n c e is t h a t u n d e r 
t h e null h y p o t h e s i s H^ of no occur rence d e p e n d e n c e a n d a l lowing for t h e 
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effects of changes of covariables across spells the expected value of successive 
u n e m p l o y m e n t dura t ion spells should be equal, i.e. 
E{lnt^) = 
This implies t l ia t 
E\ln t^ - In t^^^] = (X - X + X; /?^ - (4.9) 
if X is invar iant across spel ls . 
Hence tes t of the null hypothesis H^ can be conducted by test ing the 
least squares coefficient of X^ in (4.9). This definit ion of occurrence 
dependence which is based on a comparison of the expected means of the 
d i s t r ibu t ion of unemployment dura t ion is called 'mean occurence dependence ' 
by Heckman and Bor jas (1980). This test of mean occurrence dependence is 
robus t with respect to the assumed underlying d is t r ibut ion funct ion of 
unemploymen t dura t ion . Where all the covaria tes are invar ian t across spells, 
d i rect tes t ing of the equali ty of the mean dura t ions across successive spells 
can be performed. Tes t of lagged dura t ion dependence in the regression 
con tex t is accomplished by test ing for significance of coefficients of lagged 
unemploymen t dura t ion te rms on the r ight hand side of (4.9). 
The principal d i sadvantages of the regression method of test ing are 
twofold. Fi rs t ly , t ime dependent covar ia tes cannot be readily incorporated into 
the regression f ramework . Secondly, and more impor tan t ly in our context , 
regression analysis is performed with uncensored observat ions involving only 
those individuals with complete spells. For a d a t a set such as the ALS 
which has a relatively shor t reference period, the degree of bias result ing f rom 
the use of a t runca ted sample consisting only of complete spells can be 
especially crit ical. This well known bias associated with sample selection or 
t r u n c a t i o n arise because the condit ional expecta t ion of e in (4.8) is no longer 
equal to zero bu t in fact depends on X . [See for example , Madda l a (1983) 
and Heckman (1979) ]. The m a x i m u m likelihood approach is not prone to 
th is deficiency and is t hus preferred. 
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4.3 Specification of the Empirical Reduced Form Hazard Function 
W e can infer f r o m t h e p r e d i c t i o n s of t h e t heo re t i c a l j o b search model 
t h e likely a r g u m e n t s in t h e h a z a r d f u n c t i o n and t h e expec ted s igns of t h e 
e s t i m a t e d coef f ic ien ts . T h e a p p r o a c h we a r e a d o p t i n g he re is a r educed f o r m 
m e t h o d as opposed t o s t r u c t u r a l e s t i m a t i o n of t h e c o m p o n e n t s of t h e h a z a r d 
f u n c t i o n in (4.7) . T h e l a t t e r a p p r o a c h would involve t h e e s t i m a t i o n of t h e 
s t r u c t u r a l p a r a m e t e r s of t h e r e se rva t ion w a g e e q u a t i o n f r o m t h e j o b search 
m o d e l , a top ic wh ich we will i n v e s t i g a t e in t h e n e x t c h a p t e r . 
Us ing t h e r e l a t ion (4.7) and n o t i n g t h e ef fec ts of changes in t h e cos ts of 
s ea r ch , t h e d i s c o u n t f ac to r a n d t h e j o b a r r iva l r a t e on t h e r e se rva t ion wage 
de r ived ear l ier , we can p red ic t t h a t 
dh(t) 
> 0 , 
dc 
dh(t) 
dp 
> 0. 
T h e sign of is i n d e t e r m i n a t e as it d e p e n d s on t h e ba l ance of t h e direct 
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pos i t i ve effect of 7 on h ( t ) and t h e nega t i ve effect of increase in the 
r e s e r v a t i o n w a g e fol lowing t h e increase in 7. 
T h e d i s c o u n t f ac to r and t h e cos t s of sea rch m a y differ a m o n g t h e 
u n e m p l o y e d d e p e n d i n g on t h e pe rsona l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s such as age, sex, 
b i r t h p l a c e , e d u c a t i o n level, t r a i n i n g a n d househo ld s t r u c t u r e . A prion, we 
expec t t h a t i nd iv idua l s w i th h igher e d u c a t i o n a l qua l i f i ca t ions would face b e t t e r 
w a g e offers and h igher p robab i l i t y of a c c e p t a n c e by employers . T h e r e f o r e t h e 
s igns of t h e coef f ic ien ts of those ca tegor ica l e d u c a t i o n va r i ab les which ind ica t e 
h igher e d u c a t i o n received a re expec ted t o h a v e pos i t ive signs. P r e v i o u s 
e m p l o y m e n t expe r i ence m a y be used by emp loye r s t o guage t h e p r o d u c t i v i t y 
p o t e n t i a l of t h e employee . U n e m p l o y e d ind iv idua l s w h o have long prev ious 
e m p l o y m e n t r eco rds a re likely t o receive h igher r a t e of j o b offers a n d 
expe r i ence h igher a c c e p t a n c e p r o b a b i l i t y . T h e coeff ic ient of t h e j o b exper ience 
v a r i a b l e is t h e r e f o r e expec ted t o h a v e a pos i t ive sign t o i nd ica t e t h e h igher 
r a t e of exi t f r o m u n e m p l o y m e n t . Inc reas ing t h e level of w e a l t h or n o n - l a b o u r 
i n c o m e h a s a pos i t ive in fuence on t h e r e se rv a t i o n wage a n d hence is expec ted 
t o lower t h e h a z a r d r a t e . T h e A L S d a t a set does no t expl ic i t ly c a p t u r e t h e 
w e a l t h of each ind iv idua l . A s u i t a b l e p roxy for t h e level of a c c u m u l a t e d 
w e a l t h is t h e size of t h e p a s t f inanc ia l y e a r ' s income'*. T h e sign of t h e 
coef f ic ien t of t h i s va r i ab l e is likely to be nega t ive . 
'^This m a y not be an en t i r e ly s a t i s f a c t o r y m e a s u r e in some i n s t a n c e s s ince t h e pas t financial y e a r 
e x t e n d s i n to J u n e 1984 a n d hence o v e r l a p w i th t h e c u r r e n t u n e m p l o y m e n t expe r i ence of t h e 
i n d i v i d u a l . 
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Labour m a r k e t condi t ions of the region or locality in which the 
unemployed person is engaged in job search will affect the costs of search and 
the ra te of job ar r iva ls since a slack labour marke t is likely to increase 
search costs and lower the probabi l i ty of receiving j ob offers. Unfor tuna te ly , 
local unemploymen t ra tes are not cap tured in the ALS d a t a set but 
in format ion on the type of residential location is avai lable , i.e. whether it is a 
capi ta l city, ma jo r ci ty, count ry town or rural area . This is used in place of 
the unemploymen t r a t e to model the labour demand condit ions facing the 
individual . General ly , we would expect j ob oppor tun i t i es to be more 
favourab le in capi ta l cities and hence increasing the hazard ra te . However, a 
prion, we cannot be cer ta in of the sign of these variables. The complicat ing 
fac to r is t h a t , in general , search costs would tend to be lower in cities owing 
to the more extensive j ob oppor tuni t ies available. This results in a higher 
reservat ion wage for the individual which tends to reduce the hazard rate . 
Therefore the u l t ima t e signs of the coefficients of the location variables 
depend on the in terac t ion of these opposing factors . 
The effect of du ra t ion on the hazard is also not predictable . In the 
absence of dura t ion dependence in the job arr ival ra te and prejudices towards 
rec ru i tment of longer t e rm unemployed, the infinite horizon job search model 
predic ts a cons tan t haza rd . If the j ob arrival ra te and recru i tment policies are 
adversely dependent on unemployment dura t ion , a decreasing hazard can be 
expected. In the finite horizon model the net ou tcome concerning the 
direct ion of the hazard r a t e wi th dura t ion t ime hinges on the relative 
s t r eng ths of these effects and the positive dura t ion dependence effect of the 
declining reservat ion wage predicted by the model. 
The general reduced form of the hazard funct ion used in es t imat ion is 
where v is a scalar unobserved heterogeneity t e rm with d is t r ibut ion ©(v) and 
is assumed to be independent of and acts mult ipl icat ively on the X vector. 
In the case of the propor t ional hazard model, 
h{t\^,v) = /.(X)^(i),;. 
where = exp(X/9) and is the baseline hazard whose funct ional f rom 
is dependent on the choice of the pa ramet r i c d is t r ibut ion of T.^ 
^ T h e choice of t h e e x p o n e n t i a l f u n c t i o n is dec ided p r i m a r i l y by t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t h ( t ) m u s t 
be n o n - n e g a t i v e . O t h e r f u n c t i o n a l f o r m s of X which sa t i s fy th i s n o n - n e g a t i v i t y c o n d i t i o n s can also 
be u s e d . 
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4 . 4 T h e A u s t r a l i a n L o n g i t u d i n a l S u r v e y 
T h e A u s t r a l i a n L o n g i t u d i n a l Su rvey is an a n n u a l su rvey of young people 
a n d is des igned t o e x a m i n e t h e p a t t e r n of y o u t h l abou r force exper ience in 
A u s t r a l i a . T h i s s u r v e y , m a n a g e d by t h e B u r e a u of L a b o u r M a r k e t Resea rch 
( B L M R ) is i m p l e m e n t e d in severa l p h a s e s cover ing a t o t a l of some 14000 
p e r s o n s . 
T h e f i r s t p h a s e of t h e su rvey , c o m p l e t e d in l a t e 1984, is specif ical ly 
d i r e c t e d a t t h o s e w h o are long t e r m u n e m p l o y e d a n d is based on a s a m p l e of 
3000 se lec ted f r o m a p o p u l a t i o n of a b o u t 226.000 pe r sons reg is te red a s 
u n e m p l o y e d w i t h t h e C o m m o n w e a l t h E m p l o y m e n t Service ( C E S ) . T h e s a m p l e 
list is t a k e n f r o m a t o t a l of 63 C E S local off ices w i t h a b o u t 50 persons , aged 
15 t o 25 yea r s a n d reg i s te red as u n e m p l o y e d for a t least six m o n t h s a t t h e 
end of J une 1984. se lec ted f r o m each office. De ta i l s of t h e s a m p l i n g design 
a r e f o u n d in K r o n e n b e r g et. al. (1985) a n d M c R a e (1984) . T h e ind iv idua l s 
se lec ted were i n t e r v i e w e d in S e p t e m b e r a n d O c t o b e r 198-4 a n d t h e response 
r a t e of a b o u t 80% p r o d u c e d a f inal s a m p l e of 2403 cases. 
T h e s a m p l e was des igned in such a way t h a t all pe rsons in t h e 
p o p u l a t i o n wou ld h a v e t h e s a m e p r o b a b i l i t y of se lec t ion . However , because of 
c h a n g e s in t h e n u m b e r s of u n e m p l o y e d a t each C E S c e n t r e be tween t h e 
se lec t ion of t h e c e n t r e in M a r c h 1984 a n d t h e select ion of t h e u n e m p l o y e d 
s a m p l e f r o m each c e n t r e in J u n e 1984, w e i g h t s h a v e to be ca l cu la t ed to 
ref lect t h e a d j u s t m e n t s t o t h e unequa l p r o b a b i l i t i e s of se lec t ion . Al lowances 
a r e also i n c o r p o r a t e d in these we igh t s for p o t e n t i a l b ias due to non - r e sponse 
f r o m t h e se lec ted s a m p l e . F ina l ly t h e w e i g h t s a re a d j u s t e d so t h a t they a d d 
u p t o k n o w n p o p u l a t i o n t o t a l s f r o m t h e C E S . De ta i l s of t h e complex 
d e r i v a t i o n of t h e A L S w e i g h t s a re f o u n d in M c R a e et. al. (1985) . 
T h e b r e a k d o w n of t h e 2403 cases in t h e A L S s a m p l e in t e r m s of l a b o u r 
force s tatus® is s h o w n in T a b l e 4-1. 
T h e ana ly s i s we h a v e p l a n n e d requ i re s t h e d e r i v a t i o n of t h e n u m b e r a n d 
t h e l e n g t h of spel ls of u n e m p l o y m e n t a n d e m p l o y m e n t exper ienced by each 
i n d i v i d u a l d u r i n g t h e re ference per iod which s t r e t c h e s f r o m S e p t e m b e r 1983 to 
S e p t e m b e r or O c t o b e r 1984, d e p e n d i n g on t h e d a t e of t h e in te rv iew. T h e 
c a l c u l a t i o n of t h e n u m b e r of spells of u n e m p l o y m e n t is done us ing t h e 
v a r i a b l e J O B T O T which gives t h e n u m b e r of j o b s held d u r i n g t h e re ference 
®The c la s s i f i ca t ion of l a b o u r force s t a t u s is a r r i ved at t h r o u g h t h e e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e r e sponses 
to a set of q u e s t i o n s s imi la r to t h o s e used by t h e A u s t r a l i a n B u r e a u of S t a t i s t i c s in t h e i r 
h o u s e h o l d s u r v e y s . 
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Table 4-1: Breakdown of ALS sample by labour force 
Sta tus Total 1 Spell 2 Spells 3 Spells 
Employed 895 521 180 43 
Unemployed 1233 885 241 57 
Not-in-labour force 25 19 4 -
Discouraged 251 180 45 13 
Total 2403 1605 470 113 
period together with information on the labour force s tatus of the individual 
at both ends of the reference period. The length of each spell of 
unemployment is calculated using the job calendar da ta which give the start 
and end date(in week number) of all jobs held during the reference period. 
Multiple jobs holders identified by negative duration values for some spells of 
unemployment are exclude from the sample used in estimation. The number 
of multiple job holders totalled about 70. The distribution of the sample in 
terms of the number of unemployment spells, both complete and censored, is 
shown in Table 4-2. 
T a b l e 4-2: Distribution of ALS sample by Number of Unemployment Spells 
Number of spells 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 
Number of cases 86 1605 470 113 37 11 4 4 2 
The sample used in our analysis is restricted to only those who are 
either employed or unemployed at the interview date. Further reduction of 
the sample size is necessary due to non-response to questions on financial 
income of the income unit for the previous financial year, leaving a total 
sample size of 1164 for those with one unemployment spell (432 employed, 
732 unemployed), 365 with two spells (156 employed, 209 unemployed) and 
84 with three spells (35 employed, 49 unemployed). The characteristics of the 
respective samples are summarised in Table 4-3. 
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M o s t of t h e covar i ab les used in t h e e s t i m a t i o n of t h e h a z a r d a re 
c a t e g o r i c a l in n a t u r e . W h e r e c o v a r i a t e s vary over t h e spell of u n e m p l o y m e n t , 
it is necessa ry t o i n c o r p o r a t e such t i m e v a r i a t i o n s in e s t i m a t i o n . F l inn and 
H e c k m a n (1982) h a v e d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t f a i lu re t o cor rec t ly model t i m e 
v a r i a t i o n s can cause mis lead ing a n d bias resu l t s . In our case, because of t h e 
s h o r t re fe rence per iod of t h e A L S d a t a se t , we can jus t i f i ab ly a s s u m e t h a t 
e x o g e n e o u s v a r i a b l e s a re i n v a r i a n t over t h e per iod of ana lys i s . 
T h e A L S d a t a set does no t c o n t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n which ind ica t e w h e t h e r 
a person w a s in receipt of u n e m p l o y m e n t benef i t s d u r i n g prev ious 
u n e m p l o y m e n t spells . For t h o s e w h o were in receipt of benef i t s a t t h e 
i n t e rv i ew d a t e , t h e a m o u n t of u n e m p l o y m e n t bene f i t s received a lso c a n n o t be 
a s c e r t a i n e d f r o m t h e i n f o r m a t i o n ava i l ab le . T h i s deficiency in t h e d a t a does 
no t p e r m i t us t o p u r s u e i n v e s t i g a t i o n s in to a top ic which has a roused much 
i n t e r e s t overseas , name ly t h e i m p a c t of u n e m p l o y m e n t benef i t s on 
u n e m p l o y m e n t . [ H a m e r m e s h (1982) , A t k i n s o n et. al. (198-1) and 
N a r e n d r a n a t h a n et. al. (1985)] 
O u r ana lys i s is a lso conf ined to t h e i nves t i ga t i on of t r a n s i t i o n behav iou r 
b e t w e e n t h e u n e m p l o y m e n t and e m p l o y m e n t s t a t e s due to l i m i t a t i o n s of t h e 
d a t a se t . In view of t h e i m p o r t a n c e of h idden u n e m p l o y m e n t as we have 
seen in C h a p t e r 2, it would h a v e been i n t e r e s t i n g to ana lyse t h e d e t e r m i n a n t s 
of h a z a r d r a t e s f r o m u n e m p l o y m e n t t o ou t of t h e l abour force s t a t e . 
H o w e v e r , t h i s t a sk is no t feas ible w i th t h e c u r r e n t ALS d a t a se t . One reason 
is t h e r a t h e r smal l s a m p l e size of t hose in t h e n o n - l a b o u r force s t a t e . T h e 
p r inc ipa l d i f f i cu l ty , however , conce rns t h e f ac t t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e n o n - l a b o u r 
force s t a t u s of an ind iv idua l can be cor rec t ly d e t e r m i n e d a t t h e po in t of 
i n t e rv i ew , it is d i f f icul t t o a s c e r t a i n wi th a c c u r a c y , t h e po in t in t i m e when 
t h e t r a n s i t i o n t o t h e n o n - l a b o u r force s t a t e was m a d e . 
4 .5 E m p i r i c a l R e s u l t s 
4.5 .1 T e s t of M e a n Occu r r ence D e p e n d e n c e 
T e s t of m e a n occur rence d e p e n d e n c e w a s p e r f o r m e d us ing c o m p l e t e 
u n e m p l o y m e n t spells and a s s u m i n g t h a t c o v a r i a t e s a re i n v a r i a n t across spells . 
T h e t e s t s t a t i s t i c used to t e s t t h e h y p o t h e s i s of equa l i ty of t h e m e a n 
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Table 4-3: Summary of Characteristics of ALS Sample 
Characteristics 1 Spell 2 Spells 3 Spells 
Married(%) 9 9 7 
Female(%) 38 35 39 
Birthplace(%) 
Australia & Anglo-Saxon 82 91 97 
Asian 5 3 2 
Others 7 6 1 
Education(%) 
10 yrs & less 46 45 39 
11 to 12 yrs 31 35 42 
Diploma & Trade Cert. 16 14 13 
Tertiary 2 1 1 
Others 5 5 5 
Location(%) 
Capital Cities 51 54 55 
Other Cities 25 22 19 
Country Town 19 20 19 
Rural Village 5 4 7 
No Children(%) 98 98 98 
Living with Family(%) 76 73 69 
Unemployed at interview(%) 63 57 58 
Average Income (S) 4964 6297 6317 
Average Age (yrs) 20.1 19.9 19.6 
Average Work Experience(wks) 14.0 20.4 19.8 
Average Unemployment Duration 
Current Spell 58.9 13.7 8.8 
Previous Spells - 32.7 40.3 
Sample Size 1164 365 84 
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durat ions across spells is the paired t-test ." The results of the these tests 
reported in Table 4-4. suggests that for individuals who experienced three or 
less complete spells of unemployment, there is evidence of occurrrence 
dependence between the first and second spells. It must be pointed out that 
these tests are based on very strong assumptions concerning absence of lagged 
durat ion dependence and omission of censored observations. Tests using the 
maximum likelihood approach which can overcome these deficiencies are 
performed later in Section 4.5.3 
T a b l e 4-4: Test of the Equality of Mean Unemployment Duration 
No. of Spells No. of Cases Null Hypothesis T Statistic 5% 
2 250 U1 = U2 6.84 R 
3 66 U1 = U2 2.82 R 
U2 = U3 1.02 A 
4 21 U1 U2 1.93 A 
U2 = U3 0.96 A 
U3 = U4 0.54 A 
N o t e s : U. = Mean duration of the ith spell of unemployment 
R = Reject Null Hypothesis 
A = Accept Null Hypothesis 
4.5.2 Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
A Weibull model of the baseline hazard was first specified and the 
hazard function estimated® for a sample consisting of individuals with up to 
T h e tes t s t a t i s t i c is de f ined as t = , where D is t h e o b s e r v e d d i f f e r ence be tween t h e 
t w o ^ D ^ ^ 
m e a n s a n d S p is t h e s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n of the pa i r ed o b s e r v a t i o n s a n d N is t h e s a m p l e size. T h e 
s a m p l i n g d i s t r i b u t i o n of t , if t h e d i f f e rences are n o r m a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d wi th m e a n zero is S t u d e n t ' s t 
w i th N-1 degrees of f r e e d o m . 
^ In i t i a l l y , t h e m o r e f lexible genera l i sed g a m m a d i s t r i b u t i o n was used for t h e base l ine h a z a r d . 
H o w e v e r , p r o b l e m s a s soc i a t ed wi th c o n v e r g e n c e of t h e l ikel ihood were e n c o u n t e r e d d e s p i t e a d o p t i n g 
t h e r e p a r a m e t e r i z a t i o n of t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n a long t h e l ines sugges t ed by P r e n t i c e (1974) . R i d d e r a n d 
V e r b a k e l (1983) h a v e shown t h r o u g h M o n t e Ca r lo s t u d i e s t h e i m p o r t a n c e of a d o p t i n g a f lexible 
base l ine h a z a r d f u n c t i o n t o r e d u c e b iases in t h e e s t i m a t e d coef f i c ien t s . O n e a d v a n t a g e of using t h e 
s i m p l e r b u t r e l a t ive ly f lexible m o n o t o n e W e i b u l l h a z a r d he re is t h a t it is more a m e n a b l e to d i rec t 
t e s t i n g of h y p o t h e s e s c o n c e r n i n g l a b o u r m a r k e t t r a n s i t i o n b e h a v i o u r de r ived f r o m t h e j o b search 
m o d e l . 
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th ree spells of unemployment . The results® presented in Table 4-5 are based 
on weighted m a x i m u m likelihood es t imat ion using the weights provided for 
each observat ion in the ALS d a t a set. Unweighted es t imat ions were also 
performed bu t the results obtained did not differ substant ia l ly f rom the 
weighted es t imates here^*^. For the purposes of es t imat ion , the control group 
individual is an Austra l ian or Anglo-Saxon single male who lives in a capital 
city with his pa ren t s or relative and has 11 to 12 years of educat ion . [See 
Appendix F for the definit ion of the variables used ]. 
L'sing the combined sample , we find t h a t the hazard ra te decreases 
significant h with age and for those with less than 10 years of educat ion. 
Ter t i a ry degree holders have higher exit probabil i t ies as are those with 
previous employment experience. The dura t ion dependence pa rame te r , a , is 
insignificantly different f rom uni ty , suggesting t h a t no dura t ion dependence is 
present . Individuals with previous unemployment spells surprisingly tend to 
have a higher hazard rate f rom unemployment . This covar ia te indicat ing the 
length of previous unemployment spells is probably act ing as a dummy 
var iable picking up the effects of heterogeneity between individuals with one 
spell and those with mult iple spells. 
In order to remove the effects of spell-specific heterogeneity and to 
c rea te a more homogeneous sample for es t imat ion , the d a t a was s t ra t i f ied into 
th ree subsamples comprising individuals with respectively, one, two and three 
spells of unemployment . The m a x i m u m likelihood es t imates (MLE) for the 
subsamples in Table 4-5 indicate that effects of the covariates on the hazard 
funct ion is similar to those in the combined sample. Living in ma jo r cities 
compared to the country does not appear to make significant difference to the 
individual hazard rates . However those who live with family members or 
relat ives tend to be slower in moving out of unemployment . In the case of 
those with mult iple spells, Asian-born persons and those with higher past 
income tend to experience lower exit ra tes f rom unemployment . The la t te r 
finding is consistent with our a priori predict ions f rom the j ob search model 
^Al l t h e m a x i m u m l ikel ihood e s t i m a t e s r e p o r t e d were o b t a i n e d us ing t h e p a c k a g e p r o g r a m 
L I M D E P of G r e e n (1983) . A n a l y t i c a l f i rs t d e r i v a t i v e s were n e e d e d for t h e o p t i m i s a t i o n a l g o r i t h m 
a n d w e r e w r i t t e n in t h e use r - supp l i ed s u b r o u t i n e of t h e p a c k a g e . T h e o p t i m i s a t i o n m e t h o d used is 
t h e i t e r a t i v e q u a s i - N e w t o n m e t h o d of D a v i d o n - F l e t c h e r - P o w e l l ( D F P ) . [ S e e F l e t c h e r a n d Powel l 
(1963) a n d M a d d a l a (1977)]] 
" ^ U n l e s s o t h e r w i s e s t a t e d , all t h e m a x i m u m l ikel ihood e s t i m a t e s p r e s e n t e d in th i s c h a p t e r a re 
w e i g h t e d e s t i m a t e s . 
Tab le 4-5: Parameter Estimates for Weibull Model 
Variable All Spells 1 Spell 2 Spells 3 Spells 
Constant® -0.445 LIO 0.279(1.42 -2.071 2.31] 0.600 6.64] 
Log Past UnempI 0.284 0.03 - - 0 . 0 0 r 0 . 0 8 i 0.014 0.23] 
Married -0.060 0.15 -0.150 0.21 0.224(0.31] 1.016(0.90] 
Female -0.021 0.081 -0.040 0.10] 0.165[0.17; -1.337(0.54] 
Log Age -1.545 0.39 -1.900[0.50; -0.2210.93 -1.86812.44 
Location: 
Other Cities -0.153 0.10 -0.188;0.12; -0.015:0.21] -0.800:0.61] 
Country Town -0.049 0.11] -0.020 0.13] -0.183:0.231 0.302:0.63] 
Rural or Farm -0.065 0.18] -0.065:0.22 -0.155(0.44; 0.286 0.84] 
Birthplace: 
Asian 0.035 0.22] 0.164|0.24; -0.398:0.55] 1.510:1.19] 
Other Countries 0.250 0.17] 0.252;0.19] 0.382(0.35: 0.006(1.22] 
Education: 
10 years less -0.660 0.09; -0.658 0.12: -0.573 0.20; -0.269 0.62: 
Diploma i: Trade 0.151 0.11] 0.187 0.14] -0.022 0.24 1.949 0.56] 
Tertiary 0.9180.27] 1.033 0.29] 0.302 0.66 5.302 1.66] 
Others 0.154 0.15] 0.165 0.19] 0.448 0.37 -0.666 1.07; 
Have Children 0.066 0.25] 0.144 0.29] 0.472 0.89 -1.783 1.961 
Live with Family -0.172 0.09 -0.118 0.12 -0.184 0.18 -0.817(0.66] 
Log Past Income 0.001 0.03; 0.022 0.04 -0.172 0.13 -0.356(0.22] 
Log Job Experience 0.414 0.03] 0.370 0.03 0.409(0.08; 1.561(0.40: 
Q 1.064 0.05] 1.094 0.04: 1.040(0.07] 1.608(0.23] 
Log-likelihood -3387.65 -2560.51 -682.62 -119.13 
Sample size 1613 1164 365 84 
Notes : 
a. Standard errors are in brackets 
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concerning weal th effects. A g e " no longer appears to be a significant factor 
in lowering the hazard ra tes and in the three spells subsample , males and 
holders of d ip loma and t r ade qual if icat ions have significantly higher hazard 
ra tes . Evidence of positive dura t ion dependence is par t icular ly obvious in the 
la t te r sample where 
In all our es t imat ions , previous job experience appears to play a 
consistently s ignif icant role in influencing the hazard ra te . The job experience 
var iable t ha t we have used in the reported results refers to to ta l employment 
prior to the la test spell of unemployment . Therefore , because of the 
relatively short observat ion period of the d a t a set , it may be argued t ha t the 
significant re la t ionship t ha t is found may be spurious, i.e. a long previous 
employment record necessarily implies a short unemployment spell, and vice 
versa. This prop^osition would hold much weight if the d a t a set consist only 
of individuals who had only one previous employment spell and are all 
unemployed a t the point of interview. However, the d a t a set include a 
subs tan t ia l propor t ion of uncensored observat ions i.e. those who are employed 
a t the interview da te . The likelihood of a spur ious relat ionship is therefore 
not high, especially for those with mult iple spells.^^ 
4.5.3 Occurrence Dependence Test using M L E 
To test for occurrence dependence in the 2 and 3-spell samples, we 
apply the m a x i m u m likelihood method to es t imate the Weibull model for each 
of the earlier spells of unemployment experienced by the individual prior to 
his current spell. Appropr ia te a d j u s t m e n t s are made to variables representing 
length of previous unemployment and employment spells, which are varying 
across spells prior to each es t imat ion. The expected complete dura t ion of 
unemployment for every individual, condit ional on the vector of individual 
character is t ics and on the es t imated are then numerically computed for 
each of the spells of unemployment they have experienced. '^ Next , we test 
" W e e x p e r i m e n t e d wi th d i f f e ren t ways in which t h e age v a r i a b l e e n t e r s t h e mode l . T h e s e 
i nc ludes A G E - 1 4 a n d l o g ( A G E - 1 4 ) , ca tegor ica l age va r i ab l e s to d i f f e r e n t i a t e t h o s e below 18 a n d 
t h o s e a b o v e 21 y e a r s of age and finally th 
A G E ^ . T h e r e su l t s o b t a i n e d f rom these specil 
ve r s ion of t h e e s t i m a t e d mode l r e p o r t e d here . 
t e q u a d r a t i c fo rm of t h e age v a r i a b l e i.e. A G E a n d 
.  l t  t i   t  i f i ca t ions do not d i f fer s ign i f i can t ly f r o m t h e l o g ( A G E ) 
12 
I n s t e a d of us ing t h e t o t a l p a s t e m p l o y m e n t e x p e r i e n c e v a r i a b l e for t h e m u l t i p l e spells samples , 
we h a v e a lso used a v a r i a b l e which c a p t u r e s only t h e j o b d u r a t i o n in t h e m o s t r e c e n t 
e m p l o y m e n t spell . T h i s v a r i a b l e also t u r n s ou t t o be s i gn i f i can t , t h e r e f o r e c o n f i r m i n g t h e role of 
j o b e x p e r i e n c e in a f f e c t i n g t h e c u r r e n t h a z a r d r a t e . 
13 
T h e c o m p u t a t i o n s were d o n e us ing t h e N u m e r i c a l A l g o r i t h m G r o u p ( N A G ) s u b r o u t i n e 
D O I A M E . 
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for the equality of these computed unemployment durations across spells and 
the results are reported in Table 4-6. The test results indicate that the 
assumption of no occurrence dependence is untenable in both subsamples.^"* 
T a b l e 4-6: Test of Equality of Expected Complete Unemployment Duration 
No. of Spells No. of Cases Null Hypothesis T Statistic 5% Type 
2 365 U1 = L2 5.56 R + ve 
3 84 U1 = U2 10.15 R -ve 
U2 = U3 5.75 R -i-ve 
N o t e s : U. = 1 Expected complete duration of the ith spell of unemployment 
R . . Reject Null Hypothesis 
A = Accept Null Hypothesis 
4.5.4 Specification Tests 
The tests of specification of the estimated models that are implemented 
consist of the graphical plots of the generalised residuals of the maximum 
likelihood duration models and the Information Matrix test for unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
To assess the goodness of fit of the estimated Weibull models 
graphically, we follow the method reviewed in the previous chapter where the 
cumulative hazard residuals are first calculated and then the Kaplan-Meier 
procedure applied to estimate the survivor function of the residuals at each 
uncensored observation. Fig 4-1 shows the graphs of minus the log survivor 
function of the estimated integrated or cumulative hazard H(t) plotted against 
H(t) itself. If the model is correctly specified, the scatter plots should cluster 
tightly around the unit slope line. From a casual inspection of the plot 
however, the inadequacies of the one-spell Weibull model is particularly 
evident in the departure of the scatter plots from the unit sloped line. The 
plots of the 2-spell model similarly do not appear to cluster around the unit-
sloped line sufficiently well. 
^'^The t es t t r e a t s t h e e s t i m a t e d d u r a t i o n s as i n d e p e n d e n t o b s e r v a t i o n s . T h i s p r o c e d u r e would be 
va l id in la rge s a m p l e s u n d e r t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e mode l is co r rec t ly spec i f i ed . 
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Numerical calculations presented in Table 4-7 show that the mean of e, 
where i = H(t) + c, where c = l if censored and 0, otherwise, is close to 
unity in all the three subsamples. Comparison of the sample variance of e 
with the sample proport ion of non-censored observations, which forms the 
basis of the IM test , indicate tha t the two terms are not equal. In the case 
of the one-spell and two-spell models, the sample variance of e appear to be 
overdispersed while underdispersion of this sample variance is found in the 3-
spell model. 
T a b l e 4-7: Test of Unobserved Heterogeneity - Weibull Model 
All Spells 1 Spell 2 Spell 3 Spells 
Mean of I 1.0155 1.0220 1.0002 1.0047 
Propor t ion of sample 
Non-censored 0.3862 0.3711 0.4274 0.4167 
Sample \ ' a r iance of 
Residuals 0.4346 0.4235 0.4575 0.3844 
IM test of parameter 
constancy (x^( l ) ) 40.00 8.80 6.44 
N o t e s : 
I A' a. This equals 
b. This equals (e^.-l)". 
The IM test for unobserved heterogeneity can be interpreted as a test of 
parameter constancy of the constant te rm (Chesher (1984)]. The 
regression based approach as we have seen in the previous chapter , involve 
dL ^ a^L 
the regression of a column vector of ones on the term (——)'+ and the 
individual components of the scores of all parameters in the W eiDull model. 
The sum of the predictions from this regression is distr ibuted as a x* s ta t is t ic 
and is reported in the last row of Table 4-7. The null hypothesis of 
pa ramete r constancy is is clearly rejected for the one and 2-spell simple 
Weibull model, thus corroborat ing the evidence of possible model inadequacy 
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d e d u c e d ear l ie r f r o m t h e visual inspec t ion of t h e genera l i sed res idua ls plots.^^ 
T h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g va lue of t h e IM tes t s t a t i s t i c for t h e 3-spell Weibul l model 
does no t cause a re jec t ion of the null h y p o t h e s i s a t t h e 1% level ( x ^ ( ] ) = 6 . 6 3 
a t 1%). T h i s sugges t t h a t t h e e x t e n t of unobse rved or neglected 
h e t e r o g e n e i t y in t h i s p a r t i c u l a r smal le r s u b s a m p l e is no t as ser ious . 
Given t h a t t h e rnisspecif ica t ion t e s t s sugges t s t h e p resence of unobse rved 
h e t e r o g e n e i t y , t h e task c o n f r o n t i n g t h e a n a l y s t is t o d e t e r m i n e t h e f o r m of 
t h e u n d e r l y i n g d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e h e t e r o g e n e i t y in f luence . W e a d o p t t h e 
p a r a m e t r i c a p p r o a c h by speci fy ing a G a m m a d i s t r i b u t i o n for t h e sca la r 
l i e te rogenei ty t e r m v, w h e r e the dens i ty f u n c t i o n of v has t h e f o r m 
e { v ) = 
sk A: 1 - A t 
X V e 
m 
w h e r e r ( k ) - ^ - z ' " ' ' e ' ^ d z . 
D e p e n d i n g on t h e va lue of k, t h e s h a p e of t h e dens i ty f u n c t i o n of v can 
a s s u m e a va r i e ty of f o r m s . M a x i m u m l ikel ihood e s t i m a t e s of a , A and k 
a re o b t a i n e d by us ing in the l ikelihood f u n c t i o n t h e h a z a r d a n d su rv ivor 
f u n c t i o n c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e m i x t u r e of a Weibu l l d i s t r i b u t i o n of T and a 
G a m m a mix ing d i s t r i b u t i o n of v.(See e q u a t i o n s (3.2) a n d (3.3) of t h e p rev ious 
c h a p t e r . ) T h e p a r t i a l de r iva t i ve s of t h e log-l ikelihood f u n c t i o n are given in 
A p p e n d i x E, and m a x i m u m likelihood e s t i m a t e s a re p re sen ted in T a b l e 4-8. 
Only resu l t s for t h e one and two-spel l s a m p l e a re r e p o r t e d as convergence 
p r o b l e m s were e n c o u n t e r e d wi th t h e three-spel l s a m p l e possibly due to 
iden t i f i ca t ion p r o b l e m s as a consequence of t h e smal l s a m p l e size. In t h e one 
and two-spel l mode ls , t h e M L E of k w a s found to be respec t ive ly , 0 .272 a n d 
0 .248, i nd i ca t i ng a m o n o t o n e decreas ing p .d . f . for v. T h e s t a n d a r d e r ro r s of 
A were very large sugges t ing possible iden t i f i ca t ion p r o b l e m s due to 
o v e r p a r a r n e t e r i s a t i o n of t h e likelihood f u n c t i o n . W h e n t h e va lue of A w a s 
held fixed a t va r ious va lues r ang ing f r o m 1.0 to 10.0 t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g 
m a x i m i s e d log-l ikel ihood f u n c t i o n was found t o c h a n g e only s l igh t ly . 
T h e r e is a need t o m a i n t a i n p a r s i m o n y in t h e spec i f i ca t ion of t h e 
l ikel ihood f u n c t i o n . T o achieve th i s , we impose t h e r e s t r i c t i on t h a t t h e 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of v h a s u n i t m e a n (A=^k) a n d m o v e to a o n e - p a r a m e t e r G a m m a 
' ^ I t is c o m m o n in ana lys i s of th i s n a t u r e t h a t ou t l i e r s can d ra s t i ca l ly a f fec t t h e e s t i m a t e s of t h e 
mo d e l s . R e p e a t e d exerc ises were car r ied out to sift ou t t h e in f luence of s u s p e c t e d ou t l i e r s by 
r e m o v i n g f rom t h e s a m p l e t h o s e cases which has e x t r e m e va lues of d u r a t i o n a n d f inanc ia l i n c o m e 
a n d a lso t h o s e c o r r e s p o n d i n g to o u t l y i n g p o i n t s in t h e genera l i sed r e s idua l s p lo t s . R e s t i m a t i o n of 
t h e mode l s howeve r , did not p r o d u c e resu l t s s ign i f i can t ly d i f f e r en t f rom t h o s e r e p o r t e d here . 
T a b l e 4-8: Pa ramete r Es t imates of Weibul l -Gamma Mixture Model 
\ ' a r iab le 1 Spell 2 Spells 
Cons tan t^ 0.2-44;2.74; 6.712i4.84] 
Log Past Unempl - O.OOliO.18] 
Married -0.212 0.41 -0.161 0.75] 
Female 0.235 0.20 0.26810.36 
Log Age -1.92910.95] -1.92411.84] 
Locat ion: 
Other Cities 0.024 0.22 -0.276 0.46] 
Country Town 0.05l[0.27i -0.316l0.48] 
Rural or Fa rm -0.295:0.48] 0.558i0.87] 
Birthplace: 
Asian 0.439 0.42! -0.611 iO.97] 
Other Countr ies -0.129;0.42] 1.078[0.73] 
Educat ion: 
10 years less -1.002:0.24] -1.559 0.41] 
Diploma Trade 0.119 0.31j -0.425!0.54] 
Tert iary 1.116 0.72] 1.125 1.67] 
Others 0.097;0.46j 0.693:0.93: 
Have Children 0.104!0.60] 1.41i;i .58] 
Live with Family -0.130 0.21] -0.84810.41] 
Log Past Income 0.123,0.06] -0.378,0.22] 
Log Job Experience 0.699:0.08] 0.729:0.17] 
Q 2.032,0.17] 1.926:0.36] 
k^ 0.248i0.05] 0.272!0.09] 
A 7.660 4.630 
Log-likelihood -2534.19 -675.43 
Sample size 1164 365 
N o t e s : 
a. S tandard errors are in brackets. 
b. k and A are the parameters of the G a m m a heterogeneity 
distr ibution which has mean k/A and variance k/A^. 
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distribution for v, where variance of v, var(v) = (T^= ]/A. The estimates of this 
Weibul l duration model with unit G a m m a distributed unobserved 
heterogeneity (henceforth referred to as the Burr duration model) are shown 
in Table 4-9. Likelihood ratio tests of the restriction A = k clearly do not 
reject the null hypothesis. The estimated variance of the heterogeneiy 
distribution a ' is significant in the one and two-sf>ell models confirming the 
earlier tests which indicate the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in the 
samples. From the estimated values of we can derive the corresponding 
values of k since k —A = v l/V^. The values of k obtained in this fashion are 
almost identical to those estimated earlier in the model with the two-
paraniet(>r ( Jamma heterogeneity distribution. The scatter plots of the 
generalised residuals for the Burr models shown in Figure 4-2 show 
improvements over those of the Weibull models. 
The effect of correcting for unobserved heterogeneity on the estimate of 
the duration dependence parameter, a is remarkable. In both instances, the 
value of a is almost doubled, indicating unmistakably the presence of positive 
duration dependence. Except for the age, education and job experience 
variables, most of the coefficients of the covariables remain insignificant. In 
majority of the cases, it appears that allowing for unobserved heterogeneity 
has the effect of increasing the magnitude of the estimated coefficients. 
The value of is insignificantly different from zero for the 3-spell thus 
val idating the results of the IM test which indicated insignificant 
heterogeneity in the simple Weibull model. The estimates of the parameters 
of the 3-spell Burr model are almost identical in magnitude to those of the 
Weibull model. 
Further restrictions on the specification of the likelihood function is 
achieved by assuming A = k = l . This in effect assumes a unit Exponential 
distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity variable and generates a 
loglogistics mixture distribution for T. The estimated loglogistic models are 
shown in Table 4-10. Tests of the restriction A = k = l (or using the 
likelihood ratio test is rejected for the one-spell model but not for the two-
spell model (at the 1% level). The effect of the covariates on the hazard are 
quite similar to the Burr model, and in both instances the estimate of Q is 
reduced but still showing significant positive duration dependence'® . We also 
' ^ T h e reduction in a is understandable since a unit G a m m a distr ibution has greater mass at 
lower values of v when compared to the unit exponential distr ibut ion. The imposit ion of the 
latter distr ibut ion means that a greater proportion of the populat ion are assumed to have higher 
values of v which, given the observed aggregate hazard rate, would imply lower values of the 
ind iv idua l hazard rate and hence a . 
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Tab le 4-9: Parameter Estimates of Burr Models 
Variable 1 Spell 2 Spells 3 Spells 
Constant^ -3.203i2.76 3.857[4.81] 0.700:5.91; 
Log Past Unempl - -0.002;0.18] 0.01410.29] 
Married -0.210!0.41j -0.165:0.75] 1.020:1.35: 
Female 0.233:0.20] 0.26810.36] -1.333[0.57] 
Log Age -1.92710.95] -1.915;i.83i -1.90012.18] 
Location: 
Other Cities 0.024:0.22] -0.276i0.46] -0.791:0.79] 
Country Town 0.050i0.27] -0.317;0.48] 0.30110.71] 
Rural or Farm -0.30110.48] 0.552(0.87] 0.281 ;0.86] 
Birthplace: 
Asian 0.459 0.42: -0.600;0.97] -1.500(1.59] 
Other Countries -0.133:0.42] 1.08310.73] 0.010(1.22] 
Education: 
10 years & less -1.005^0.24] -1.55510.41] -0.273[0.57] 
Diploma ^ Trade 0.115 0.31] -0.423;0.54] 1.950(0.82] 
Tertiary 1.108 0.72] 1.12511.66] 5.299(1.58] 
Others 0.085:0.46] 0.693:0.93] -0.650[0.89] 
Have Children 0.093 0.60; 1.449[1.58] -1.770:2.19] 
Live with Family -0.127l0.21; -0.850i0.4lj -0.819:0.56] 
Log Past Income 0.122;0.06] -0.378i0.22j -0.355[0.24] 
Log Job Experience 0.701 [0.08] 0.72910.17; 1.559(0.50] 
Q 2.038:0.17] 1.926!0.36j 1.606(0.48] 
2 
a 4.058;0.75] 3.671:1.24: 0.5x10-® 
Log-likelihood -2534.20 -675.43 -119.13 
Sample size 1164 365 84 
LR Test'' 0.02 0.06 -
Notes : 
a. Standard errors are in brackets. 
b. Likelihood ratio test of restriction A: =k. 
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Figure 4-2: Residual Plots of Burr Models 
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conducted a test for r andom var ia t ions in the the cons tan t t e rm of the 2-
spell loglogistic model using the IM test described above. The IM test 
s t a t i s i t c has a value of 16.1, therefore rejecting the hypothesis of pa rame te r 
constancy of the cons tan t t e rm. It appears , therefore, t h a t the assumpt ion of 
uni t exponent ial d is t r ibut ion for unobserved heterogeneity is also un tenab le in 
th is instance. 
The expected complete unemployment dura t ions based on the individual 
hazard rates are computed and shown in Table 4-11. The expected length of 
a complete spell of unemployment falls as the number of spells of 
unemployment increases. This finding is consistent with the observat ion by 
Akerlof and Main (1980) for the U.S. However, one difference is t ha t in our 
case the to ta l unemployment experience of a person with mul t ip le spells is on 
average less than t h a t of a single-spell person. 
The effect of correcting for unobserved heterogeneity on the expected 
dura t ion is clearly evident too. When unobserved heterogeneity is ignored, the 
simfile Weibull model predicts an average complete dura t ion of abou t 67 
weeks, more than three t imes of tha t when unit G a m m a heterogeneity is 
assumed. 
4.5.5 Robustness of Posit ive Durat ion Finding 
The findings of our analysis is surpris ing in respect of the magn i tude of 
the es t imate of the dura t ion dependence pa ramete r a . Most o ther s tudies on 
this subject for example. Lancaster (1979), Lancaster and Nickell (1980) and 
Lynch (1985), have obta ined results which suppor t the hypothesis of negat ive 
dura t ion dependence. Na rendrana than et. al. (1985) on the other hand have 
obtained values of a similiar in magni tude to those of our s tudy but have 
dismissed the credibility of their results. 
It may perhaps be contended t ha t the size of a can be sensitive to the 
choice of the specification of the likelihood funct ion. Recall t h a t in the last 
chap te r we saw t h a t a possible construct ion of the likelihood is to condit ion 
it on individuals who are unemployed at a par t icular point in t ime and on 
their dura t ion of unemployment at t ha t point i.e. 
NE + NU ^ n n — ^^ l - F ( ( . ; X ) ^^ l-F(t .\X ) 
where h is the t ime interval between the interview da t e and the d a t e of 
selection into the sample , 
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Tab le 4-10: Parameter Estimates of Loglogistic Model 
Variable I Spell 2 Spells 
Constant'' - 0 . 9 0 2 i L 7 4 ] - 1 . 3 1 4 1 2 . 9 5 ] 
Log Past Unempl - - 0 . 0 2 9 1 0 . 1 1 ] 
Married - 0 . ] 9 2 ; 0 . 2 5 j 0 . 1 6 7 [ 0 . 4 4 ] 
Female 0 . 0 2 5 i 0 . 1 2 ] 0 . 1 7 8 1 0 . 2 3 ] 
Log Age - 1 . 8 3 2 i 0 . 6 l ] - 0 . 2 9 3 ; i . l 0 ] 
Location: 
Other Cities - 0 . 1 5 3 ! 0 . 1 4 - 0 . 0 5 9 ^ 0 . 2 9 1 
Country Town 0 . 0 2 5 i 0 . 1 7 ] - 0 . 1 5 5 1 0 . 3 0 
Rural or Farm - 0 . 1 0 3 1 0 . 2 9 ] 0 . 1 3 9 | 0 . 5 0 ] 
Birthplace: 
Asian 0 . 1 4 4 | 0 . 2 9 j - 0 . 5 1 0 i 0 . 6 7 ] 
Other Countries 0 . 1 4 2 1 0 . 2 7 ] 0 . 6 1 9 [ 0 . 4 4 ] 
Education: 
10 years & less - 0 . 7 7 5 [ 0 . 1 4 l - 0 . 8 6 0 [ 0 . 2 5 ] 
Diploma & Trade 0 . 2 0 4 [ 0 . 1 9 ] - 0 . 1 6 0 1 0 . 3 4 ] 
Tertiary 1 . 0 8 2 1 0 . 4 6 ] 0 . 4 1 4 [ 0 . 8 4 ] 
Others 0 . 1 9 3 1 0 . 2 7 ] 0 . 5 5 3 ( 0 . 4 8 ] 
Have Children 0 . 1 7 9 0 . 3 7 ] 0 . 5 9 2 [ 1 . 1 3 ] 
Live with Family - 0 . 1 0 1 0 . 1 4 ] - 0 . 3 4 9 0 . 2 4 ] 
Log I'ast Income 0 . 0 4 9 | 0 . 0 4 j - 0 . 2 6 4 i 0 . 1 3 j 
Log Job Experience 0 . 4 5 0 ; 0 . 0 4 i 0 . 5 1 2 | 0 . 1 0 ] 
a 1 . 3 4 8 | 0 . 0 6 ] 1 . 2 8 1 | 0 . 3 6 ] 
Log-likelihood - 2 5 4 6 . 3 4 - 6 7 8 . 5 4 
LR Test^ 2 4 . 2 8 6 . 2 0 2 
Sample size 1 1 6 4 3 6 5 
Notes : 
a. In brackets are standard errors. 
b. Likelihood ratio test of restriction <7^=1. 
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T a b l e 4-11: Expected Duration of U nemployment of Individual (Weeks) 
Model 1 SpelP 2 Spells 3 Spells 
Weibul l 
Average'' 67.4 24.1 12.6 
Typ icar 47.5 17.7 7.2 
Burr 
Average 21.8 8.2 
Typical 17.7 4.2 
Loglogistic 
Average 42.6 15.7 
Typical 31.6 10.1 
N o t e s : 
a. Calculations are performed numerically using the NILE of the 
parameters of the models and the Numerical Algori thm Group 
(NAG) subroutine D O I A M E . 
b. Average here refers to calculations based on the average values of 
the covariables of the sample. 
c. The typical person is a 20 year old single Australian-born male 
residing in a capital city, have no children, live with his 
family or relatives and has 11-12 years of education. His income 
and past employment experience are set at the average values 
of the sample. 
s is the length of time between the selection date and the point when 
the individual leaves unemployment, 
t is the duration of unemployment at the t ime of selection. 
To check this out, we use this likelihood to reestimate the Weibul l and 
Burr models using a reduced one-spell sample 972 cases. The estimate of a 
for the Weibull model was 0.796, suggesting negative duration dependence. 
However, the IM test indicated significant random parameter variation in the 
constant term. The Burr model when estimated produced a significant 
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e s t ima te of the heterogeneity variance and a value of Q = 2.537. Therefore , 
regardless of the the form of the specification of the likelihood func t ion , the 
evidence points to the existence of positive dura t ion dependence. 
To a certain ex ten t , it may be argued t ha t the es t imated value of a 
may in fact be downward biased. We have included in our sample for 
es t imat ion those individuals whose unemployment spells overlapped with the 
s tar t of the reference period of the survey. This may int roduce a negat ive 
bias since the inclusion of such individuals causes an oversampling of people 
wi th long spells. To test this hypothesis , we restr icted the one-spell sample 
to include only those whose spell began within the reference period and 
rees t imated the Weibull dura t ion model. With the reduced sample size of 
862, the es t imate of a = 1 . 6 9 6 proving the existence of s t ronger positive 
dura t ion dependence effect. 
Finally, the na tu re of the ALS sample give sufficient reasons to believe 
t h a t the extent of positive dura t ion dependence is not overes t imated . The 
ALS sample, a f ter all, is not a representa t ive sample of all the unemployed 
you ths but in fact intent ional ly oversamples those who are long-term 
unemployed. Al though the misrepor t ing of labour force s t a tu s has resulted in 
the inclusion of about 25% who were actually employed at the selection date , 
the outcome is still a sample where major i ty of individuals possess 
character is t ics , measurable or inherent , which cause lower escape ra tes f rom 
unemployment . 
4.5.6 Policy Implicat ions of Heterogeneity Correction 
The shape of the aggregate hazard funct ion of the es t imated models are 
depicted in Figure 4-3. We have also t raced the es t imated hazard funct ion of 
the accelerated fai lure t ime lognormal models. In both the 1-spell and 2-
spells cases, the hazard func t ions are quite similar to those of the loglogistic 
models. It is interest ing to note t h a t while the experience of an individual is 
t h a t of increasing probabi l i ty of escape f rom unemployment with du ra t ion , the 
aggregate hazards of the mix tu re models show the t ime pa th of the hazard 
first increasing and then falling with dura t ion . This can be seen as the 
ou tcome of the 'weeding o u t ' effect (Lancaster (1979)) where individuals with 
high values of v, due to some unmeasured character is t ics will leave the 
unemployment pool earlier, leaving behind those with lower v values. The 
initial surge of exits is thus followed by a period of relat ive decline in the 
average hazard . 
F i g u r e 4 - 3 : A g g r e g a t e Hazard F u n c t i o n s 
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The marked difference between t}ie behaviour of ihc individual hazard 
and the aggregate hazard highlights the potential pitfalls of using average 
unemployment leaving probabilities of a group of individuals to make 
inferences about individual unemployment behaviour, when the aggregate 
hazard has in fact been generated as the result of interactions with some 
unobserved heterogeneity component. This underscores the importance of 
diagnostic test ing of the est imated models to detect random variat ions in the 
es t imated parameters . An investigator who is unaware of the presence of 
unobserved heterogeneity when faced with the choice of the Weibull or 
loglogistic model for example, may choose the la t ter on the basis of some 
goodness-of-fit criteria and conclude tha t hazard rates tend to first increase 
and then decrease with unemployment dura t ion. But the loglogistic model as 
we already know, can be decomposed into model where the individual hazard 
is of the monotonic Weibull type and where individuals in the sample possess 
unobservable heterogeneity which has unit exponential distr ibution. The 
implications of this for the policy maker is t ha t it is not the length of 
dura t ion unemployment tha t is the cause of the decline in the probability of 
leaving unemployment . Instead, it is the presence of some unobserved or 
unmeasurable characterisi tcs of the individual t h a t causes the inverse 
relat ionship between the hazard rate and durat ion of unemployment to be 
observed on average. 
4 . 6 C o n c l u s i o n 
In this chapter , we have examined the unemployment experience of 
youths in the Austral ian labour market using the da t a f rom the first phase of 
the Austral ian Longitudinal Survey. Tests conducted have indicated presence 
of occurrence dependence in unemployemnt . Although the composition of the 
d a t a set is biased heavily towards those with long unemployment spells and 
thus making it more likely to unear th evidence of negative durat ion 
dependence, the findings of our analysis indicate otherwise. These findings of 
positive durat ion dependence go against the grain of popularly held views 
t h a t negative durat ion dependence is prevalent in the labour market . Our 
results suggest t ha t the experience of the typical unemployed youth in 
Aust ra l ia is one of increasing probability of escape f rom unemployment as 
dura t ion increases. Spells of unemployment are short ra ther than prolonged 
and job experience plays an impor tan t role in determining fu ture probabili ty 
of unemployment . We have shown tha t the es t imates obtained are robust 
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and given the inherent bias in tlie cons t ruc t ion of the ALS sample, the 
e s t ima tes f rom a more represen ta t ive sample are expected to indicate even 
s t ronger posit ive dura t ion effects. 
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APPENDIX E 
PARTIAL DERIVATIVES OF LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION 
E . l W e i b u l l w i t h G a m m a Heterogene i ty 
The hazard function and survivor are, respectively, 
h(t] = + 
S(t) = ( 1 + 
A" ' A 
a 
A 
Let 
The likelihood function is 
L = L ( . \ X , f , a , ^ , k , \ ) 
"" ( 
= n ^-here 
1 if not censored 
! = 1 
N 
= n I M M I " 
1=1 
The log-likelihood may be written as (ignoring the i subscripts) 
N 
logL = ^ wlog/i(«) + log 5(0 
1 
^ i. 
E k a 
w log P^- (w+ A:)log P + wlog - + wlog -
A t 
1 The first order partial derivatives are 
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5logL ^ A'P. 
] 1 
J 1 
d\ogL ^ P-
d\ " ^ ' O 
+ -Q 
El W y2p A 
E .2 W e i b u l l w i t h Un i t G a m m a 
The log-likelihood is obtained be setting /,-=A=1/(t^ and is written as 
log L = log L{. \ X, f; Q. -3, (T^) 
N 
= Y . log ~ + —)log + "''^g 7 
1 
where P^ = 1 + a'^exp{X0)t'^. 
The first order partial derivatives are therefore 
5log L ^ 1 
— ^ = y wx. - ( w + — ) — ^ 
aiogL ^ 
^ . l o g . - + + -
^logL ^ 1 
E .3 W e i b u l l w i t h Logno rma l Heterogene i ty 
If the heterogeneity random variable t' has distribution such that 
log t; ~ N[ri, cr^), the unconditional hazard function and survivor functions 
are, respectively, 
h(t) = fiat'^-'^explrj +j], 
S(t) = exp{ -fit'^explri +—] }. 
The log-likelihood function to maximise is 
l o g L = \ogL(.\X,t-a,l3,ri,a^) 
N 2 2 
^ a cr a 
= w\\ogj + logPj + ('Z + y)] - P^exp(ri+—) 
1 
where P^ = tit"" = 
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T h e f i rst order part ia l der iva t ives are 
a iog L a 
dp. ^ I t - , ' ' 2 
1 
5log L ^ 1 ff' 
= w{- + \ogt} - P^explrj + —]\ogt, 
da '—' Q 
1 
5log L ^ a' 
1 
r ^ 2 olog L ^ w . a 
da' 
Etc U 
A P P E N D I X F 
D E F I N I T I O N OF VARIABLES F R O M ALS DATA 
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Marital Status 
Control Group 
Married 
Birthplace 
Control Group 
Asian 
Others 
Never Marr ied, Widowed, Divorced or Separated. 
Married or living with defacto spouse. 
Austra l ia , United Kingdom, Ireland or United States . 
Countr ies in the cont inent of Asia excluding all of USSR 
and including Turkey. Codes 32 to 59 in ALS da t a set. 
AH other countries not included above. 
Education 
Control Group Left school in Year 11 or Year 12. 
10 Years and less 
Left school in Year 10 or below. 
Diploma and Trade 
Holds Diploma Cert i f icate or Trade Qualif icat ion, a t tended 
business school or technical college. 
Tertiary Holds Bachelor degree or higher qualif ications. 
Others At tended transi t ion course, adul t educat ion or other forms 
of educat ion classes. 
Household Structure 
Control Group Has no other family member(s) in household or live with 
non-relative(s) and friends. 
Living with Family 
Living with a t least one other family member in household. 
Skilled Occupation 
Managerial and supervisory occupat ions (Code 01), 
professional and para-professional occupat ions (Codes 02, 03), 
t rades and other skilled occupat ions (Codes 07, 08). 
Past Income Income of the income unit of the indvidual for the previous 
financial year 1983\84. 
Job Experience Total of all previous job dura t ions prior to the latest spell 
of unemployment . 
Previous Job Tenure 
Employment Durat ion in the last job prior to the latest 
unemployment spell. 
Mobile Prepared to move to a n o t h e r S ta te or a n o t h e r p a r t of 
the current Sta te of residence if offered a suitable job. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ANALYSIS OF EESEEVATION WAGE 
5.1 Introduction 
In chapter 4, the approach adopted in analysing the determinants of re-
employment probability of an unemployed person is essentially a reduced form 
approach. The methodology involves the direct formulation and estimation of 
the hazard function which is determined by two major factors namely, the 
probability or rate of job arrivals and the reservation wage of the 
unemployed individual. However, since no explicit reference to the behaviour 
of the reservation wage is made in the specification of the hazard function, 
the results from the reduced form estimation do not allow us to test directly 
the various hypotheses regarding the reservation wage function in the job 
search model. Although a job search model was developed, it served only to 
provide a basis by which we can interpret and make indirect inferences from 
the results of estimation. The structural approach to estimation, on the 
other hand, uses information concerning the structure of the job search model 
and imposes appropriate restrictions on the data, at varying degrees, in the 
estimation process. The estimation and analysis of the behaviour of 
reservation wages of the unemployed usually form an important part of this 
structural approach. 
The concept of reservation wage is used in different ways to describe 
the labour market behaviour of individuals. In the analysis of labour supply, 
e.g. Gronau (1974), Heckman (1974) and Cogan (1980), the concept of 
reservation wage is used in the context of labour force participation. A 
person participates in the labour force only if market wages exceed his or her 
reservation wage. In the unemployed job search model presented earlier in 
Chapter 4, the reservation wage is seen as the minimum offered wage 
necessary to induce an unemployed person to take up employment, while with 
on-the-job search model in Burdett (1979) the reservation wage refers to the 
minimum wage offer which will cause an employed person to leave his current 
job for another. In this Chapter we will use the term in conjunction with 
the unemployed job searcher. 
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The ability to identify and estimate the underlying structural 
relationship of a job search model is of importance to the policy maker 
involved in the design and evaluation of policies affecting the job search 
process. Kiefer and Neumann (1981a) have demonstrated the relative 
superiority of using structural estimates as opposed to reduced form estimates 
in the area of policy analysis. In this Chapter we will focus on the analysis 
and structural estimation of the reservation wage relation in the job search 
model. Section 5.2 reviews the reservation wage property of the job search 
model and further examine factors which determine the reservation wage. In 
Section 5.3 we survey the existing approaches and methods to estimation in 
the literature. An empirical analysis of the reservation wage of unemployed 
youths in Australia is presented in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 contains the 
conclusion and summary. 
5.2 T h e Reserva t ion W a g e F u n c t i o n 
Consider the infinite horizon unemployed job search model of Chapter 4. 
Recall that at the optimum, we have the following expression: 
/• oo 
y = u ( y ) + P 7 / . i ' ( w ) d G ( w ) + p { l - 7[1 - Gli/^'lDV' (5.1) 
J w 
where V is the expected maximum lifetime utility from search of an 
unemployed person who adopts optimal search strategy in all future periods, 
y is the net non-wage income, u is the utility function and u ' > 0, V (^w) is 
the lifetime utility from accepting a job offer with wage w and equals , 7 i -p 
is the job arrival rate and p the disount factor.^ Substituting for V'(w) and 
using the necessary first order condition for optimum which is V = ip[w ) 
and rearranging, we get 
u(w') = u ( y ) + f t u { w ) - u ( w * ) d G { w ) (5.2) 
1 — p J VJ 
Suppose we assume that the utility function is linear in income and wealth so 
tha t u(x)=x. We can the write (5.2) as 
1 « 
T h e l i f e t ime u t i l i t y f r o m a c c e p t i n g a j o b of fer w i t h w a g e w is : 
2 
i ) ( w ) — u { w ) + p u { w ) + p u ( u i ) + . . . 
u { w ) 
i f 0 < p < 1. 
l - p 
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PI 
w = y + , {w-w ) dG{w). (5.3) 
1 - pJw 
If we integrate , by parts, the second term on the right hand side of 
(5.3), we obtain 
roo f-oc 
^ (w- w*) dG(w) = {w-w')G(w)r* - ,G{W)d{w) 
Jw Jw 
w')(G(u;) - 1)|°°» + (u;- - / . G(w)dw 
w w J^ 
roo rOO 
= j t dw — I t G{w)dw 
J w VJ 
roo 
= / « 1 — G[w) dw. 
Jw 
There fo re , we can rewr i t e (5.3) as 
PI 
w = y + / . 1 - G(^) dw. (5.4) 
1 - pJw 
T h i s express ion (5.4) specifies the m a r g i n a l condi t ion which d i c t a t e s t he 
choice of t he rese rva t ion wage a n d is s imi lar t o t h a t found in Lancas t e r a n d 
Cheshe r (1983) , a n d Kiefer a n d N e u m a n n ( I979a)^ . T h e exis tence of an 
a n a l y t i c express ion for t h e rese rva t ion wage convenien t ly s impl i f ies t h e 
ana lys i s of j o b search b e h a v i o u r since we need only t o look a t t he effect of 
changes on one va r i ab le w*. 
T o e x a m i n e t he c o m p a r a t i v e s t a t i c p rope r t i e s of t he r e se rva t ion wage 
f u n c t i o n , we rewr i te (5.3) as an impl ic i t f unc t i on in w , i.e. 
r oo 
K(w') = u(y) - u{w') + . u ( u ; ) - u ( t / ; ' ) dG(w) = 0. (5.5) 
1 — pJw 
P a r t i a l l y d i f f e r en t i a t i ng K(w*) , we see t h a t 
^ = -u'(wj{l + f . g(w) dw) < 0, 
dw 1-pJw 
^Hencefor th , we shall use the abbrev ia t ions L-C and K-N to refer to, respectively, Lancas te r and 
Chesher , and Kiefer and Neumann . 
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dK P 
dK 
= > 0 , dy 
dK ycc 
I t [u(u;) — u(w )!?(») dw > 0. 
J m 
Using the implicit function rule we again obtain the following 
derivatives which describes the comparat ive stat ic behaviour of the reservation 
wage in the job search model. 
dw' dK/di 
— r > 0-
dK/dw 
t 
dw 
> 0, 
dy 
* 
dw 
> 0. 
dp 
The sign of these derivatives are identical to those derived in Chapter 4 
and the intuition underlying these signs are exactly the same. 
5.2.1 Effect of Minimum Wage. 
The wage offer distribution G(w) is defined over the entire non-negative 
real domain. In reality, however, minimum wage levels exist and hence all 
observed wage offers must equal or exceed the prescribed minimum wage rate, 
say m. This means tha t the wage offer distribution is lower t runcated at m, 
which could be a function of, for example, location or occupation. The 
distribution of wage offers is thus conditioned on the event w > m, and the 
t runcated density defined on the interval [m,oo) is 
d(w) = g{wlw > m) = ^ _ ^^^^ if w > m, 
= 0 otht rxxnse. 
The job search problem is then defined in terms of this t runcated 
distr ibution. The equivalent expression for (5.1) is 
V = u(y) + PI , rP(w)dD(w) + p{l - 7(1 -
J W 
Again, by using the necessary first order condition for opt imum and 
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assuming a linear utility function^ we can write 
(5.6) 
PI f ^ 
(1 - p)\\ - G{m)] Jw 
To ascertain the comparat ive stat ic properties of the reservation wage to 
changes in the minimum wage rate, we use the implicit function rule as 
before."^ Let 
r 00 
K{w') = y - w* + / . = 0. 
1 - p !l - G{m)\Jw 
dK pt 
(  - ) ! l - G ( m ) ] J u j
PI 
dK g{m)p-^ 
Therefore, 
dw dK/dm 
> 0 . 
1 - G(w) dw > 0. 
J yj 
dK/dw' 
The intuition underlying the sign of this derivative is simple. An 
increase in the minimum wage rate would understandably increase the chances 
of receiving higher wage offers. This provides the incentive to the unemployed 
searcher to hold out for these higher offers by raising his reservation wage. 
5.2.2 Effect of changes in the Wage Offer Distribution. 
We may distinguish two principal ways in which the wage offer 
distr ibution can change : 
(a) mean-preserving change where the variance of the distribution is 
changed but the mean remains unaltered; 
(b) variance-preserving change where a translat ion of the whole 
distr ibution occurs but the dispersion of the wage offers around the mean 
remains unchanged. 
Consider first the mean-preserving change. Let G(w/a^) denote the 
^Th i s is a s implifying as sumpt ion which does no affect the compara t ive s ta t ic proper t ies derived 
below. 
' ' w e have assumed t h a t 7 , the job arr ival ra te , is independen t of the min imum wage. This 
a p p r o a c h is based on a par t ia l equil ibr ium analysis of the s i tua t ion . In a general equil ibrium 
se t t ing , we may expect 7 or the wage offer d i s t r ibu t ion G(w) to vary with changes in the 
m i n i m u m wage. See, for example , Albrecht and Axell (1984). 
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distribution of wage offers with variance cr^ . We can rewrite (5.5) as:' 
. /* oo rw 
K{w*) = y - w * w d G ( w / a ^ ) - wdG(w/a^) 
1 - p Jo Jo 
/: J U) w dG{w/a^) } 
* r VJ 
1 - p ^ Jo 
- w''\\-G{u>la'^)\ } 
* 
p-i 9 » 
= y - w + {E(W)+ G(w/a^)dw-w }. 
1-/3 Jo 
dE{W) 
For a mean-preserving change, = 0 by definition. Therefore, 
dcP-
* 
dK p dG{wla . r 9G(w/a') ^ 
= - { / ^ dw}. 
^-P Jo arr l - p O 
Under a mean-preserving increase in the dispersion or riskiness of the wage 
offer distribution, we can show that (see Appendix G) for any given w*. 
dGU/a^) 
-dw > 0. 
dK 
This result implies that > 0 and by the implicit function rule, 
dw' dK/da^ 
^ > 0. 
da^ dK/d w 
At first reading, the intuition underlying this response of the individual's 
reservation wage may not be obvious. A change in the dispersion of the wage 
offer distribution reflects changes in the flow of information in the labour 
market. A decrease in the dispersion of wage offers may be the outcome of 
better information that unemployed searchers have of the wages offered in the 
marketplace and/or improved knowledge by firms of each other's wage offers. 
The former will lead to more intensive sampling of the high-wage firms 
causing these firms to lower their wage offers and the low-wage firms to raise 
The following expression is ba^ed on McKenna (1985). However, here we provide a formal proof 
of the sign of the derivative of w with respect to a . 
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their offers. In the same way, uniformity of wage offers for jobs with similar 
characterist ics will be promoted if f irms know more about the competi tors ' 
wage policies. Conversely, where imperfect information and uncertainty 
characterise the labour market , the distribution of wage offers becomes more 
diversified. The prospect of sampling a very poor wage offer increases as are 
also the chances of receiving a very good offer. However, because poor offers 
are already unacceptable in the first instance, the increase in the probability 
of sampling poor offers does not adversely affect the expected returns from 
continued search which, in fact, improves due to the simultaneous rise in the 
chances of sampling very good offers. The reservation wage increases as a 
consequence. 
Suppose, a translat ion of the wage offer distribution occurs with the 
shape or dispersion of the distribution remaining untouched. Let a be the 
magni tude of the translat ion so tha t : 
before translation: P r ( W = w ) = g(w) and E(W) = /x 
after translation: Pr(W=:w) = g(w-a) = gj(w) and E(W) — a. 
If a > 0, then G(w) > Gj(w) V w. In other words, G j stochastically 
dominates G in the first degree. Conversely, if q < 0, then G(w) < Gj(w) 
V w and G is said to dominate G^ stochastically in the first degree. 
Lets assume tha t the existing wage offers has distribution G ( w + q ) . We 
can rewrite (5.5) for this general case as: 
r oo 
K(w*) = y - u;' + { / . 1 - G(w+a) dw } a e R . 
1 — p Jw 
Differentiating with respect to a , we have 
dK - p-i 
• dw. 
- P I r 
1 — P Jw da I  p vj dot 
dG 
But we know tha t — < 0 from the stochastic dominance property of 
dK 
G. Therefore, — > 0 and hence 
da 
dw* dK/da 
^ > 0. 
5a dKjdw 
The explanation of the sign of this derivative is intuitively obvious since 
a r ightward shift of the wage offer distribution (a > 0) represents an increase 
in the expected mean wage offer and thus the returns from job search. An 
increase in the reservation wage is hence warranted. 
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In this section we have analysed the comparative static properties of the 
reservation wage function in response to changes in the parameters of the job 
search model. These results provide the framework which will assist us in 
the specification of the reservation wage equation to be estimated and in the 
interpretation of the estimated results. 
5.3 Survey of E s t i m a t i o n M e t h o d o l o g y 
The existing literature on the econometric analysis of reservation wages 
can be broadly classified under two major categories - those in which data on 
reservation wage are not available and must be deduced from the estimation 
process and those where data on reservation wage are used. 
5.3.1 Estimation of Non-observed Reservation Wage 
The work of Kiefer and Neumann (1979a,b) probably represent the first 
major a t tempt at empirical estimation of the reservation wage of unemployed 
persons. This approach uses data on offered wages of people who were 
observed to have been unemployed at some point in time. Other studies 
which employ similar methods are Kahn and Low (1982) and Fishe (1982). 
This approach first assumes a specific distribution for the wage offers -
usually the lognormal distribution. The offered wage facing the i'^ individual 
may be approximated by the equation 
log w° = X-d + e,. (5.7) 
^ I t It * ' 
2 
where e^  ~ N(0, a j and X. is a vector of personal and labour market 
characteristics associated with the individual. 
The approximate form of the nonlinear expression (5) for reservation 
wage may be written as 
* 
log w. = Z.0 + e^. (5.8) 
2 
where e^ ~ N(0, a^) and Z. is a vector of personal and labour market 
characteristics and e^  and e^  are jointly distributed as bivariate normal with 
covariance 
From job search theory, we know that a person is employed if and only 
if 
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S^ — log w. — log w^ >0 
= - + - > 0. 
or 
S. = X.e - Z.p + V . > 0 (5.9) 
t 1 t * ' 
2 2 
where v. = - e^p v ~ N(0, o^) and = Cov(ej£2)-
Therefore in order to observe employed wages, the prerequisite is that 
the condition in (5.9) holds. Observed wages w are therefore lower truncated 
at the reservation wages of the individuals. Hence, any a t t empt to estimate 
the offered wage equation using (5.7) must take this into account. 
Otherwise, ordinary least squares estimation (5.7) will incur selectivity bias 
which produce inconsistent estimates of 0 since it is well known [Gronau 
(1974), Lewis (1974), Heckman (1979)] that (ignoring the i subscript) 
£'( ej/og w" > log w ) = 
r = (xe -
<j> and <P are the density and cumulative density of the 
s tandard normal distribution. 
If the selectivity factor A^  is known, then the equation in (5.7) can be 
written as 
logw° = xe -CTJ^AJ + Uj, i:(uj) = o 
and can be estimated to obtain consistent estimates of and a^^. A 
convenient way to do this is to use a two-stage procedure suggested by 
Heckman (1976b, 1979) where at the first stage consistent estimates of the 
selectivity variable is estimated from a probit model of the normalised version 
of (5.9) where the dummy variable in the probit model is: 
1=1 if (xe - ZP + v)/a^ > 0 
= 0 otherwise. 
In a similar manner, equation (5.8) can be writ ten and estimated as 
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« 
log w = ZP + a. A- -f u„ 
ZV Z L 
where E(u„) = 0 and A = . 
If w is not observed, consistent est imates of p and can be obtained 
provided one of tlie following identification conditions holds : (Maddala 1983, 
p.229) 
i. ~ or 
ii. X contains at least one variable not included in Z. 
The second identification condition is applied in K-N (1979a, b). The 
implication of this condition in the context of the job search model is tha t 
certain variables do not affect reservation wage directly through changing 
search costs but do so only indirectly through their effect on the wage offer 
distribution. Examples of such variables suggested by K -N are previous job 
tenure and previous wage. Nonstationarity or duration dependence of the 
reservation wage is allowed for in K-N (1979b) in an ad-hoc fashion by 
respecifying (5.8) as 
* 
log w = ZP + r]t + e^. 
Estimation then proceeds along the same lines as before. Extension of 
this procedure to allow for unobserved individual heterogeneity is discussed 
and applied by K-N (1981b). 
Another approach tha t does not require reservation wage observations is 
found in Narendranathan and Nickell (1985). This method directly estimates 
the parameters of the structural relationship for the reservation wage, such as 
equation (5.2), derived from the job search model. The da ta requirements for 
implementat ion of this procedure include knowledge of the pre-unemployment 
wages, non-wage income and unemployment duration of individuals in the 
sample. Simple wage or earnings functions, stratified by age and skill 
requirements, are first estimated using the pre-unemployment wage data . 
Predictions from these estimated equations are treated as the mean offered 
wage of the set of vacancies facing the individual. Next, the structural 
relationship in equation (5.2) is parameterised by adopting the following 
functional specification for the component terms: 
i. the utility function is separable in income and leisure and is of the 
form u(y) = log y. v(l) , where 1 is leisure and is equal to 1 if the 
individual is unemployed and I otherwise; 
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ii. the relative value of leisure as measured by = exp(X6), where X 
is a vector of personal characterist ics; 
iii. the job arrival probabil i ty 7 = 7(Z,w) = exp(Z^ + KW) 
log W — fj. 
where w = , 
cr 
Z is a vector of personal and labour marke t characterist ics, 
fji is the predicted value from the wage equat ions and 
a"^  is the corresponding regression error variance. 
If we assume t h a t non-wage income k is received each period, regardless 
of labour force s ta tus , then we can rewrite equation (5.2) as: 
exp{Zl3) w+k 
log (u; -f-A:) = exp{X9)log y + / , log (—^ )exp{Kw)g(w) dw (5.10) 
^ Jw w+k 
where r is the ra te of discount . 
The hazard ra te f rom unemployment h, depends on the probabili ty of 
receiving a job offer and the probabili ty t h a t the wage offered exceeds the 
reservation wage, t h a t is 
= 1 - G(w') ] 
roo 
= I t exp{ZP + /cif}3(ui) dw. 
J Ul 
From this, we can obtain the density and distr ibut ion funct ion of the 
dura t ion of unemployment by using the familiar s t andard results (See Chapter 
3) which is 
1 - F{t) = exp\ -ht 1 
F{t) = h t x p \ - h t \ . 
For a sample consisting of NE employed and NU employed individuals, 
the es t imates of the s t ructura l parameters of the job search model can be 
obtained by maximising the likelihood of 
NE NU 
L(. | z , t , w ' - , p, /c) = n /,(<,) n 1 -
where w* is solved numerically at each s tep of the maximising procedure 
according to the expression in (5.10). Once the s t ruc tura l parameters of the 
model are es t imated , var ia t ion of the reservation wage with respect to the 
variables in the model can be determined. 
The above approach was devised in an a t t e m p t to present an es t imated 
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model which is consistent with the underlying theoretical framework. It is 
not entirely obvious whether in doing so, the final estimates are robust. Of 
part icular concern is the unknown consequences of adopting various ad-hoc 
functional specifications of the component terms of equation (5.2) leading to 
equation (5.10). Since the value of the reservation wage w ' used in the 
maximisation process is obtained as a solution to the equation in (5.10), the 
exact form of this equation is expected to play a crucial role in determining 
the final estimates of the structural parameters. The a priori specification 
and estimation of the mean offered wage using pre-unemployment wages is 
also worrisome. The absence of selectivity bias ad jus tments can be expected 
to produce biased predictions. Finally the approach is used in the context of 
a constant reservation wage model. Extension of this procedure to the 
variable reservation wage case may be numerically intractable since the 
corresponding expression to (5.10) will involve a non-linear first order 
difference equation in w . 
5.3.2 Analysis Using Observed Reservation Wage. 
The two methods of analysing reservation wage behaviour outlined 
above have been conceived primarily because of the non-availability or non-
observability of reservation wage data . Some labour market surveys however 
do a t t empt to measure the reservation wage of individuals looking for work. 
These observations on reservation wage are the answers to questions like 
"What is the lowest weekly pay you would accept to work in any full-time 
job?" 
The availability of reservation wage da ta allows us to dispense with the 
indirect estimation procedures outlined above and adopt a more direct method 
of estimating the structural parameters of the job search model. Pioneering 
work in the development of techniques which utilise the information contained 
in reservation wage da ta have been done by Lancaster and Chesher (1983, 
1984) and Lancaster (1985a). 
The recognition of the potential two-way causal link between 
unemployment duration and reservation wage provides the motivation for the 
techniques developed in L-C (1984) and Lancaster (1985a) which allow the 
s t ructura l parameters to be estimated using two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
method. The procedure for deriving the simultaneous equation system for w* 
and t comprise the follow steps: 
i. Assume a prior distribution for the wage offers. The commonly used 
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distributional form is either the lognormal as in L-C (1984) and K-N (1979a, 
1981b) or the Pareto as in Lancaster (1985a) . 
For the lognormal case, 
log w — a 
GH = -) 
a 
where and a are respectively, the mean and standard duration of the 
distribution and 4> the standard normal distribution function. 
For the Pareto assumption, 
w 
G H = 1 - ( - ) « 
1 
where — = var(log w) and w^ > 0 is the origin of the lower tail of the 
a 
Pareto distribution and may be regarded as the minimum wage offer in the 
market . 
ii. Adopt functional forms for 7 [ l -G(w' ) ] and w* and use the hazard 
formula h(t) = 7 [ l -G(w )] to derive the functional form for the hazard 
function. In L-C (1984), the following specifications were used: 
w = exp[X^ + u\t'' , u ~ y V ( 0 , a J (5.11) 
* 
logw — n , 
7ll-0( )] = exp\Xe + wlogw ] (5.12) 
a 
so that , 
h(t) = t'"'eipiX(6l+7r/?) +7rw]. (5.13) 
Lancaster (1985a) assumes 
w* = exp\XP + (5.14) 
and 
= exp\Xe + u j (5.15) 
so that 
h(t) = t''''exp\X(e~7rP) +uj-7ru2]. 
iii. Derive the density function of t from the hazard function using the 
formula /(() = exp[- /p/ i (s ) rfs].K(t) 
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iv. Derive the expressions for the expected values E[log t] and E[Iog w ' 
using moment generating functions. 
The detailed derivation of the final simultaneous s t ructural equations 
system for the two distr ibutional assumptions are in Appendices H and I. 
For the lognormal case, the s t ructural equations are 
log w' = ijlog t + XP + u^ (5.16) 
c » 
logt = Tvlog w - XO + u^ (5.17) 
a ^ 
where 
E(u^u^) ^ 0 
Var(ti ) = (T^  
Var(u.) = 
d^logr [a] 
1 + TTT] 
dlogF [a] c = a{ -log a}. 
In the absence of any restrictions on and 6, identification of the 
s t ructural parameters is dependent on second moment restrictions. However 
L-C (1984) have shown tha t problems arise in the event of omitted 
heterogeneity or measurement error in the endogenous variables and 
identification is no longer possible with these restrictions. 
The coefficients in 6 as we recall from (5.11) and (5.12) capture the 
effects of variables on the job arrival ra te and the moments of the wage offer 
distribution, while the coefficients measure their effect on the reservation 
wage. The familiar necessary order condition for identification of any of the 
s t ructural equations (5.16) and (5.17) in the system, if 2SLS is to be used, 
requires at least one of the X's to be excluded from the equation in question. 
Therefore if the reservation wage equation is to be identifiable, a t least one 
must be zero. For both equations to be identified, we must have = 
= 0 for i It has been suggested by L-C tha t if we can find a variable 
which influence the costs of search ( and hence the reservation wage ) but 
not the job arrival ra te or wage offer distr ibution, we will have a restriction 
( = 0, /3j 0 ) which enables the s t ructural parameters tt and 6 of (5.16) 
to be identified. The variable which indicates the number of dependent 
children of the unemployed individual has been used to achieve this 
identification in est imation. With regards to the identifiability of r] and 0, 
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L-C argued tha t every variable which influences the probability of job arrivals 
and the distribution of wage offers must also enter in the determination of 
the reservation wage of a rational utility maximising agent. As a 
consequence, r? and /? are unidentified. Closer examination, however, reveal 
tha t these assertions by L-C are in fact contrary to the necessary condition 
for identification of the reservation wage equation applied by K-N (1979, p. 
95) whose necessary condition is that there must be at least one variable 
which does not affect the search costs but indirectly influence the 
determination of the reservation wage via its effect on the wage offers (i.e. 
= 0, 0. ). Some possible candidates for these variables suggested by K-N 
are previous job tenure and previous wages. Admittedly, this causality 
assumption of K-N can be rather tenuous. However if a set of variables can 
be found to possess such characteristics in causality, it means that all the 
structural parameters in the two equations (5.16) and (5.17) can, in practice, 
be identified. 
In the following section we will proceed to specify and estimate the 
reservation wage equation and other structural parameters of the job search 
model using data from the Australian Longitudinal Survey. The estimation 
methodology adopted is based primarily on that of L-C with some 
modifications. 
5.4 E s t i m a t i o n of the Structural Equat ions 
The structural equations that will be estimated are based on the 
assumption of a lognormal distribution of the reservation wage and the 
specific functional forms of the components of the hazard function in (5.13). 
We have, 
log w ' = Xj^ + 7?log t -H Uj (5.18) 
log t = - X^e - dog w* + U2 (5.19) 
where E (Uj "2)= 0 
The P coefficients captures the effects of variables on the reservation 
wage. The variables we have in X j include personal characteristics variables 
indicating marital status, sex, birthplace, type of household and age, location 
variables which reflect labour market conditions, education which represent 
productivity characteristics and efficiency of job search. Previous financial 
year's income is also included as a proxy to model possible wealth effects. A 
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prion we would expect high non-wage income to be associated with higher 
wealth levels and hence according to the predictions of the job search model 
a higher reservation wage for the individual. Other variables in X^ include a 
mobility variable which indicates whether the person is prepared to move 
in t ras ta te or interstate to secure a job offer and an occupation variable which 
shows whether the person is looking for a job in a skilled occupation. A 
priori, we would expect a mobile person to engage in more extensive 
information gathering and hence would be better informed about wage offers 
in the market . They may also face different wage offer distributions. This, 
of course, implies a smaller dispersion of the wage offer distribution and 
hence a lower reservation wage. Individuals looking for skilled jobs would be 
confronting more favourable wage offer distributions and hence would be 
expected to have higher reservation wages. 
The vector of parameters 9 measures the effects of variables which 
determine the job arrival rate and the wage offers. The composition of the 
X j vector contains the personal characteristics variables, age and education 
variables which measures general accumulated human capital, location and 
occupation variables, previous income and mobility variables which act as 
indicators of the potential productivity of the individual to the firms and of 
the intensity of search undertaken by the individual which determines the 
rate of job arrivals. To ensure identification of the log t equation, recall 
tha t we must have at least one element of Xj which is not in X2, that is, 
this variable affects reservation wage only through search costs but not wage 
offers or job arrivals. The variable we have chosen is the dependent children 
variable. Similarly, to secure identification of reservation wage equation, X j 
must contain at least one variable which affects reservation wage only via its 
effect on job offers. We have assumed that the variable, previous job tenure 
which measures the individuals accumulation of specific human capital 
through on-the-job training, satisfy this criteria. 
5.4.1 Data Used in Estimation 
Reservation wages are recorded in the first phase of the Australian 
Longitudinal Survey (ALS) data set for two groups of individuals - those 
employed but looking for another job, and those unemployed and looking for 
work. For our estimation purposes, the da ta set is restricted to those 
unemployed and looking for full-time jobs. The reservation wage data are 
constructed from answers to two questions. Firstly, those who have indicated 
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t h a t they are looking for a par t icu lar kind of ful l - t ime work are asked 
: " \ \ h a t is the lowest weekly pay you are prepared to accept in the job?" 
Those who are not specific in their job search are asked :" W h a t is the 
lowest weekly pay you are prepared to accept in any j o b ? " The responses 
are given ei ther as gross pay or net t ake-home pay. The figures given as net 
a m o u n t s are ad jus ted to gross t e rms for our estimation.® Of the 1233 cases 
of unemployed persons in the ALS d a t a set , abou t 191 (15.5%) had missing 
values of the reservation wage (i.e. replied "don ' t know") . The fmal sample 
size used is 846 cases as fu r the r reduct ion was necessary because of missing 
values in the income variable and cases with mul t ip le job holdings. Table 1 
provides some descriptive s ta t i s t ics of the sample used. 
The employed sample is used later in th is section in conjunct ion with 
the es t imat ion techniques which allows for selectivity bias in the model. To 
m a i n t a i n compat ibi l i ty with the unemployed sample, this sample is restricted 
to wage and salary earners working in ful l - t ime jobs and who had a t least 
one unemploymen t spell in the survey period. 
5.4.2 2SLS Es t imat ion Results 
Table 5-2 gives the 2SLS es t imates of the s t ruc tu ra l pa rame te r s of the 
j ob search model . Before arr iving a t the fmal specification repor ted here, we 
exper imented with different ways in which the age and previous job tenure 
var iables enter the model. Both variables cap tu re the effects of accumulated 
h u m a n capital and the mot iva t ion underlying the exper imenta t ion was to 
allow for nonlineari t ies in the ra te a t which these var iables affect the 
reservat ion and offered wages. We find t h a t , on the basis of goodness-of-fit 
cr i ter ia , the quadra t ic specification of the age variable per forms bet ter than 
its logar i thmic or categorical coun te rpa r t s , implying therefore , a concavity in 
the wage funct ions with respect to age. 
In in terpre t ing the resul ts in Table 5-2, it is helpful to be reminded 
t h a t the values of the coefficients in the log dura t ion equat ion are also equal 
t o minus the coefficients of the corresponding variables in the job offer 
equat ion in (5.12). The significant coefficient of the previous job tenure 
var iable af f i rms the impor tance of specific h u m a n capi tal in de termining j ob 
ar r iva ls and wage offers. Other th ings remaining cons tan t , a 10% increase in 
®The a d j u s t m e n t s a re based on t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e e a r n i n g s of t h e u n e m p l o y e d i nd iv idua l 
a r e w i t h i n t h e 30% i n c o m e t a x b r a c k e t . T h e AS4600 t a x - e x e m p t a n n u a l i n c o m e level in A u s t r a l i a 
impl i e s a weekly t a x - e x e m p t income of a b o u t $89. T h e r e f o r e , no a d j u s t m e n t s a r e m a d e if t h e 
r e p o r t e d t a k e - h o m e p a y is less t h a n $89. 
I l l 
Table 5-1: Statistical Characteristics of Sample 
Unemployed Employed 
Sample Size 846 485 
Married (%) 9 10 
Female (%) 33 35 
Birthplace (%) 
Asian 5 4 
Others 6 8 
Australia & Anglo-Saxon 89 88 
Education (%) 
10 yrs. & less 54 33 
11 to 12 yrs. 29 37 
Diploma & Trade Cert. 12 21 
Tertiary 1 3 
Others 4 6 
Location (%) 
Capital Cities 51 55 
Other Cities 24 24 
Country Town 19 17 
Rural Village 6 4 
No Children (%) 96 96 
Living with Family (%) 75 73 
Mobile (%) 64 
Look for/In Skilled Jobs(%) 38 29 
Average Annual Income (S) 4761 6472 
Average Age (Yrs.) 20 20 
Av. Previous Job Tenure(Wks) 11.0 15.3 
Av. Number of Search Methods 4.9 
Av. Reservation/Current Wage($) 179 234 
Av. Previous Unemployment Dur.(Wks) 54.7 24.9 
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Table 5-2: Two Stage Least Squares Estimates of Structural Parameters 
Dependent Variable Log Duration Log Reservation Wage 
Constant -5.704[2.16] 
Female 0.571 [2.43] 
Age 0.43010.77] 
Age^ -0.012[0.95] 
Location: 
Other Cities 0.080!0.86] 
Country Town 0.035[0.24] 
Rural or Farm 0.144[0.62] 
Birthplace: 
Asian -0.19610.77] 
Other Countries -0.118(0.71] 
Education: 
10 years & less 0.015[0.13] 
Diploma & Trade -0.129(0.69] 
Tertiary -0.513!l.08] 
Others 0.087[0.41] 
Have Children 
Live with Family 0.089[0.64 
Log Past Income -0.084(2.07j 
Log Previous Job Tenure -0.434(12.83] 
Mobile 0.277(1.74] 
Looking for Skilled Job 0.032(0.21] 
No. of Search Methods -0.052(1.66 
Log Reservation Wage 1.199(1.09] 
Log Unemployment Duration 
Std Error of Regression 1.082 
R2 0.273 
Sample size 846 
-0.501(0.54] 
-0.179(5.85] 
0.505(5.18 
-0.011(4.48] 
0.010(0.31] 
-0.091 ;2.50] 
-0.150(2.55 
0.134[2.03] 
0.033(0,58] 
0.068(2.15] 
0.116(2.49] 
0.228(1.62] 
0.089(1.32] 
0.198(2.74] 
-0.08i;2.60] 
0.018(1.56] 
-0.121(4.30] 
0.119(3.29] 
0.002(0.16] 
-0.047(2.02 
0.377 
0.356 
846 
Notes: 
a. t-statistics are in brackets. 
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previous job tenure shortens the durat ion of unemployment by about 4%. 
Unemployed females also appear to face significantly adverse employment 
prospects and sex difference alone can cause their unemployment duration to 
be prolonged by about one and a half t imes those of the males. Individuals 
with high past incomes, which act as signals to employers of their potential 
productivi ty, seem to encounter significantly better employment offers as are 
those with t rade and tertiary education, although the effect of the latter on 
unemployment duration is not as significant. Similarly, individuals who 
engaged in intensive job search, modelled by the number of job search 
methods used, experience shorter durat ion of unemployment^. The signs of 
all these coefficients conform with our a priori predictions. However, the 
sign of the mobility variable presents some difficulty in interpretat ion. A 
priori^ we would expect the range of suitable jobs which a mobile person 
encounters to be more extensive. This is equivalent to facing a higher job 
arrival rate and hence other things remaining unchanged, a shorter duration 
of unemployment would be expected. The positive sign of the mobility 
coefficient in the log duration equation suggests tha t mobile individuals may 
possess qualities which are not regarded favourably by potential employers. 
This may perhaps be their increased liability to quit which makes the 
employers averse in hiring them. 
Turning to the reservation wage structural equation, the signs of most 
of the estimated coefficients are accordant with our a priori predictions. The 
reservation wage of females are about 17% lower than were males. 
Reservation wage also increase at a decreasing rate with the age variable 
which, in this instance, reflect both human capital and minimum wage effects. 
A turning point in the reservation wage function occurs at about 45 years of 
age. An unemployed person living in the country and rural region has lower 
reservation wage than a similar person living in the cities. This is possibly 
the outcome of lower mean wage offers of jobs in the rural community and 
the generally higher search costs incurred because of the more scattered 
^In one var ia t ion of our es t imat ion, we replaced the var iable which denotes the n u m b e r of job 
search me thods with an a l te rna t ive var iable which indicates the type of job search me thods 
a d o p t e d . The purpose of this exercise was to test the hypothes is of effectiveness of formal versus 
in formal job search methods . Informal job search me thods are defined as those t h a t utilise more 
in tensive and qua l i ta t ive informat ion . Individuals who adop t these methods include those who 
have wr i t t en , phoned or contac ted an employer; answered newspaper adver t i sement ; advert ised or 
t endered for work; or contac ted fr iends and relat ives abou t jobs. Formal job search methods are 
defined as those activi t ies like registering with the employment service agency or looking in 
newspapers and fac tory not iceboards . However, this search method var iable was found to be 
highly insignificant and therefore it may be concluded tha t no significant difference in effectiveness 
exists between formal and informal job search methods . 
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dis t r ibut ion of j o b oppor tun i t i es in these areas. In general more educated 
ind iv idua ls tend to have higher reservat ion wages . H o w e v e r an except ion to 
this concerns those w i th less than 11 years of school ing w h o have , on 
ave rage , s l ight ly higher reservat ion wages ( about 7% h igher ) than the control 
g roup ind iv idua l w h o received 11-12 years of educat ion. Th i s , perhaps, is 
ind i ca t i ve of the fact that for those w h o leave school earl ier, the general 
exper ience ga ined f r o m the f irst f ew years in the marke t place contr ibutes 
m o r e to p roduc t i v i t y than the ext ra years spent in school. A s expected, 
higher reservat ion wages are also associated w i th indiv iduals w h o have higher 
past incomes or looking for skilled jobs . Conve rse l y , mob i l e persons and 
those l i v ing w i t h fami ly and re lat ives have l ower reservat ion wages . A 
plausible exp lanat ion for the lower reservat ion levels of those l i v ing wi th 
fami l i es is that for these people, the psychic or in tang ib le costs of 
unemp l oymen t associated w i th the shame or embarrassment of being w i thout 
a j o b wou ld be considerably greater than if they were l i v ing by themselves or 
w i t h fr iends. T h e nega t i ve sign of the es t imated coe f f i c ient TT of the log 
durat ion var iab le prov ides direct ev idence of decl in ing reservat ion w a g e as 
e lapsed unemp loymen t durat ion increases. T h e rate of decl ine howeve r is not 
ve ry steep, w i th reservat ion w a g e reduced by about 3 .2% as the durat ion of 
unemp loymen t is doubled. 
T h e est imates of the structural parameters a l l ows us to de t e rmine the 
f o r m of durat ion dependence in the sample . Recal l that in equat ion (5.13) 
hazard funct ion is speci f ied as 
h ( t ) = t'^'^exp [ X ( 0 + 7r/3) + TTU 
Th i s is s imi lar to the VVeibull hazard funct ion in Chap te r 3 where 
h ( t ) = Qt'^-i expiX/3 
and A - 1 > 0 signi f ies pos i t i ve durat ion dependence whi l e Q-1 < 0 implies 
nega t i v e durat ion dependence. Using the es t imates o f the structural 
paramete rs , the computed va lue of the product TT^ equals 0.056. Th i s is 
equ iva l en t t o a va lue of a = 1.056 for the We ibu l l mode l . C o m p a r i n g this 
va lue of Q w i th the m a x i m u m l ike l ihood es t imates o f a in the ' reduced f o r m ' 
W e i b u l l hazard mode l in Chap t e r 4, w e see that they are of the same order 
o f magn i tude and both est imates a f f i rm the presence of pos i t i ve durat ion 
dependence . 
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Table 5-3: 2SLS Structural Estimates with Selectivity Adjustments 
Dependent Variable Log Duration Log Reservation Wage 
Constanf" -8.011 [1.0 
Female 0.479[l.86] 
Age 0.86010.97] 
Age^ -0.021 [1.08] 
Location: 
Other Cities 0.08010.86] 
Country Town -0.017[0.10] 
Rural or Farm 0.175[0.69] 
Birthplace: 
Asian -0.142i0.55] 
Other Countries -0.17l[0.82] 
Education: 
10 years & less 0.303[0.55 
Diploma & Trade -0.172(0.74] 
Tertiary -0.723[0.92] 
Others 0.101 [0.50] 
Have Children 
Live with Family 0.122|0.75 
Log Past Income -0.120(1.49] 
Log Previous Job Tenure -0.434(13.09] 
Mobile 0.33411.57] 
Looking for Skilled Job -0.072(0.25] 
No. of Search Methods -0.111(0.94] 
Log Reservation Wage 0.879(0.78 
Log Unemployment Duration 
Selectivity variable A 0.912(0.40( 
Std Error of Regression 1.069 
r 2 0.273 
Sample size 1331 
-2.391(0.78] 
-0.199(4.25] 
0.650(2.47 
-0.014(2.32] 
0.010(0.28 
-0.106(2.24; 
-0.103[1.03] 
0.142(1.88] 
-0.009:0.10 
0.223(0.92 
0.055(0.54] 
0.006[0.02i 
0.074(1.00] 
0.158(1.53] 
-0.04610.73 
0.004(0.10] 
-0.065(0.68] 
0.029(0.20] 
-0.033(0.59] 
-0.036(1.22 
0.667(0.66] 
0.372 
0.357 
1331 
N o t e s : 
a. t-statistics are in brackets. 
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T a b l e 5-4: Max imum Likelihood Es t imates with Selectivity Ad jus tmen t s 
Dependent Variable Log Durat ion Log Reservation Wage 
Cons tan t^ -7.313[2.26] 
Female 0.525[2.10] 
Age 0.647[1.06] 
Age^ 0.016[1.23] 
Location: 
Other Cities 0.082[0.82 
Count ry Town 0.008[0.05] 
Rural or F a r m 0.158[0.69] 
Birthplace: 
Asian -0.168:0.63] 
Other Countr ies -0.147(0.76 
Educat ion: 
10 years less 0.156[0.83l 
Diploma & Trade -0.158[0.74] 
Ter t ia ry -0.653[0.46] 
Others 0.090^0.37 
Have Children 
Live with Family 0.105[0.74] 
Log Pas t Income -0.100[l.68 
Log Previous Job Tenure -0.434(13.53] 
Mobile 0.304il.73] 
Looking for Skilled Job -0.022(0.13 
No. of Search Methods -0.081(1.72] 
Log Reservation Wage 1.032(0.90 
Log Unemployment Durat ion 
p.^^ 0.475(1.39 
Std Error of Regression 1.139 
Log likelihood -2090.3 
-0.56510.24] 
-0.179(4.51] 
0.506(2.47 
-0.108(2.27 
0.010(0.30] 
-0.091(2.11 
-0.149(1.95 
0.135(1.71 
0.032(0.43] 
0.071(0.38] 
0.114(1.28 
0.219(0.76] 
0.088(1.06] 
0.197(1.61 
-0.080(1.54] 
0.018(0.60] 
-0.120 1.60] 
0.116(1.03] 
0.001(0.02] 
-0.046(1.63] 
-0.064(0.03 
0.373 
-1209.2 
N o t e s : 
a. t -s ta t is t ics are in brackets. 
b. p.^ is the correlation between the errors in the s t ruc tura l 
equat ion and the probit equation of the d ichotomous varaible L 
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5.4.3 Selectivity Bias Adjus tments 
The structural equations in (5.18) and (5.19) have been estimated using 
only observations of persons still unemployed. This means tha t observed data 
used in estimation are in fact not randomly sampled but selected according to 
the criterion w > w i.e. the reservation wage is greater than the offered 
wage. The operation of this sample selection criterion means tha t both 
elapsed duration t and w* are truncated variables. As a consequence, the 
residuals in the structural equations no longer have zero means. [ Heckman 
(1979)] This selectivity problem must therefore be taken into account in 
est imation, otherwise potentially serious biases can arise. To accomplish this, 
we adopt the procedure suggested by Lee et. al. (1980) and Maddala (1983, 
Chapt . 8). Briefly, the steps involve the following: 
(i). Est imate the probit criterion function based on the dichotomous 
variable I. where 
I. = 1 = Z.i5 + €. if w ' > w (unemployed) 
= 0 otherwise (employed) 
and Z contains all the exogenous variables in X j and X^. We note tha t for 
the structural equations (ignoring subscript i) 
E(u. iw'>w) = -CT A j=1 .2 
V J , J Ujt J ' 
and for the reduced form equations, 
E(v. ;w'>w) = -a^^^A j = l ,2 
d(z6) 
where A = - — - is the Mill's ratio, 0 and # are the s tandard normal density 
and distribution functions, o^^ = cov(upe), cr^^ = cov(Vj,£) and u and e, v 
and e have bivariate normal distribution. 
(ii). Include the Mill's ratio term A on the right hand .side of both the 
s t ructural and reduced form equations and subst i tute A = j- for A, where 6 4>(ZS) 
is the estimated value of 8 from step (i). 
(iii). Apply 2SLS method to the selectivity bias adjusted equations. 
The estimates obtained from this procedure are consistent. 
Alternatively, we can apply the procedure presented in Nelson and Olson 
(1978) which is analogous to the 2SLS procedure but uses instead the 
maximum likelihood technique to obtain the estimates a t each stage. This 
two stage procedure, called 2SLDV following Nelson and Olson, comprise the 
following steps: 
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(i). E s t ima te the reduced form coefficients and by m a x i m u m 
liltelihood applied to each reduced form equat ion. The likelihood funct ion to 
be maximised is 
N ^Z.6 
L{.! z , w*-nj = n I 1 1 -
1 
where N is the sample size, v. is the reduced fo rm equation residual error 
t e r m , g is the b ivar ia te normal density funct ion of (v.^ e.) and 
= f o r j = l ,2 . 
(ii). Form the ins t ruments 
log w ' = X f j 
log t = Xf^. 
(iii). Replace log t and log w ' by their ins t ruments f rom step (ii) and 
ob ta in m a x i m u m likelihood es t imates of the s t ruc tura l pa ramete r s in (5.18) 
and (5.19) by maximising the likelihood 
rZ.6 
L ( . l Z , w ' ; 0 ) = n i f ' [l -—oo 
where u^  is the residual error t e rm of the j ' ' ' s t ruc tura l equat ion, g is the 
b ivar ia te normal density funct ion of (u..,£.), and 
© = j = 1, 
= j = 2. 
The results of es t imat ion using these modified 2SLS and m a x i m u m 
likelihood procedures which allow for selectivity bias are presented in, 
respectively. Table 5-3 and Table 5-4. Compar ison of these es t imates wi th 
those of Table 5-2 reveal only minor differences in the coefficients - the sign 
of the coefficient of the variable which indicate search for skilled job in the 
unemploymen t dura t ion equat ion is now positive bu t insignificant. Selectivity 
bias reflected by the coefficient of A in Table 5-3 is insignificant. 
5.5 S u m m a r y and Conclus ions 
In this chapte r , we have surveyed the various s t ruc tu ra l approaches to 
the es t imat ion of the job search model . The me thods varied depending on 
whe the r reservation wage d a t a are avai lable to the ana lys t . The 2SLS 
app roach pioneered by L-C (1984) uses recorded reservat ion wage d a t a , which 
a re avai lable in the ALS d a t a set, and is based on par t icu lar funct ional forms 
of t he reservation wage and hazard funct ions . These funct ional specifications 
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are conformable with the reduced form representa t ion of the Weibull hazard 
func t ion used in Chap t e r 4. This allows us to make direct comparisons , 
especially wi th regard to the dura t ion dependence effect of unemployment . 
W e have been able to secure ident i f icat ion of bo th s t ruc tu ra l equat ions by 
combining the restr ic t ions found in K-N (1979, 1981b) and L-C (1984). We 
have also re-es t imated the s t ruc tu ra l equat ions using modified 2SLS and 
m a x i m u m likelihood procedures which allow for selectivity bias. 
T h e es t imated results concur with most of the predict ions of the 
theoret ical j ob search model. Reservat ion wage is found to be declining with 
elapsed unemploymen t , albeit a t a decreasing ra te . The es t imated coefficient 
(=0 .046) of elapsed dura t ion in the reservat ion wage equat ion implies t ha t a 
person who has been unemployed for 3 m o n t h s has a reservation wage which 
is 11% lower t h a n when he first became unemployed and in another 3 
m o n t h s the corresponding value will be 14%. These figures are comparable 
wi th those found in K-N (1979) where the ra te of decline is computed as 
2.5% per m o n t h . Our results also provide evidence of positive dura t ion 
dependence, the magn i tude of which is consis tent wi th , and gives renewed 
confidence in the reduced form es t imates found in C h a p t e r 4. 
No claims however will be made to suggest t h a t the job search model 
provides a comple te and adequa te explanat ion of unemployment behaviour . 
There is evidence in our results which suggest t ha t quan t i ty cons t ra in t s may 
play a role in de termining unemployment . This is implied f rom the 
s t ruc tu ra l es t imates which show unemployed females having significantly lower 
reservat ion wages and yet experiencing longer spells of unemployment a t the 
same t ime. T h e absence of significant selectivity bias in the es t imates also 
suppor t this hypothesis . The reason is t ha t a d j u s t m e n t s for selectivity bias is 
based on the premise t h a t exit f rom unemployment is d ic ta ted by supply 
behaviour i.e. when the reservat ion wage, w , is exceeded by the offered wage, 
w. However, if quan t i ty cons t ra in t s in the form of deficient demand are 
opera t ive and prevent exit f rom unemployment even if w < w, then it is 
likely t h a t the ex ten t of selectivity bias in the sample will not be as serious. 
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APPENDIX G 
EFFECT OF CHANGE IN WAGE OFFER DISTRIBUTION 
i-w dG(w) 
W e wan t to show that [ dw > 0. 
0 2 
dq 
First w e need to prove that if the means of t w o d is tr ibut ions F and G 
are equal , that is, /Xp = and if the var iances < oJ^, then 
[ G{x) dx > [ F(x] dx V 2 G l0,oo). 
Jo Jo 
In other words , the d is tr ibut ion F stochast ica l ly dominates G in the 
second degree. 
P r oo f : 
f^F = 
/- oc r CO 
= / xf(x) d x = 1 - F(x) dx 
Jo Jo 
Since /Xp = f i ^ , 
/• oo roo 
- / 1 - F ( x ) d x = 1 - G ( i ) dx 
Jo Jo 
r OC rOO 
^ / F{x) dx = / G ( z ) dx. 
Jo Jo 
Let X j be the point where F ( x ^ ) = G ( X j ) . 
W e know that G ( y ) > F ( y ) V z e [0 ,Xj ) . 
But since F(x) dx = f ^ G(x) dx, and F ( x ) > 0, G ( x ) > V x, 
/ G(x] dx > [ F(x) dx V z e [0,oo) 
Jo Jo 
Q . E . D . 
Fo r finite w ' < oo, it must be true that 
* 
r G(x) - F(x) > 0. 
Jo 
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If we consider a small change in a^ ' to a^^ where 
= V ' + 
then 
» w 
y^ dG(w) / G(x) - F(x) ~ / ~ d x > 0. 
Jo Jo 
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APPENDIX H 
DERIVATION OF STRUCTURAL EQUATIONS I 
Lognormal Distribution 
T h e hazard funct ion is specified as^ 
h(t) = exp'Xe+T^log w'\ ( H i ) 
and the reservat ion wage equat ion is 
log w' = X^ + piog t ( H 2 ) 
where u ~ N(0, a^). 
Subs t i tu t ing (H2) in to (HI ) , we get 
h[t) = + TTu] 
Let G( t ) be the dis t r ibut ion funct ion of completed durat ion t 
(condit ional on X and u). We can express 1- G( t ) as 
1 - G(0 = exp\- I h{s)ds] 
Jo 
= exp[- [ +Tru}ds 
Jo 
( l + TTT/) 
Let a = and k = aexp(X(0+7r/?) + t t u I . l + TTT] ' ^ ' 
Therefore , 
1-G(0 = exp\ - k t " ] . 
Let denote the expected complete dura t ion . 
^The detailed derivations contained in this appendix closely follow the approach outlined in L-C 
( 1 9 8 4 ) 
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roc roc 
= / tg(t) dt = / 1-G(<) dt 
Jo Jo 
1 
•oo 
= / e x p l - k t ^ l d t using (H3) 
Jo 
= + (H4) 
where r[z] - (z-1)! . 
To prove the result in (H4), we use the technique of integrat ion by 
change of variable. 
. 0 0 u r[k+i] Proof: We know t h a t J^ t exp'i-Atjdt = . 
1 A 
a Let 2 = < 
dt = az^-^dz 
Therefore, 
roo - rOO 
I exp\ — kt'^\dt = I exp\ — kz\az'^~^dz 
Jo Jo 
roc 
= a z^'^expl-kz] dz 
Jo 
= a = I | l + a;fc 
k" 
Q.E.D. 
In a s tat ionary populat ion model, the density of elapsed durat ion t of 
individuals sampled from the stock of unemployed is 
f^(t\X,u) = ^ 
1 
= k'^expl-kt^'l/rll + a] (H5) 
using the results in (H3) and (H4). 
The joint density of t and u (conditional on X) may be factored as 
follows: 
f(t,u) = f^{t\u) f^(u). 
But since u ~ N(0,(t^), this means 
1 u^ f,{u) = ——expl-—] (H6) 
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Next, we want to derive the joint moment generating function of w* and t 
which is defined as 
=E\exp{s^log W'+ s^log t}] 
We obtain this by substi tuting for log w* from (H2) and taking expectation 
conditional on u and then with respect to u. See Lancaster and Chesher 
(1984). Tha t is, 
noo exp[s^log w + s^log t] f^(t\u) f^(u)dtdu 
noo exp\s^Xl3+{s^V+s^)logt f^(t\u)f^(t)dtdu. 
Substi tut ing for f j ( t | u ) from (H5), we have 
k 
+ (s^r]+s^)logt +s^u-kt'']f^(u] dtdu 
1 
1 
Again let z = t" so tha t dt = az""'^  dz. Therefore, 
/
oo rcc 
J-oofll+a] 1 1 ' 
/
oo exp[s 
^ — -oo A^al^ifZ+'z' 
where q = — . r[a] 
Substi tut ing for f2(u) from (H6) and for k, we get 
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^ V ^ ; — 
exp\s ^XI3+2{aa(s ^-S^TT)}'^] ^oo exp\-{u-(T'^a[s^-S^'K)]'^ 120"^] 
- 1 
1 
-du 
= q-exp\a{s ^r]+s^){X(e+T:P)+loga}] 
since the last integral term is equal to unity. 
Therefore, 
1 
= qexp\aXP(s ^ -s^-!r)-a(s^r]+s^)(Xe+loga) + 2{aa(s 
The moment generating function of log w* = M(s j ,0 ) and the expected 
value of log w is 
dlog M(sj,0) 
= — — 
logM{s^,0) = log r\a[s^T]+s^)]-log r\a] +s^aXP 
1 
- s^ar]{X0+loga) + 2{aas 
Therefore, 
* 
E\log w ] = arjipla) - arjloga + aX{P - rjO) 
= r?c + aX(^-r ie ) (H7) 
1 a r 
where rl}(a) — - — is the digamma function and 
i da 
c = - alog a. 
Similarly, 
dlog M(0,s^) 
E[logt] = 
= aiP(a) - aXp-K - a[Xe + logo) 
= c - aX[e + TT^ ) (H8) 
The variances and covariance of log w ' and log t are obtained as 
d'^log A/(Sj,0) 
Var\log w ] = | ^ 
d'^log M(0,s^) 
Var{logt] = | „ 
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d^log 
Cov\log ra',log t] = = 
W e can easily show that 
Var\log w*] = (H9) 
Var\logt\ = a ^ l ^ ' + c r V ^ ] (HIO) 
Cov\log w',log t] = a'^lrjip' - a'^n] ( H H ) 
d'^logf aVl dTl 
where = - - - { - - } 
da da 
A d d i n g error terms to (H7) and (H8) , we can write 
logw' = rjc + aX(/3^rie) + v^ (H12) 
logt ^ c - aX(e + w/^) + v^ (H13) 
where E ( v j ) = E(v2) = 0. 
(H12) - r,(H13) gives 
logw' = X/3 + Tjlogt + (t'l-t'j) 
7r(H12) + (H13) gives 
logt = - - Tilog w - + + xt)J (H15) 
a ^ ^ 
Using the results f r om (H9) to ( H l l ) , we can easily show that 
Var\v^ - = Var(v + ri'^Var{v - 2riCov{v 
= a' 
Var\v^ + nv^ = ' 
= 0. 
T h e var iance-covariance matrix of the s imultaneous equat ions system in 
(H14) and (H15) is thus 
/ a ^ 0 
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APPENDIX I 
DERIVATION OF STRUCTURAL EQUATIONS II 
Pareto Distribution 
The hazard function is 
/i(/) = A:1-G(«;')] ( I I ) 
w 
where G(w^) = 1 - ( - ^ f 
» ^ 
and w > w^ the origin of the Pareto tail. 
Assume that reservation wage is falling with duration according to the 
relation 
w' = (12) 
where 
» * 
u) = lim w 
0 
t — oo 
Substituting for G(w*) in ( I I ) , we get 
w 
h [ t ) = X i — y ' l ( 1 3 ) 
w 
o 
Next , we assume that the components of the hazard function may be 
expressed as function of observed variables X. 
X w ^ = exp\X9 + u j 
w^ = exp\XP + ti^] 
where Uj and u^ are error terms due to variations in unobserved variables. 
Let G(t ) be the distribution function of complete duration t (conditional 
on X , Uj and u^). The survivor function 1 - G(t ) can be written as 
1 2 8 
l-G(t) - exp[- f h(s)ds] 
Jo 
rt W 
= exp[- / 
Jo ^ 
0 
1 
= exp[ — k t a 
w 
0 ^ 1 
where k = a A ( — a = 
w 1 + 1"'/ 
0 Fol lowing the same procedure as before in Appendix H, we can show 
that the density of elapsed duration t is 
1 
= k\xp\-kt''\ir\l + a\, t>0 (14) 
T h e marginal density of w* is 
g(w*\t,X,u^,u^) = 7TwJ'(w'y~\ w'>wj (15) 
W e can now derive the jo int moment generating function of w ' and t 
which is (conditional on X , Uj and u^) 
/•OO roo ^ 
= / texp[s ^logw + s^logt]g(w \t) f(t) dw dt 
1 
roo rco ^ 
= / / k^expl-kt^l/rll + aidw'dt 
Jo J w ° 
0 
I * \ s , - T T - l TV, a 1 (w 1 TTW k poo ^ 0 ' 0 
r\l + a] Jo 
a r [ a ( s - s r;+7r7/+T?+l)] 
= q{w V r ' ^ - ' 
using the integration by change of variable technique as shown in Appendix 
iTw k 
0 
H and where q = „ 
/]l + a] 
T h e moment generating function of log t is = M(0,S2) and the expected 
va lue of log t (conditional on X,Uj,U2) is 
dlog M(0,s 
E\log t] = ^ , 
2' 
°2~ 
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log M(0,s^) =logq - {•K+l)logw^' + logT - a\s 
Therefore, 
£"1/03 t\ = a^(6) - alogk 
= axl]{b) — aloga — alog[\w J^) + avlogw ^ 
= c + a X { n l 3 - e ) + a(nu^-u^) ( 1 6 ) 
where b = a(7rr;+r?+l), rjj(b) = ——— is the digamma function 
1 |fc]5fc 
and c = V(b) - aloga. 
Similarly, the expected value of log w* is 
dlog M{s^,0) 
* 
= logw ^ — T]aip(b) + rjalogk 
= —rilail:[b) — aloga] + T]alog{\w J^) — [nrja — l)logw^ 
= -r)c + aX{f3 + r]6) + + (17) 
Adding error terms to (16) and (17), we can write 
log XV = -Tjc + aX(0 + TjO) + + (18) 
logt = c + aX{TT0-e) + a(7ru2-Uj) + (19) 
Adding rylog t to (18) and substituting jrlog w ' from (19), we get the 
following system of structural equations 
log w' = rjlog t + XjS + + + ( 1 1 0 ) 
c , 
logt h TTlog w - - Uj + - ttv^ ( 1 1 1 ) 
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CHAPTER 6 
MULTIPLE SPELLS UNEMPLOYMENT 
6.1 Introduction 
In Chap t e r 4, we noted t h a t there has been a growing awareness in 
recent years t h a t to ta l unemployment experience is gradual ly being 
concent ra ted among those with long single spells of unemployment . However 
in Aus t ra l ia and in other O E C D countr ies , a significant propor t ion of the 
unemployed popula t ion still cont inues to experience mult iple short spells of 
unemploymen t . In 1983, for example, the percentage of to ta l unemployment 
for those people in the under 24 years of age category accounted for by 
unemployed who had more than one spell of unemployment varied f rom about 
20% in Aus t ra l ia to abou t 34 % in the United Sta tes [See Trivedi and Baker 
(1983), OECD(1985) ] . 
The fac tors which are t hough t to de termine the incidence of mult iple 
unemploymen t spells are many and varied. People who experience recurring 
spells may perhaps represent those to whom non-market and leisure activit ies 
are relatively more a t t r ac t ive than employment , but who cont inue to register 
themselves as unemployed in order to claim unemployment benefits . These 
people will f rom t ime to t ime take up jobs in order to satisfy work tes ts to 
ma in t a in their eligibility for receipt of unemployment benefits and then later 
qu i t to pursue their ut i l i ty maximising non-marke t activit ies. .4 priori, we 
would expect the incidence of these job turnover act ivi t ies to be more 
prevalent among the younger workforce.^ 
The existence of mul t ip le unemployment spells may also reflect the 
seasonal f luc tua t ion in labour demand in cer tain industr ies such as 
cons t ruc t ion , tour i sm and certain rural activit ies. Another explanat ion 
a t t r i b u t e s the causes of fu r the r unemployment spells pr imari ly to the 
experience of u n e m p l o y m e n t itself ra ther t han to individual and employment 
charac ter is t ics . T h a t is, it pos tu la tes dynamic dependence in unemployment . 
^ L a b o u r force e x p e r i e n c e s u r v e y d a t a used in t h e O E C D (1985) r e p o r t shows th i s t o be t h e case 
in t h e U.S. H o w e v e r , c o n t r a r y t o a prion e x p e c t a t i o n s , t h e inc idence of m u l t i p l e u n e m p l o y m e n t 
spel l s in A u s t r a l i a a n d S w e d e n , t e n d s to be h ighe r a m o n g a d u l t s . 
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This is the state dependence, occurrence dependence or lagged duration 
hypothesis which is discussed in Chapter 4. 
The causes and pattern of occurrence of mult ip le unemployment spells 
have important implications for policy. Clearly, the range and type of policies 
and the need of them to address the problem of mult iple unemployment spells 
would be more limited if these spells were the result of seasonal demand 
variations than if they were due to employment policies of firms in relation 
to the unemployed or the difficulties encountered by particular groups of 
unemployed individuals. If the usual sequence of mult iple unemployment 
spells is one where a series of short spells is followed by increasingly longer 
spells, then there is mot ivat ion to formulate employment policies directed at 
those currently experiencing short spells, in order to reduce the incidence of 
long term unemployment in the future. 
The explanation of the phenomenon of mult iple spells unemployment 
may be rationalised by appealing to predictions of existing labour market 
models. However as we shall see in Section 6.2. none of the existing models 
can provide a completely satisfactory explanation of the occurrence of these 
unemployment spells. The main thrust of this chapter however is concerned 
with the second aspect of mult iple spells unemployment , that is, the analysis 
of the p a t t e r n o f o ccu r rence of spells of unemployment . 
Most of the empirical work concerning multiple-spells unemployment in 
the literature, e.g. Akerlof and Main (1980), Trivedi and Baker (1983), relate 
mainly to analyses of the average spell lengths and the comparison of the 
total unemployment experience of multiple-spells individuals with single-spell 
individuals. Al though the existence of recurrent unemployment is known to 
labour market analysts and data relating to the history of these spells are 
captured in presumably most of the labour market longitudinal or panel data 
sets, surprisingly little research has been done in investigating the nature of 
the pattern of occurrence of such spells. This chapter is intended to be a 
contr ibut ion to the literature on this aspect of the analysis of recurrent 
unemployment . The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 
6.2 we review briefly the potential contribution of existing labour market 
theories to the explanation of mult ip le spells unemployment . Section 6.3 
introduces the stochastic point process approach and discusses its relationship 
with the survival analysis concepts. The modell ing and estimation of the 
t iming of occurrence of mult ip le spells are presented in Section 6.4 and 
Section 6.5 concludes. 
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6 . 2 T h e o r i e s of M u l t i p l e Spel l U n e m p l o y m e n t . 
The a im of this section is not to develop a model of multiple spells 
unemployment . This task is beyond the scope of this chapter . Instead, we will 
briefly examine how well existing labour marke t theories can contr ibute to 
the explanat ion of mult iple spells unemployment . 
The job search mode! t h a t we have presented in previous chapters is 
essentially a supply-side model. . \n implicit assumption made is t ha t once an 
acceptable job is found, the individual remains employed for life. The model, 
as it s tands , is not suited for a theoretical analysis of job separations. 
Burde t t (1978) has analysed job quits using a job search model which allows 
for possibility of on-the-job search while Burdet t and Mortensen (1980) use a 
modified job search model which includes the probabili ty of layoff as a choice 
variable. However, while these models may explain the existence of quits and 
layoffs, the non-dynamic s t ruc ture of the models does not permit the 
predict ions of occurrences of job separat ions through t ime. The same may be 
said of existing demand-side models of turnover and layoffs such as those of 
Feldstein (1976) and Bailey (1977), and the implicit contract models of 
Azariadis (1981, 1983) and Burde t t and Hool (1983). Essentially these models 
use compara t ive s tat ic methods to analyse employment and wage strategies 
under condit ions of uncer ta in ty . Recurrent unemployment is explained to the 
extent t h a t the frequency of spells of unemployment is directly related to the 
probabil i ty or incidence of layoffs which are, in turn , dependent on demand 
variat ions and the oppor tuni ty costs of the worker. However these models 
shed little light on the way fu ture employment behaviour of the firm and 
worker are affected by an ex tan t spell of unemployment . 
An indication of how fu ture employment behaviour of a worker is 
determined by current non-employment s t a tus can perhaps be inferred from 
the predict ions of job-search turnover models [Jovanovic (1979)], which 
embraces elements of human-capi ta l theory. Jovanovic 's model predicts t ha t 
product ivi ty of a worker increases with tenure as a result of accumulat ion of 
specific human capi tal . Employee-init iated job separat ions occur as a 
consequence of accumulat ion of information concerning the current and 
a l te rna t ive jobs. A properly matched employee spends less t ime searching for 
a l te rna t ive employment , s tays longer with the firm and has a lower 
probabi l i ty of leaving the job. However, any job separat ion which reduces 
average job tenure is expected to result in higher job separat ion probabilities 
or turnover over the individual 's lifetime. This helps to explain the incidence 
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of multiple spells through the effect of j o b tenure on lifetime j o b separation 
probabilities if we assume that each employment spell is separated by a 
period of unemployment. However, the duration of each intervening 
unemployment spells remains unexplained. 
A viable model of recurrent unemployment must therefore be able to 
account for both employee-initiated quits and employer-initiated layoffs. More 
importantly, the links between a current unemployment spell and the 
probability of occurrence and lengths of future spells need to be established. 
Inevitably, this would require a model set in a dynamic framework with 
predictions consistent with profit maximisation of the firm and utility 
maximisation of the individual and which allows for variations in individual 
preferences, j o b characteristics, institutional factors such as unemployment 
benefits and minimum wages, and demand fluctuations. 
6 .3 Stochastic Process Models . 
In this section, we consider an approach to the modelling of occurrences 
of unemployment spells based on stochastic process models. We will first 
define the concepts and terms relating to the simple and common 
homogeneous Poisson process and later look at the alternative non-
homogeneous process models. 
6.3.1 Homogeneous Poisson Process 
Let N(t , t + h ) be a random variable which denotes the number of events 
occurring in the time interval (t, t-(-h). The counting process {N( t ) , t > 0} 
is said to be a homogeneous Poisson process if it has the following properties: 
Cox and Lewis (1966, Ch 2); Parzen (1962, Ch 4)] 
(i) Prob ;N(t, t + h ) = 0] = 1 - Ah + o (h) 
(ii) Prob [N(t, t-ph) = 1] = Ah + o (h ) 
g{h) 
where o(h) denotes the function g(h) such that lim = 0, A is called the 
rate of occurrence of events or the intensity function of the process and 
measures the mean rate of occurrence of events over a period of time, 
(i) and (ii) imply 
(iii) Prob [N(t, t + h ) > 2] = o (h) 
i.e. the probability of two or more events occurring simultaneously is zero. 
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The homogeneous Poisson process has the following innplications: 
(a) The probabil i ty of an event occurring in a given t ime interval is 
identical for all intervals of the same length; 
(b) The number of events occurring in any interval of time (t, t+h) has 
Poisson distribution with mean A(h) i.e 
Prob\N(t,t + h)=r] = — , ^  ' " (6.1) 
r! 
for r > 0. 
Let Q j be the interval of t ime between the origin and the occurrence of 
the first event. The distribution function of Q^ may be derived as follows: 
F(s) = Prob\Q^ < s] 
= 1 - Prob'iQ^ > s] 
But Prob\Q^ > s] = /Vo6|A'(0,s) =0] = eip[-As], the probability of no event in 
the interval [0, s] using (6.1). 
Therefore, 
F(s) = 1 - exp| —As! 
and the density function, 
f(s) = F'(s) = Aezpl-Asj. 
Q j therefore has an exponential distribution with parameter A. Let T^,... 
T^ denote the successive times of occurrence of events in the interval (0, T) 
and let Q j = T j , Q2 = T^ - Tj, . . . Q„ = T^ - T^ j, be the random variables 
which measure the interval of time between successive occurrences of the 
event. We know from the properties of the homogeneous Poisson process 
outl ined above that the probability of an event occurring in any interval is 
independent of all previous events that have occurred in a non-overlapping 
interval. Also, this probabil ity is identical for any interval of equal length. 
Therefore it must be true that all the Q"s have independent and identical 
exponential distr ibution with common parameter A. 
To relate and apply the theory of stochastic processes to the analysis of 
mul t ip le unemployment spells, we define the occurrence of an event as the 
occurrence of the transition to employment which is regarded as a point 
event. The occurrence of the event of employment is synonymous with the 
arrival of a failure in the language of reliability analysis [Barlow & Proschan 
(1975)] and the durat ion of unemployment corresponds to the t ime between 
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failures. The assumption that the arrivals of employment events fol low a 
homogeneous Poisson process means that the duration of unemployment in all 
spells are independently and identically distributed (i .i .d.) with exponential 
distribution function having c o m m o n parameter A. The exponential 
distribution, as we have seen earlier in Chapter 3, has the distinctive 
property that the hazard rate f rom unemployment defined as h(t) = 
a constant and equals to A in this case. This constant hazard property 
implies that 
Prob\Q > t+s j Q > i] = ProblQ > s] t, s > 0. 
i.e. being unemployed for t periods in the current spell does not affect the 
probabil ity of being unemployed for a further s period. 
The i.i.d. property of unemployment duration distributions means that if 
a person is unemployed again, either for a second, third or n time, hi IS 
probabil ity of re-employment is exactly the same as when he was unemployed 
the first time. In statistical terms the sequence of arrival times T j , T^, .... 
is said to be generated by a renewal process. The renewal process 
assumption postulates that the experience of employment returns a person to 
a 'same as new' condition. In general, however, a renewal process allows the 
distribution of times between failures to have other distributions besides the 
exponential. 
The majority of the existing literature on the analysis of re-employment 
probabilities or hazard rate f rom unemployment has been based on the 
duration data of a spell of unemployment without any distinction with 
respect to the order of the spell in the individual's unemployment history and 
consideration of the length of previous unemployment spells. Under these 
circumstances, the assumption that is explicitly or implicitly embodied by the 
analysis is one of the fol lowing: 
(i) Once the individual has made the transition to employment , he 
remains employed for the rest of his lifetime, or 
(ii) The underlying stochastic process is a renewal process and therefore 
unemployment durations are i.i.d. Hence even though multiple spells exist, 
there is no need to include any information on the history of the process in 
the analysis. This is because the i.i.d. property ensures that analysis of the 
unemployment duration data from any spell is sufficient to allow 
identification of the parameters of the underlying process. 
In the terminology of reliability analysis case (i) corresponds to the 
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failure analysis of parts of a system or a non-repairable system where failure 
of parts in the system leads to total failure of the entire system. [Ascher and 
Feingold (1981)]. Case (ii) corresponds to a repairable s y s t e m where if the 
failed components are replaced, the system is 'as good as new'. 
It is evident that to assume a renewal process for the arrival of events 
of employment implies a denial of the presence of any form of occurrence or 
lagged duration dependence in unemployment. This assumption of a renewal 
process may be untenable in analysis associated with human behaviour. Time 
in unemployment may cause a deterioration of human capital which can 
influence future employment prospects and the history of previous 
unemployment spells can stigmatise a person's employment record and 
adversely affect his success in securing jobs. It is therefore more realistic to 
consider a model where the underlying process is one where the rate of 
occurrence of events (employment) is not constant but is dependent on t, the 
time from the origin of the process. This leads to the discussion of a non-
homogeneous stochastic process. 
6.3.2 Non-Homogeneous Poisson Process 
We can generalise the definition of the homogeneous Poisson process to 
the case where the rate of occurrence of event (failure) or the intensity 
function is dependent on the time since the start of the process i.e. A = A(t). 
This underlying process is then called a non-homogeneous or time-dependent 
or non-stationary Poisson process. 
For a non-homogeneous Poisson process, N(t, t-|-h) the number of events 
occurring in a interval of time (t, t + h) has a Poisson distribution with mean 
/
t + n 
X(s)ds 
= M(t + h) - M(t) 
where M(t) = f^XisJds = ElN(0,t}j. 
The probability of observing r events in the interval is thus 
ProblNit, t + h) = r] = ^ ' ^ ^ ' (6.2) 
where r > 0 [Lawless (1982, p.495), Cox and Lewis (1966, p.28) . 
With a non-homogeneous Poisson model, the distribution of times 
between occurrence of events (failures) Q is no longer independent nor 
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iden tically distributed. The distribution of Q is now conditional on t, the 
time since the origin of the process, and is written as F^(s) where as before 
F^(s) = Prob\N(t, t + s) > 1] 
= 1 - Prob\N{t,t + s) ^0} 
= 1 - exp\-a(t, «)] using (6.2) 
(6.3) 
= 1 - exp\M(t) - M(t+s)] 
The probability density function of Q is 
dF^(s) 
= 
' as 
= M'(< + s) exp[M(t) - M(t + s)] 
= X(t+s] exp\M(t) - M(t+s)] (6.4) 
Two functional forms of A(;) that have been used widely in reliability 
analysis are 
(i) The power law or VVeibull process [Lec and Lee (1978), Engelhart 
and Bain (1978)] where: 
A(«) = // Q i " " ^ fi, a > 0. 
(ii) Cox-Lewis model [Cox and Lewis (1966)] where 
X{t) = exp'p. + Qt] ti, a e R 
For our analysis we concentrate on the use of the Weibull process (WP) 
model. 
To examine how the value of a in a W P model determines the timing 
of arrival of events (failure), consider the expected time to failure at time t 
which can be written as 
= /f 1 -s)ds 
= f exp\M(t) - M(t + s)]ds using (6.3) 
Jo 
For a W P model, the expected number of events to time t is 
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M{t) = £'ljV(0,t)] = / t i a x ' ^ ' ^ d x 
Jo 
= f i t 
0 
a 
There fo r e , 
r oo 
^ Jo 
= exp\fit°'] f exp\-fi{t+s)°']ds 
Jo 
Dif f e r en t i a t i ng E\Q^] w i th respect t o t , we get 
dt 
= expltit''] f /xqU"-^ - + exp[~^i(t+s)'']ds 
Jo 
Since p, a, s > 0, th i s implies t h a t 
dE[Qt] 
(i) if Q < 1 then > 0 
^ ' dt 
(ii) if a > 1 then < 0 
^ dt 
Again t o re la te these resul ts t o our ana lys i s of u n e m p l o y m e n t spells, we 
see t h a t if the Weibul l process is used to model t he a r r iva l t imes of 
e m p l o y m e n t events , t h e n a > 1 implies t h a t t he t imes be tween a r r iva l of 
e v e n t s will be decreas ing wi th t , i.e. the d u r a t i o n of successive u n e m p l o y m e n t 
spells will be decreas ing in l eng th . Converse ly , a < 1 impl ies t h a t 
i n t e r a r r i v a l t imes will be increas ing wi th t i.e. t he successive spells of 
u n e m p l o y m e n t d u r a t i o n will be increas ing in l eng th . 
S imi la r conclus ions are ob t a ined if we e x a m i n e t he c h a n g e in t h e 
expec t ed n u m b e r of occur rence of even t s in a given in te rva l . T h e expec ted 
n u m b e r of even t s or fa i lures for a W P model in a given in t e rva l ( t , t + h ) is 
E[N(t,t^h)\ = M(t + h) - M(t) 
= ^ [ t + h r -
Di f f e r en t i a t i ng wi th respect t o t , we o b t a i n 
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+ . a - 1 
dt 
The re f o r e , 
dE\N{t,t + h)] 
m 
dE\N(t, t + h)] 
= a^I'{t -+ hf-' - r 
> 0 if a > 1 
< 0 i f Q < 1. 
dt 
T h a t is, if Q > 1 (a < 1), the intensity funct ion A(<) is increasing (decreas ing ) 
in t ime and the expected number of occurrence of e m p l o y m e n t events in any 
g iven t ime interva l increases (decreases) w i th the to ta l t ime in unemp loyment . 
T h i s is equ iva lent t o a fall in the durat ion of successive spells of 
unemp loymen t . 
T h e e f fec t of t ime- independent changes in A due to var ia t ions in ^ may 
be eva luated f r o m the f o l l ow ing der iva t i ves . 
V a > 0. 
Jo 
and 
dE\N(t, t+h)] 
= (t + /i)" - > 0 V /i, Q > 0. 
5M 
Hence, an increase in the magn i tude of the intensity funct ion s t emming 
f r om a rise in the value of fi wi l l reduce the expected wa i t ing t ime in 
unemp loymen t and reduce the expected number of e m p l o y m e n t events 
occurr ing in any g iven t ime interva l . 
F ina l l y , w e note that whi le the use of the non-homogeneous Poisson 
mode ls in general a l lows us to de te rmine the pat tern of arr ival of 
e m p l o y m e n t events and the trend of the lengths of successive unemp loymen t 
spells, w e cannot make any direct inferences regard ing the nature of 
occurrence dependence of e m p l o y m e n t events. T h e reason is that the non-
homogeneous Poisson process still retains the proper ty of independent 
increments of the homogeneous Poisson process. [Cinlar (1975, C h a p t 4 ) ] . T h i s 
means that the number of events occurr ing in nonover lapp ing interva ls , 
N ( t + s ) - N ( t ) , are random var iables where t , s > 0. 
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6.3.3 Weibul l Process Model and Weibull Survival Model. 
The survival model with Weibull hazard function that we have 
estimated in Chapter 4 is based on the assumption of a renewal process 
generating a Weibul l distribution of unemployment durat ion. Therefore, if s is 
duration of unemployment , the distribution function of s is 
F{s] = 1 - exp i - / j (6.5) 
and the density function of y is 
f{s) = //j Q j s 1 exp\~^t^s l ! 
The Weibul l hazard function is 
h{s) = 
The relationship between the Weibul l process model and the survival 
model is apparent if we look at the expression for the distribution of wai l ing 
t ime (unemployment durat ion) in (6.3) under the Weibul l process model 
where 
= 1 - exp:/.(t)" 
When t = 0, 
which is identical to (6.5). Therefore the Weibul l process implies that the 
distribution of unemployment duration in the first spell of unemployment is 
Weibul l and the parameters in the Weibul l hazard function are identical to 
the parameters of the Weibul l intensity function. Subsequent spells however 
do not have Weibul l distributed durations since 
F^(s) = 1 - + 
and the hazard function or force of mortal i ty 
h^(s) = /x a ( t + 
are now no longer functions of s alone but are conditional on the t ime 
of occurrence of the most recent event, measured from the start of the 
process i.e. the entrance into the labour force. Looking at the hazard 
function expression, we see that the magni tude of q also has connotations for 
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the na ture of dura t ion dependence within each spell of unemployment . 
Posi t ive durat ion dependence is conveyed by a > 1 and negative durat ion 
dependence is implied by a < 1. 
F rom a probabilist ic point of view, the Weibull process (or any non-
homogeneous Poisson process) is entirely determined by the distr ibut ion of the 
wai t ing t ime to the first occurrence of an event i.e. the durat ion of the first 
spell of unemployment [Thompson (1981)]. Therefore, if we have observat ions 
on the dura t ions of the first unemployment spells of a group of identical 
individuals and we know tha t the underlying process is Weibull, for example, 
then in principle, we can predict the pa t te rn of occurrence of employment 
events for the entire life of each individual using the paramete r es t imates 
f rom the es t imated Weibull unemployment distr ibution . This ext rapola t ive 
exercise is only valid provided we have prior knowledge of the correct 
specificat ion of the underlying process. The a l ternat ive approach, which is 
more plausible, is to fit the non-homogeneous Poisson process model using all 
available information on the successive t imes of occurrence of events and the 
use the est imated results to determine, by interpolat ion, the dis t r ibut ion of 
unemployment durat ion in each spell. 
6 . 4 E s t i m a t i o n of N H P P M o d e l 
In this section, we will describe the modelling of the arrival t imes of 
employment events of individuals using a non-homogeneous Poisson process 
( N H P P ) Model. 
Suppose we observe the process over a fixed interval (0, t^) measured in 
unemployment t ime for a par t icular individual j. If n failures are observed a t 
t imes t , , t , . . . t where 0 < t , < t ^ < .... < t < t then the joint density l ' 2 n — 1 2 ri — L 
of t j , t t ^ is given by 
where f^(s) is the density funct ion, at t ime t , of the t ime between arrival of 
events and F^(s) is the corresponding distr ibut ion function. 
Using the expression for the density and distr ibut ion funct ion f rom (6.3) 
and (6.4), we can rewrite the joint density of arrival t imes in te rms of the 
intensi ty funct ion A(t) as 
M'2 
= i n v . , , ) ) " P i - y ^ 
1 = 1 
Suppose we liave observations on the labour force histories of N 
individuals in a sample. Da ta can be pooled under the assumption that each 
of the series of arrivals of events is modelled by a N H P P model. The jo int 
likelihood of the sample is thus 
N n ,, 
L = 
j=l t=l 
The individuals in the sample are not all identical. Allowance, therefore, 
must be made for the effects of heterogeneity in determining the arrival times 
of employment events. In our model, we allow the intensity function to vary 
across individuals as a function of their personal and locational characteristics. 
Hence for a Weibull process, the intensity function is written as 
= / . ( X . ) q ^ / - ' > 0, a > 0 
where = and is a vector of covariates associated with the 
individual. 
The log-likelihood to be maximised is 
N n 
log L(. \ X, f, { L - V + log a + (Q-l) log - f 
j=\ .=1 
The first order partial derivatives are (omitt ing the j subscripts for 
notat ional convenience) 
5log L J^ , . , 
and the second order partial derivatives are 
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5 ' log L ^ 
L 
M 
= E - 2 
5a a 
6.4.1 D a t a Used in Es t ima t ion 
T h e d a t a which is used in es t imat ing the \VP model is generated f rom 
the ALS d a t a set which contain informat ion on the labour force histories of 
individuals measured in calendar t ime (in weeks). F r o m this informat ion , we 
cons t ruc t , for each individual , the sequence of t imes representing the 
ar r iva l or s t a r t i ng da tes of the 1®' to n'^ employment spells. These t imes are 
measured in unemployment t ime (in weeks) since for our analysis, 
emp loymen t is t rea ted as a point event . To obta in this sequence of arrival 
t imes f rom the ALS d a t a , the dura t ion of all previous employment spells are 
sub t r ac t ed f rom the commencement da t e of each job measured in calendar 
t ime. T o main ta in uniformity in the s t a r t ing point of the underlying process 
and to minimise the effects of any exogenous change in the economic 
env i ronment not reflected in the set of covaria tes used in our analysis, the 
re levant d a t a set is restr icted only to individuals whose par t ic ipa t ion in the 
labour force began on 1 J anua ry 1984. Only observat ions with a t least one 
spell of unemployment are included, otherwise = 'Censored ' 
observa t ions in this ins tance correspond to those who are unemployed a t the 
interview da t e in which t^ equals the da te of interview measured in 
unemploymen t t ime. For those who are employed a t the interview da te , 
t = t , where t is the arr ival da te of the cur ren t job measured in L ri' n 
unemploymen t t ime. A to ta l of 1167 valid cases are available for our 
e s t ima t ion . A s u m m a r y of the character is t ics of th is sample is presented in 
Tab le 6-1. 
144 
Tab le 6-1: Statistical Characteristics of Sample 
Number of Employment Events All More than 1 
Employed at Interview (%) 34 71 
Married (%) 10 11 
Female (%) 35 32 
Birthplace (%) 
Asian 4 2 
Others 6 5 
Australia & Anglo-Saxon 90 93 
Education (%) 
10 yrs. & less 48 39 
11 to 12 yrs. 29 32 
Diploma & Trade Cert. 16 19 
Tertiary 2 4 
Others 5 6 
Location (%) 
Capital Cities 51 54 
Other Cities 25 21 
Country Town 19 19 
Rural Milage 5 6 
No Children (%) 96 97 
Living with Family (%) 72 61 
Look for/In Skilled Jobs(%) 22 24 
Average Annual Income ($) 5352 7374 
Average Age (Yrs.) 20.4 20.7 
Av. Previous Job Tenure(Wks) 4.4 12.6 
Av. Number of Jobs 0.8 2.4 
Number of observations 1167 217 
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Tab le 6-2: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Weibull Process Model 
Model ] Model 2 
Constant^ 
Married 
Female 
Age 
Age^ 
Location: 
Other Cities 
Country Town 
Rural or Farm 
Birthplace: 
Asian 
Other Countries 
Education: 
10 years L less 
Diploma & Trade 
Tertiary 
Others 
Have Children 
Live with Family 
Log Past Income 
Looking for Skilled Job 
2.78011.18] 
-0.268|2.08] 
-0.048[0.68] 
-0.8213.49] 
0.09113.381 
-0.118(1.43] 
0.100:1.14] 
0.068(0.43 
-0.323|1.63] 
0.100(0.721 
-0.321:3.97] 
0.078(0.80] 
0.353(1.80] 
0.193(1.37 
-0.162(0.83] 
-0.261(3.56] 
0.340(7.91] 
0.137I1.73] 
4.968(2.01 
-0.36212.23] 
-0.066(0.79] 
-1.064(3.55] 
0.025[3.43 
-0.143(1.75] 
0.112;i.31 
0.217(1.49 
-0.379:1.89; 
0.111 0.75] 
-0.383(4.09 
0.124:1.07] 
0.437(2.07] 
0.306:i.87] 
-0.167:0.92] 
-0.35014.12] 
0.384(10.581 
0.129;1.61 
0.905;32.43] 1.005:20.37 
0.768(4.24] 
Log likelihood 
Sample size 
-4404.85 
1167 
-4380.36 
1167 
Notes: 
a. t-statistics are in brackets. 
J 46 
6.4.2 Es t ima ted W P Models 
The es t ima ted p a r a m e t e r s of the simple Weibull process model are 
presented as model 1 in Tab le 6-2. F rom these e s t ima tes we can make the 
following observat ions . Firs t ly unmarr ied and younger persons experience 
signif icantly higher number of employment events in any given unemployment 
t ime period. This result reinforces the common a priori expecta t ion t ha t 
younger people with no family c o m m i t m e n t s tend not to have s t rong job 
a t t a c h m e n t and therefore experience higher j ob tu rnover and mul t ip le short 
i n t e r m i t t e n t unemploymen t spells. Significantly lower values of the intensity 
func t ion are also associated wi th individuals who had less t h a n 11 years of 
schooling, suggest ing t h a t lower educated persons are prone to have more 
prolonged du ra t ions bu t fewer spells of unemployment . The coefficients of the 
o ther educat ion variables show t h a t , in general , individuals with more formal 
educat ion tend to have relatively greater number of jobs over a given to ta l 
t ime in unemployment . The significant positive coefficient of the variable 
which records the income of the individual ' s income unit in the previous year 
which is used here as a proxy for weal th may be adduced as evidence to 
suppor t the hypothesis t h a t individuals with grea ter weal th are more able 
f inancial ly, and more willing to qui t to under t ake unemployed job search in 
the search for bet ter j ob offers leading to a higher frequency of short 
unemploymen t spells for these people. The type of household s t ruc tu re which 
a person lives in also appear to de termine the pa t t e rn of occurrence of 
employment events . Individuals living with the family tend to have lower 
n u m b e r of employment events and longer spells of unemployment . The 
in tu i t ion underlying this effect is ra ther difficult to rat ionalise. Our findings 
in the previous chap te r indicate t h a t these individuals tend to have lower 
reservat ion wages and hence, ceteris par ibus should have higher unemployment 
exit probabi l i t ies . One plausible explanat ion may be t h a t the household 
s t r u c t u r e var iable reflects to some extent cer tain unmeasurab le character is t ics , 
for example , lack of independence or mobil i ty , which adversely influence their 
success in securing jobs . The es t imated value of a is highly significant and 
less t h a n un i ty . Th is result implies t h a t the successive spells of unemployment 
t end to increase in length and the hazard func t ion in each spell of 
u n e m p l o y m e n t exhibi t negat ive du ra t ion dependence proper t ies . 
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6.4.3 A l l o w i n g for Unobserved Heterogene i ty . 
T h e W P mode l es t ima ted is essential ly a 'f ixed effects' mode l where all 
i n d i v i d u a l heterogenei ty is assumed t o be c ap t u red by the non-stochast ic X 
vector . W e shal l now consider a ' r a n d o m effects' mode l where we a l low for 
the poss ib i l i ty t h a t the X vector m a y no t con t a i n al l t he exp lana to ry 
var i ab les t h a t a ccoun t for va r i a t i ons in the in tens i ty f unc t i on A(t) across 
i nd i v i dua l s . Unobserved heterogenei ty is i n t roduced in the es t ima t i on by 
w r i t i n g 
I v) = V 
where v is a speci f icat ion error due t o o m i t t e d exp l ana to ry var iab les wh ich 
are i n dependen t of X . 
T h e presence of th is unobserved r a n d o m var i ab le v m e a n s t h a t the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of i n terar r iva l t imes is now also a cond i t i ona l d i s t r i b u t i on . F r o m 
(6 .3 ) , we now wr i te 
1 t;) = 1 - exp\M[t I v) - M(t + s \ i>)l 
For the W e i b u l l process th is m a y be wr i t t en as 
F J s h ) = 1 - expl + 
1 — eip[ —r(f + s)i;] 
where r(( + s) = + — fit'^. 
T o o b t a i n the uncond i t i o n a l or m a r g i n a l d i s t r i bu t i on f unc t i o n , we m u s t 
i n teg ra te ou t v. i.e. 
1 - F^(s\v) g(v) dv 
where g ( v ) is t he dens i ty f unc t i on of v. 
Suppose we assume t h a t v has un i t g a m m a d i s t r i bu t i on where 
= m 
k 
a n d E(v) = 1 = -
7 
k „ 
Var[v) = — = 
1 
T h e u n cond i t i o n a l d i s t r i bu t i on f unc t i on of i n terar r iva l t imes (w i t h 
respect t o v) is 
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roo 
1 - FAs] = 
y  
/ exp\-{-^ ^ r[i + s)]v\ dv 
Jo m 
rit + s) , 
= 1 + 
again using the result that J z ' e x p i - r z ] dx = , where F is the gamma 
function. 
] 
Since k = — for the unit gamma distr ibution, we have 
a 
1 
1 - = [ 1 
' (7 
1 
a 
T h e corresponding marginal (with respect to v ) density function is 
1 
/(s) = I 1 + + - Mt""} (6.8) 
' <T 
W e can now proceed to obtain max imum likelihood estimates of the 
underlying process using a random effects Weibul l process model that allows 
for unobserved heterogeneity. 
F rom the jo int density function of t^ t^ given in (6.6), we can now 
wri te the jo int likelihood of the sample as 
= n {fi 1 1 + - V} + - V 
If ^l(x) = exp(X/3), the log-likelihood function to be maximised is: 
logLj = log L{.\X,t,n-a, 
N n ^ 
= E { E + + u - ( 1 + u + '^'expixm,'' - } 
;=1 .=1 
a 
T h e partial der ivat ives for this l ikelihood are in Appendix J. If this 
distribution of unobserved heterogeneity is correctly specified, then the extent 
of this neglected heterogeneity in the sample may be ascertained by 
est imat ing the above model using the max imum likelihood method and testing 
the signif icance of the est imate of a^, the variance of the heterogeneity 
distr ibution. 
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T h e es t imated Weibull process model whicli incorpora tes uni t g a m m a 
d i s t r ibu ted unobserved heterogeneity is presented as model 2 in Table 6-2. 
T h e es t imated value a^ is significant thus a t t e s t ing to the impor tance of 
unobserved heterogeneity in the sample. The significance of the es t imated 
coefficients of the X covar ia tes also has improved. Allowing for unobserved 
heterogenei ty in the sample has also increased the value of the a pa rame te r . 
6.4.4 Modelling Occurrence Dependence. 
We s ta r ted earlier t ha t the Weibull process model , per se, does not 
allow us to deduce directly the na tu re of occurrence dependence. This 
l imi ta t ion can perhaps be overcomed in our regression analysis by allowing 
the intensi ty funct ion to depend on the number of preceding events t h a t had 
occurred. This general isat ion of the intensi ty funct ion has also been suggested 
by Prent ice ei. al. (1981) who used it in the analysis of mul t ip le failures 
using an extended version of Cox 's (1972) propor t ional hazard model. For our 
analysis , we will in t roduce a spell-varying variable, Z[t) = N[t) - i , denot ing 
the number of preceding events as an addi t ional covaria te . The intensi ty 
func t ion may now be wri t ten as 
\(t) = exp\ XP + ')Z{t) 
The likelihood funct ion is thus 
= 'J i n imX^ j ' exp\XP + ds]} 
j=l t = l 
f'L 
. exp [- / exp\Xl3+ ds]. 
T h e log-likelihood funct ion may be wr i t ten as 
N n 
l og = E { E ^ ^ + + log a + ( a-l ) l o g t^ - exp\xp + - } 
Par t i a l der ivat ives for the log-likelihood are given in Appendix J . 
T h e sign of the es t imated value of 7 will permi t us to know the na tu re 
of occurrence dependence. If 7 is positive, it implies t ha t occurrences of 
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T a b l e 6-3: M L E of Weibull Process \4odel with Occurrence Dependence 
Model 3 Model 4 
Constant '^ 
Marr ied 
Fennale 
Age 
Age2 
Locat ion: 
O the r Cities 
Coun t ry Town 
Rural or F a r m 
Bir thplace: 
Asian 
Othe r Count r ies 
Educa t ion : 
10 years & less 
Diplonaa & T r a d e 
Ter t i a ry 
Othe r s 
Have Children 
Live with Family 
Log P a s t Income 
Looking for Skilled Job 
Number of Previous Spells 
0.899|0.38! 
-0.232[1.78] 
-0.025|0.35] 
-0.570(2.39] 
0.013[2.25 
-0.115(1.40 
0.078(0.90] 
-0.047(0.30] 
-0.253[1.28] 
0.132(0.96] 
-0.300(3.72] 
0.097(1.01] 
0.263(1.35] 
0.190 1.35] 
-0.138(0.70] 
-0.256(3.49] 
0.248(6.05] 
0.159(2.01] 
0.558(12.68] 
1.507(0.58] 
-0.265(1.89] 
-0.028(0.37] 
-0.649(2.43 
0.015(2.31{ 
-0.107(1.28] 
0.089(0.95] 
0.022(0.14] 
-0.259(1.29] 
0.155(1.08] 
-0.334[4.00! 
0.105(1.06] 
0.265(1.35] 
0.235(1.71] 
-0.159(0.80] 
-0.281(3.49] 
0.269(8.47] 
0.154(2.05] 
0.574(11.79] 
0.863(30.31] 0.906(21.62] 
0.266(2.00] 
Log likelihood 
Sample size 
-4342.12 
1167 
-4341.17 
1167 
Notes : 
a. t - s ta t i s t ics are in brackets . 
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previous events increase the current value of A(t) and hence the probabi l i ty of 
occurrence of the next event in a given t ime interval is increased. In other 
words , the expected wai t ing t ime (unemployment dura t ion) to the next 
emp loymen t event is reduced. Therefore , a posi t ive value of 7 implies t ha t 
the grea ter the number of employment events or equivalent ly the spells of 
u n e m p l o y m e n t a person has had in the pas t , the shor ter will be the expected 
du ra t ion of the cur ren t spell of unemployment . This is synonymous with the 
not ion of posit ive occurrence dependence which we described earlier in 
C h a p t e r 4. Similarly, we can argue t h a t a negat ive 7 corresponds to negative 
occurrence dependence. 
The resul ts of es t imat ion using the modified Weibull process model 
which allows the preceding history of events to affect the intensi ty funct ion in 
the cur ren t period are reported as Model 3 in Tab le 6-3. Model 4 in Table 
6-3 also allow for uni t g a m m a dis t r ibuted unobserved heterogeni ty . A 
compar ison of the es t imated models in Table 6-3 with those in Table 6-2 
shows t h a t no subs tan t ia l differences are observed in the es t imated coefficients 
of the var iables in the X vector of character ic t ics . The coefficients of the 
age, educat ion , household s t ruc tu re and income variables remain significant in 
the new models, a l though the magn i tude of these coefficients are all slightly 
lower. The value of Q is also smaller in both models. The significant positive 
value of 7 in both models points to the existence of positive occurrence 
dependence. An examinat ion of Model 4 reveals t h a t the value of the 
var iance of the unobserved heterogeneity d is t r ibut ion is now only marginally 
s ignif icant . T h u s it appears t h a t much of the heterogenity t h a t is previously 
regarded as unobservable can in fact be explained away by the differences in 
the number of pas t spells or events experienced by individuals in the sample. 
6.4.5 Es t ima t ion wi th s t ra t i f ied sample. 
The sample t h a t we are using comprises individuals who have varying 
n u m b e r s of employment events . For any given interval of t ime in 
unemploymen t , it is obvious t h a t the average length of an unemployment 
spell will vary inversely with the number of events of employment . Our 
sample , however, conta ins observat ions with differing number of employment 
events and interval lengths measured in unemployment t ime. It would be an 
in teres t ing exercise to test if the observat ions with differing spells are sampled 
f r o m the same popula t ion . This could be done by s t ra t i fy ing the sample by n, 
the to ta l n u m b e r of events observed and es t imat ing the s t ra t i f ied samples 
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separa te l y . A l te rna t ive ly , we can use the pooled sample and introduce n-
dependent dummies either through the pa ramete r /i (v ia the intercept term in 
0) or through the parameter q, that is, 
e i ther /x = + ^ c tf j = exp[XP) '^n'^J' 
n=2 n=2 
or Q = Q + > a d . 0 z—^ n n 
n=2 
where 
d^ = 1 if there are n events , 
= 0 otherwise. 
In some sense, these s t rat i f ied models may be regarded as dummy 
var i ab le models where the var ia t ions in unobserved heterogeneity are assumed 
to be correlated with the known number of tota l spells experienced within an 
observed interval of t ime. 
The results of this exercise shown in Tab le 6-4 reveal that people with 
higher tota l number of spells tend to have corresponding higher va lues of the 
intens i ty function and thus shorter durat ion of unemployment spells. Model 5 
which has n-dependent dummies in the a pa ramete r , indicates tha t for those 
wi th two or more events of employment , the intensity function increases with 
t ime in unemployment (i.e. a > 1 ). This also implies posit ive durat ion 
dependence in each unemployment spell. 
The results obtained here, however, need to be treated caut iously in 
view of the nature of the ALS da t a set used. It may be argued tha t some of 
the posit ive correlat ion between the intensi ty function value and the total 
number of events may be spurious, caused largely by the re lat ive ly short 
observat ion period of the d a t a set from the first phase of the ALS. This 
short observat ion period mean that indiv idua ls who have mult ip le spells of 
long dura t ions are less likely to be observed as such and in this instance 
would tend to be classified under the category of those with spells of lower 
order. High order mult ip le spells observat ions in this sample on the other 
hand , would tend to be biased towards those with spells of short durat ion. 
The resolution of this problem is essent ia l ly an empir ica l mat t e r and d a t a 
from the future phases of the ALS, which will have longer observat ion t ime 
span should provide addi t ional ins ights to the results obtained here. 
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Tab le 6-4: MLE of VVeibull Process Model Using Stratified Sample 
Model 5 Model 6 
Constant^ 
Married 
Female 
Age 
Age^ 
Location: 
Other Cities 
Country Town 
Rural or Farm 
Birthplace: 
Asian 
Other Countries 
Education: 
10 years & less 
Diploma & Trade 
Tertiary 
Others 
Have Children 
Live with Family 
Log Past Income 
In Skilled Occupations 
"o 
"3 (^3) 
"4 K ) 
Log likelihood 
N 
-3.961|1.62 
-0.212ll.62| 
0.017(0.23] 
-0.054[0.22l 
0 . 0 0 1 j o . 1 0 ] 
-0.005! 0.06] 
0.072|0.82] 
-0.124(0.79] 
0.071(0.36] 
0.265(1.91 
-0.252(3.09] 
0.09811.001 
0.158(0.80] 
0.203(1.43: 
0.043(0.21] 
-0.096(1.30] 
0.193(5.22] 
0.205[2.57] 
0.766(25.92] 
0.493(22.93] 
0.643(18.88] 
0.680[13.82] 
0.856[12.04] 
-4016.2 
1167 
-5.266[0.19( 
-0.179(1.37] 
0.014(0.19 
-0.016(0.06 
0.001(0.08] 
0.007(0.08] 
0.075(0.85] 
-0.137(0.88] 
0.151(0.75] 
0.292(2.09] 
-0.231(2.85] 
0.082(0.84] 
0.127(0.65] 
0.174^1.23] 
0.050(0.25] 
-0.054|0.72] 
0.162(4.45] 
0.181(2.27] 
1.044(32.97] 
1.894(25.05] 
2.432(22.31 
2.504(15.88] 
3.082(14.47] 
-3949.87 
1167 
Notes: 
a. t-statlstlcs are in brackets. 
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Tab l e 6-5: MLE of Weibull Process Mode! with Employment Duration 
Model 7 
Constant'' 0.377[0.]5l 
Married -0.218:1.78] 
Female -0.021 0.301 
Age -0.50912.06! 
Age^ 0.012(2.02] 
Location: 
Other Cities -0.098(1.24] 
Country Town 0.031(0.36] 
Rural or Farm -0.169(1.09] 
Birthplace: 
Asian -0.175(0.98] 
Other Countries 0.167(1.22] 
Education: 
10 years & less -0.259(3.33] 
Diploma & Trade 0.110[l.21j 
Tertiary 0.263(1.35] 
Others 0.153(1.21] 
Have Children -0.006)0.04] 
Live with Family -0.228(3.24] 
Log Past Income 0.216(7.50] 
Looking for Skilled Job 0.1171.57] 
Number of Previous Spells 0.106f2.13] 
Log Previous Employment Spell 0.611] 14.83] 
0.908(32.411 
Log likelihood 
Sample size 
-4259.98 
1167 
Notes: 
a. t-statistics are in brackets. 
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6.4.6 Effects of Dura t ion of Employmen t 
T h u s far , we have made the explicit a s sumpt ion t h a t employment is a 
poin t event in the es t imat ion of the models. This means t h a t all 
e m p l o y m e n t events are t rea ted alike, and no significance is a t t ached to the 
length of t ime a person has spent in employmen t , prior to h i s /he r cur ren t 
u n e m p l o y m e n t spell. This may be an unnecessarily restr ict ive assumpt ion 
since t ime is employment is likely to con t r ibu te to the accumula t ion of 
h u m a n cap t i ta l which can affect f u tu r e occurrences of employment events . If, 
however , the accumula t ion of human capital are in the form of firm-specific 
skills, we would not expect the dura t ion of employment to play a s ignif icant 
role in de termining the fu tu re occurrences of events . 
To test the above hypothesis , we have modified Model 4 in Tab le 6-3 
to include an addi t ional spell-varying var iable which denotes the dura t ion of 
employmen t in the job prior to each spell of unemployment the individual is 
in. The intensi ty funct ion of the new model is 
where Z{t) — N{t) - i denote the number of previous events, and •E'^jf) 
is the dura t ion of the employment event . 
The likelihood funct ion is thus 
n .t^ 
{T\ txp\xp ^ -t(i-\) exp\- / ' exp\XI5 + t{i-\] + O E d s \ } XX ! J J, ! 
"3 3 
N  
t. , 
j=l .=1 
^ exp\XP ^ (is]. 
T h e es t imated model is presented as Model 7 in Table 6-5. The results show 
the es t imated coefficient of the dura t ion of employment variable to be highly 
s ignif icant . A likelihood ra t io test indicates t h a t Model 7 represents a 
s ignif icant improvement over Model 4. The inclusion of the employment 
d u r a t i o n var iable does not appear to subs tant ia l ly affect the the significance 
or m a g n i t u d e of the coefficients of the X covar ia tes . However, the magn i tude 
and significance of the number of previous spells var iable has decreased. T h e 
va lue of a is higher bu t still indicates negat ive dura t ion dependence in 
u n e m p l o y m e n t . 
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6.5 Summary and Conclusion 
In th is chap te r , our main interest has been centred on the analysis of 
recur ren t unemploymen t . A brief survey of the fac ts associated wi th 
recur ren t spells in other s tudies indicates t h a t a sa t i s fac tory theoret ical labour 
m a r k e t model of multiple-spells unemploymen t would inevi tably have to 
appeal to the var ious s t r ands of existing labour marke t theories. The 
deve lopment of a r igorous theoret ical model of recur ren t unemploymen t 
remains a domain where more research work is necessary. 
The empirical analysis of the de t e rminan t s of the p a t t e r n of occurrence 
of employment events or synonymously , the dura t ion of successive spells of 
u n e m p l o y m e n t was the next focus of a t t en t ion . We have int roduced a 
methodology for th is task which is based on the theory of s tochas t ic 
processes. The re la t ionship and possible dual i ty between the s tochast ic 
process approach and the more convent ional hazard funct ion survival model 
techniques were also highlighted. The use of s tochast ic count ing process in the 
analysis of labour marke t behaviour has been suggested previously by 
Andersen (1984). However, the work in this chap te r represents the first 
appl ica t ion of these models to labour marke t longi tudinal d a t a in the 
model l ing of mult iple spells and the tes ts of occurrence dependence. Various 
specif icat ions of fixed effects and r andom effects of the Weibull process model 
have been es t imated . The results point to the impor tance of posit ive 
occurrence dependence in de termining the current and fu tu r e dura t ions of 
unemploymen t spells. The models t h a t are es t imated also provide informat ion 
concerning the na tu re of dura t ion dependence in unemploymen t . The result 
ob ta ined here seems to point towards negat ive dura t ion dependence which is 
a t var iance with the resul ts obtained using the survival models approach . 
These differing results are not easy to reconcile. The s tochast ic process 
es t imat ion approach draws on the informat ion regarding the labour force 
his tory of the individual in con t ras t to the survival models which is based on 
d a t a f rom one unemployment spell. One weakness of the present analysis lie 
in the n a t u r e of the d a t a set which has a relatively shor t observat ion period 
and is biased towards oversampling of those wi th only one spell of 
u n e m p l o y m e n t . Strat i f ied es t imat ion of the sample indicates t h a t individuals 
wi th mul t ip le spells tend to possess unemployment hazard funct ions which 
exhibi t posi t ive dura t ion dependence propert ies . The avai labi l i ty of d a t a wi th 
ex tended observat ion period f rom the follow-up phases of the ALS should 
shed new light on this aspect of the analysis . 
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A P P E N D I X J 
PART IAL DERIVATIVES OF STOCHASTIC PROCESS MODELS 
J . l W e i b u l l P rocess w i t h U n i t G a m m a H e t e r o g e n e i t y 
The log-likelihood function of this model is 
N n 
1 
= E ( E + " + " (1 + - ) l " g ;i + a ' e x p i x m , " - } 
J=1 .=1 a 
1 
a 
Let 
Q a 
R = ezp{X0)\t^ 
Q = exp{X/3) -
We note that 
dP 
R = 
da 
= eip(X/3) [e^ . log?^. - j], 
dQ a a 
exp[XP)\t^\ogt^- tjogt^^ 
da 
and 
y = - exp{Xi3) {logt^f - r_j{logr j}' 
Z = ^ = exp(XP)[tl{\ogtj' - C i l o g t J ^ I , 
da 
The first order partial derivatives may be written as 
alogLj N n + Q 
a l ogL j N n ^ (cr^+l)P, 
1 . 
+ - l o g [ l + a ' Q ) } -
a" a^il + a^Q) 
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aiogLj N n ^ {a' + l)R. 
= E + - — r r ) -
The second order derivatives are 
a i ogL^ N „ + 
f^c ^m ( l + a P) (1 + Q) 
a^logLj A' n 
a^iogl^ N n 
= — -
= E ^ . K E : — r - } + 
Q 
2 
2^i2 
= V { Y - — log(l + ^ + ^ 
2 , 2 Q Q(l + 2a^Q) 
log(l + a2Q) + + — 
d'logL^ N n R[P-1) 
dada' + + 
J . 2 W e i b u l l Process w i t h Spel l-dependent Va r i ab l e 
The log-likelihood function for this model is 
N n 
j=i .=1 
If we let P., Q, R., S, Yj and Z denote the same quantities as in 
Section J . l above, then the first order derivatives are 
alog L^ ^ 
aiog ^ " 
= E i E - } -
dl 
j=i .=1 
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5log L , N „ J 
= E i E - ^ " } - ^ 
d a ^ Q 
j=l 1=1 
T h e second order der iva t ives are 
^ 2=\ ,=1 
= - R . ) - s ] 
d^ d a 
" j = l .=1 
a ^ l o g L , N 
= E { E } " 
;=1 .=1 
a^iog L N 
= E { E - } -
d-)da 
= E i E 
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CHAPTER 7 
TARGETED EMPIOYMENT SUBSIDIES AND UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
7.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n 
This chapter was motivated by the Australian Special Youth 
Employment and Training Program (SYETP) , an employment based subsidy 
program, which subsidises employer at a f lat-rate to hire and train "long-
te rm" young unemployed people for a specified period^; subsequently the 
individual so subsidised may remain employed or may revert to 
unemployment . In this paper we examine the economic logic of such a 
targeted training subsidy and its likely effects. Although we confine our 
discussion to a specific type of targeted employment training, some features of 
our analysis may be applicable also to more general types of subsidies and 
training. 
A distinction may be drawn between training (or retraining) and 
subsidy. A subsidy program may be defined to be a form of labour market 
intervention to assist an unemployed person who will nevertheless remain 
dependent on receiving a job offer from an employer, with the subsidy leading 
to an increase in the probability of receiving that job offer and the extent of 
the increase depending on the employer's elasticity of demand for labour. A 
very small employment elasticity could imply a small probability of leaving 
unemployment but a high probability of remaining employed at the end of 
the subsidy period if initially hired. A pure targeted training program may 
be defined as one which an individual from the target group has a right to 
enter so tha t the elasticity of labour demand is irrelevant. At the conclusion 
of training a person will (formally) become unemployed but , of course, 
training may shorten the expected durat ion of such an unemployment spell. 
As we shall point out later in Section 7.5, S Y E T P shares some features 
of both training and subsidy programs. It provides young unemployed 
persons with an opportunity for training but the size of the program depends 
^Long- term unemployed are defined to be those with elapsed dura t ion on unemployment benefi ts 
of 17 weeks and over. The subsidy period is also 17 weeks. See Section 7.4.1 below and 
Smi th (1984a) for details . 
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upon the extent of employer participation which would presumably vary with 
the size of the subsidy. In our framework we shall pay much more attention 
to the training than to the subsidy aspect but , as we indicate briefly in 
Section 7.5, the framework can be readily modif ied to encompass subsidies. 
Intuitive rationale for preferring targeted employment training subsidies 
over unemployment benefits appears to be based on a desire to bring about 
an " i m p r o v e d " distribution of unemployment by reducing the incidence of 
long-term unemployment amongst members of the target group. This is done 
both directly and indirectly. The direct effect comes f rom providing financial 
incentives to employers to hire f rom the target group and the indirect effect 
comes f rom a possible reduction in future unemployment due to current 
employment . The argument for the indirect effect is intimately related to the 
negative duration dependence hypothesis which postulates that an individual 's 
reemployment probabil i ty is a declining function of the elapsed unemployment 
duration or lagged duration dependence as defined by Heckman and Borjas 
(1980) . Employment subsidies targeted on the long-term unemployed are 
mot ivated in part by a desire to reduce or reverse negative duration 
dependence. Given the widespread concern with the problem of long-term 
unemployment especially amongst the young and older workers, see O E C D 
(1983) , a more formal analysis of the effects of targeted subsidy seems 
worthwhile since it is not completely obvious that the substitution of a 
subsidy in place of unemployment benefits, at least for a period of time, is 
necessarily desirable, and even if it were, there remains the question of 
appropriately choosing various parameters such as the subsidy rate, the 
waiting period to be eligible for subsidy and the period of subsidy. Some of 
these issues have been examined in an earlier paper by Brooks and Volker 
(1984) . Here we at tempt a more detailed and formal treatment. 
In Section 7.2 we present a simple model which characterises the policy 
environment and a target unemployed individual 's probabil ity of leaving 
unemployment under alternative policy regimes. W e argue that introduction 
of a target subsidy scheme could give arise to certain (dis)incentive effects 
which could increase the average duration of unemployment in the pre-subsidy 
period. In Section 7.3 we show how optimal waiting period and the period 
on subsidy might be chosen by a pol icy-maker whose object ive function is 
minimisation of the expected value of the incremental cost of subsidy. In 
Section 7.4 we present some results of a numerical simulation exercise to 
exhibit the nature of trade-offs between alternative parameter settings 
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avai lable to the policy make r . Section 7.5 out l ines some f u r t h e r extensions of 
t he basic model. 
7.2 The Model 
7.2.1 Policy 
T h e policy identif ies a t a rge t g roup of unemployed individuals with 
cer ta in observable charac ter is t ics . Before enter ing the subsidy scheme they 
receive benefi ts a t a cons t an t ra te of SB per period. T h e benefi ts are 
assumed to be a t a flat r a t e and nei ther experience ra ted nor subjec t to 
exhaust ion.^ Af te r not less t h a n T^ periods in u n e m p l o y m e n t , the 
unemployed person may enter a p rog ram of subsidised employmen t for a 
m a x i m u m of r periods, 7 = T^. Volun ta ry n a t u r e of the p rog ram 
implies t h a t some will have an elapsed u n e m p l o y m e n t du ra t ion of greater 
t h a n T j periods. In t h a t case the excess period of previous unemployment 
can be regarded as an observable charac ter i s t ic of the p rog ram par t i c ipan t . 
T h e employer receives a subsidy a t a flat ra te of SZ per period, for a 
m a x i m u m period of (T^ - T^) periods. Again for simplici ty we assume t h a t 
all pa r t i c ipan t s comple te the full period of subsidised employment . (This 
a s sumpt ion can be relaxed a t the expense of some addi t ional complicat ion.) 
At TT the subsidised employee could remain employed or could revert to 
u n e m p l o y m e n t in which case s h e / h e will receive unemploymen t benefits . For 
simplici ty we shall assume t h a t the j ob offer probabi l i ty does not vary with 
the level of subsidy. 
7.2.2 The Unemployed and J o b Search S t ra tegy 
It will be assumed t h a t unemployed persons who receive unemployment 
benef i ts engage in op t imal j ob search. We will based our analysis on the job 
search model presented earlier in C h a p t e r 4. 
As before we let V(w[t]) denote the expected l ifetime ut i l i ty of a person 
w h o accepts a j o b offer wi th wage r a t e w a t t ime t , i>'{w) > 0. Let V( t ) 
be the m a x i m u m expected l ifetime ut i l i ty f rom search of an unemployed 
person who has been unemployed for t periods and who a d o p t s an op t imal 
policy in all per iods a f t e r t : 
Recall t h a t we can wr i te V ( t - l ) as . 
^ T h e s e a s s u m p t i o n s a re for s imp l i c i t y . W h i l e t h e y ref lec t c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s of t h e A u s t r a l i a n 
u n e m p l o y m e n t b e n e f i t s , t h e y cou ld be m o d i f i e d t o al low for v a r i a t i o n s in t h e r a t e of b e n e f i t s over 
a n u n e m p l o y m e n t spel l . 
163 
= U { y ) + p ^ \ l - G ( w ' ) ] E \ r P ( W ) \ W > w * ] + p { l - ' ^ \ l - G ( w ' ) ] } V ( t ) , ( 7 . 1 ) 
where p is the discount factor, w is the reservation wage and y = B+z-c 
where z is non-wage income and c is the cost of search. 
Differentiat ing (7.1) with respect to w we saw tha t the optimal 
reservation w* satisfies 
n o = ( 7 . 2 ) 
T h a t is, given an interior solution, the reservation wage w* in period t 
equates the expected return of accepting a job offer with wage w to the 
expected return f rom remaining unemployed and searching for a t least one 
more period. 
Consider the effects of an improvement in the wage offer distr ibution. 
A wage offer distr ibution Gj (w) is said to be preferred to G(w) if Gj (w) < 
G(w) for all w. In other words, G^ stochastically dominates G in the first 
order, i.e. a r ightward shift of the mean of the distribution occurs which 
increases the probability of receiving higher wage offers. 
Rearranging the terms in (7.1), we get 
V ( t - 1 ) = U{y} + p{V(t) +f . \ i ; { w ) - V { t ) ] 9 ( w ) d w } ( 7 . 3 ) 
J w 
Next, integrate by parts , the third term in (7.3) and subst i tu te for 
V'(w') using (7.2). It is readily seen tha t the change in this value function 
due to the change in wage distribution from G(w) to Gj (w) is 
J w 
which is positive. 
It follows f rom (7.3) tha t an improvement in the wage offer distr ibution 
a t t ime t will lead to an increase in V( t - l ) . If we let a( t ) = 1 - G ( w ' ) , 
then f rom equation (7.1), 
d V ( t - 2 ) ^ = > 0, 
d V ( t - Z ) _ d V ( t - S ) d V ( t - 2 ) 
d V ( t - l ) " d V ( t - 2 ) d V [ t - \ ) 
= p^\ \ - - ^ a i t - l ) ] |1-7<^(«-2)] > 0. 
i.e. an improvement in the wage offer distr ibution at t ime t will 
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increase the expected d iscounted l ifet ime ut i l i ty f rom search for all periods 
pr ior to t . Moreover the ex ten t of the increase in V will be greater for 
per iods closer t o t t h a n those per iods which are fu r the r f rom t. This 
a r g u m e n t is s imilar t o t h a t of Pissar ides (1976) who has shown t h a t 
i m p r o v e m e n t in the wage offer d i s t r ibu t ion leads to an increase in the 
reserva t ion wage. 
Using the f i rs t order condi t ion for an interior o p t i m u m in (7.2), we can 
therefore predict t h a t an expected improvemen t in the wage offer d is t r ibut ion 
a t t ime t will increase the reservat ion wage of the unemployed individual for 
all periods prior to t , the ex ten t of the increase being grea ter the closer he 
gets to t . 
7.2.3 Effects of Dura t ion -dependen t J o b Arr ivals 
So for it has been assumed t h a t 7, the probabi l i ty of receiving a job 
offer , is cons t an t and therefore independent of the elapsed unemployment 
d u r a t i o n . Arguab ly , a more realistic assumpt ion would be t h a t the ra te a t 
which new job offers are received declines as the elapsed unemployment 
d u r a t i o n increases. Suppose, 
7 = l [ t ) 0 < 7 < 1. 
where lim 7(0 0 and 7 ' ( f ) < 0 . 
t 00 
Consider a one-period increase in 7 a f te r elapsed unemploymen t dura t ion 
of t . The effect of this change on V ( t - l ) is 
^ ^ ^ = pl-g[w )i { - V'(0 } > 0. 
/ « g(w)dw 
w 
If a fu r the r increase in 7 occurs a t t ime t + 1 , the change in V ( t - l ) is 
dV(t-l) ^ dV(t-l] 
diit) 57( t + l ) 
dV(t-l) ^ dV{t-l) dV[t) 
57(0 dV{t) 8-^(1 + 1) 
Therefore , if 7 is expected to fall as elapsed unemploymen t dura t ion 
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increases , it will cause t he r e se rva t ion u t i l i ty t o decrease which will t h u s 
e n h a n c e t he decl ine in rese rva t ion wages . 
7.2.4 Some D u r a t i o n C o n c e p t s 
In absence of a policy of subsidised e m p l o y m e n t , t h e p robab i l i t y t h a t an 
u n e m p l o y m e n t spell will t e r m i n a t e a t t is deno ted by t he d u r a t i o n dens i ty 
f u n c t i o n f ( t ) , cond i t i ona l on t he c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t he ind iv idua l . Recall f r o m 
t h e discuss ion in C h a p t e r 3 t h a t given f ( t ) we can def ine t he d i s t r i b u t i o n 
f u n c t i o n F ( T ) , which gives the p robab i l i t y of observ ing a spell of l eng th t , 
t < T , a n d t he haza rd f u n c t i o n . h ( t ) , which gives t he i n s t a n t a n e o u s 
p r o b a b i l i t y of leaving u n e m p l o y m e n t ; t h a t is, 
F{Tj = f f{t)dt 0 < t < oo 
Jo 
S(T} = 1 - F(T). 
Pr(t < T < t+At ,T> t) f(t) 
Hi) = l im = — . 
T h e m e a n length of a comple t e spell of u n e m p l o y m e n t , deno ted E j , is 
given by J^ tf{t)dt. In t e r m s of t he surv ivor func t ion E^ = J^ S(t)dt. Let u 
d e n o t e t h e l eng th of e lapsed u n e m p l o y m e n t d u r a t i o n of a r andomly chosen 
ind iv idua l f r o m the s tock of unemployed persons . T h e dens i ty func t ion of u 
is known to be p ( u ) , where 
p(u] = Siu)/E^ (7.4) 
a n d t he m e a n length of elapsed d u r a t i o n , deno t ed Ep is given by 
up(u)du. As we wish t o m a k e a c o m p a r i s o n be tween t he cos ts of a 
benef i t s -on ly policy wi th t h a t a policy of bene f i t s -w i th - t r a in ing subs idy , it is 
conven i en t a n d a p p r o p r i a t e to def ine a s y n t h e t i c m e a s u r e of expec ted e lapsed 
d u r a t i o n , deno t ed e^. 
Def ine 
D, = u.l- F(uy\du 
1 Jo 
= f \n-T^)\l-F(u)]du 
1 
r oo 
= L (u-T^)\l-F{u)\du. 
2 
Then e^ = [ d^ (T j ) + T J + where 
p[u)du 
0 
r CO f o o 
2 '2 
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up(u)du 
= = - (7.5) 
^^(r^^r^) = = (7.6) 
r oo 
J^ {u-T^)p{u)du 
= ^ . (7.7) 
/•oo TOO 
J^ Piu)du [1-F(u)]du 
The divisors in (7.5), (7.6) and (7.7) are unemployment continuation 
probabilities at u = 0, T j and T^, respectively. So d j , d2 and d^ are 
measures of expected elapsed durations in three time intervals [O, T j , [ T j , 
T , ) and [T , , oo) conditional on unemployment at the beginning of each 
period. Expected unemployment benefit payments for the first T^, the next 
T2 - TJ and the remaining third period of unemployment, evaluated at 0, T j 
and TJ, respectively, are SBd^, SBdj and SBdg. 
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7.2.5 Implication of Employment- t raining Subsidy 
Next we shall argue tha t a targeted employment subsidy program 
designed to enhance the post-subsidy employment prospects of an individual 
can be regarded as improving the wage offer distribution function faced by 
t h a t individual. We have shown tha t this will raise the reservation wage in 
all periods prior to entry in the subsidy program and hence tend to raise 
expected unemployment durat ion. In brief, subsidised employment may make 
a job searcher more choosey (not lazy) and hence lead to additional 
unemployment . 
The wage offer distribution G(w) which determines the job offer 
distr ibution is conditional on the skills level q of the individual. The higher 
the skills level of the individual, the greater will be the probability of being 
offered higher wage jobs. We postulate the following, 
E[W) = R[q) R: > 0 
An improvement in the skills level of an individual will result in a 
favourable rightward shift of the wage offer distribution which increases the 
mean wage offers tha t the individual receives. 
The s ta te of being in employment-training may be regarded as a skills 
enhancement s tate . The enhancement of skills takes the form of improving 
existing skills level or acquiring new skills. An unemployed person who 
expects to part icipate in employment subsidy program at time T^, will 
therefore ant icipate an improvement in his wage offer distribution from time 
T j . The model, therefore, predicts tha t reservation wage levels of the 
potential program part icipant will increase prior to T j , which will increase his 
probability of remaining in unemployment prior to T^. Tha t is, E^ will 
increase under the training subsidy. (This may be a little strong. An 
al ternat ive would be to assume tha t the improvement in the wage offer 
distr ibution occurs at T2, on formal completion of training. Our assumption 
can be justified by arguing tha t at least as far as the incentive effect is 
concerned, what mat te rs is the worker's perception of the benefits of training 
a t the point of entry into the program.) In this sense the subsidy program 
may provide an incentive to wait rather than accept a job offer. Of course, 
if the improvement in job offer distribution is only small, an outcome which 
will depend upon the effectiveness of the program, the incentive effects will be 
negligible. 
Let f*(t), S*(t), p*(u) denote new probability functions, analogous to 
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f ( t ) , S ( t ) , a n d p ( u ) de f ined above , which app ly over t h e r a n g e [0, T j ) when 
t h e subs id i sed t r a i n i n g p r o g r a m is in o p e r a t i o n . Obv ious ly , t h e new expec ted 
e lapsed d u r a t i o n , d e n o t e d E^,, will a lso change . La t e r in Sect ion 7.3, t he 
d i s i ncen t ive effect of t h e subs idy will be def ined in t e r m s of t h e r e l a t ionsh ip 
b e t w e e n E j a n d Ej*. 
N e x t cons ider t h e imp l i ca t i ons of t h e t r a i n i n g subs idy on r e - e m p l o y m e n t 
p r o b a b i l i t y of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t a t t i m e T^. T r a i n i n g m a y confer g rea t e r 
e m p l o y a b i l i t y on a p a r t i c i p a n t e i ther by r e m o v i n g t h e s t i g m a of l ong - t e rm 
u n e m p l o y m e n t or by f ac i l i t a t i ng skill acqu i s i t i on . If nega t ive d u r a t i o n 
d e p e n d e n c e exis ts , t h e n t r a i n i n g can be t h o u g h t t o re-set t h e d u r a t i o n clock. 
By s h o r t e n i n g t h e ex i s t ing spell of u n e m p l o y m e n t , t r a i n i n g also improves 
f u t u r e e m p l o y m e n t p r o b a b i l i t y if lagged d u r a t i o n d e p e n d e n c e is p r e sen t . T h u s 
we m a y r ega rd t h e t r a i n i n g p r o g r a m as e n d o w i n g t h e t r a inee wi th a new 
h a z a r d r a t e . T h e ef fec t iveness of t he p r o g r a m will be ref lected in t h e e x t e n t 
t o which t h e p a r t i c i p a n t ' s r e - e m p l o y m e n t p robab i l i t y is increased . As a 
specif ic e x a m p l e let t h e ind iv idua l h a v e a Weibul l cond i t iona l expec ted 
d u r a t i o n dens i ty 
/ ( f ) = e x p \ - ( \ t f ] /3>0, A>0. 
a n d a s s u m e t h a t /? < 1, i.e. t he re is nega t ive d u r a t i o n dependence . T h e 
c o r r e s p o n d i n g h a z a r d f u n c t i o n is h ( t ) = A^(At)/^-^ Let A be a func t ion of t he 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e ind iv idua l , which a re deno t ed by X and X^ , pre-
t r a i n i n g a n d p o s t - t r a i n i n g , respec t ive ly , a n d A = A(X) and = -^(-^p)- > 
Ap impl ies t h a t , cond i t i ona l on p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e e m p l o y m e n t p r o g r a m , 
h a z a r d r a t e o u t of u n e m p l o y m e n t will be h igher . 
Le t S ' * ( t ) d e n o t e t h e surv ivor f u n c t i o n for t h e t ra inees , app l i cab le 
b e y o n d T j - T h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g dens i ty of e lapsed d u r a t i o n is p (u) w i th 
m e a n equa l t o E^* ' . An effect ive t r a i n i n g p r o g r a m is def ined t o be one 
wh ich r educes E^** below the va lue o b t a i n e d when no t r a i n i n g is given. In 
Sec t ion 7.3 we discuss a p p l i c a t i o n s of t h e concep t of an effect ive t r a i n i n g 
p r o g r a m . 
7.3 The Choice of T^ and T^ 
F r o m a policy v i ewpo in t t h e p r o b l e m is t o choose T j a n d T2 so as t o 
m i n i m i s e t h e expec ted cos t s t o socie ty . T h e s e cos t s inc lude t he p o t e n t i a l 
c o n t r i b u t i o n t o o u t p u t which is lost for each per iod of u n e m p l o y m e n t a n d t h e 
d i rec t cos t s of u n e m p l o y m e n t benef i t s a n d e m p l o y m e n t - t r a i n i n g subs idy 
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payments. Lengthening the waiting period for any given duration of subsidy 
will reduce the disincentive effects but will also lower the expected future 
savings in unemployment benefits if the effectiveness of training is thereby 
reduced. Lengthening the subsidy period will increase the expected cost of 
subsidy but will also increase the expected future savings in benefits, once 
again if the effectiveness increases with the duration of training. So the 
choice of T j and T^ involves a trade-off. More significantly, there will exist 
in general an interdependence between the optimum job search policy given 
T j and T2 and the optimum setting of T^ and T2. One way to model this 
would be to treat the optimising behaviour of the unemployed, given T^ and 
T j , as a constraint on the policy maker. This is the approach followed in 
the principal-agent literature; see Holmstrom (1979). We have not pursued 
this theoretically attractive route because of the difficulty of deriving an 
explicit j ob search rule when the target subsidy program offers employment 
only for a fixed duration. Instead we shall consider the problem of optimally 
choosing T j and T2 for a given individual with known characteristics and 
known hazard function both before and after policy intervention. 
We shall first specify the cost of maintaining an "average" unemployed 
person in each of the three stages of unemployment both under benefits-with-
subsidy policy and benefits-only policy. The objective function is the 
incremental cost of benefits-with-subsidy over the benefits-only policy which 
must be maintained. This specification of the objective function raises two 
questions: Who is the "average" unemployed person in this problem? What 
is the relevant per period cost of policy in each regime? 
The "average" unemployed person in our problem is a hypothetical 
individual whose unemployment experience is taken to be that of the average 
unemployed person chosen from each of three groups formed by segmenting 
the total stock of unemployed, viz., the groups with unemployment less than 
or equal to T j , between T j and T2 and more than T2. Average elapsed 
unemployment durations within each segment reflects the actual 
unemployment experience in that sub-group. In a sense, therefore, our chosen 
measure of unemployment duration focusses on those who are currently 
unemployed and hence involves experience weighting,[Layard (1981)]. As is 
now well known, average elapsed duration is in general different from average 
expected duration on entry into unemployment [Layard (1981), Carlson and 
Horrigan (1983)] and the latter does not weight actual unemployment 
experience. 
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We propose tha t the per period cost of unemployment is the sum of 
lost output and unemployment benefits and the per-period cost of employment 
training is the subsidy cost. Note that this involves both output losses and 
transfer payments. Conventionally, transfer payments involve zero social costs 
if they are financed by non-distortionary taxes. However, we assume tha t 
unemployment benefits and training subsidies are financed from general 
government revenues raised through taxes on, inter alia, labour income. 
Although this provides justification for including transfer payments in 
calculating the cost of the programs, in the sense tha t the finance of the 
programs by distortionary taxes will involve deadweight losses, a full 
t rea tment of the problem involves much additional analysis which is beyond 
the scope of this chapter. It is relevant to note, however, tha t this issue has 
been discussed in the li terature dealing with the social cost of financing a 
marginal dollar of public expenditure. See , for example, Browning (1976) 
and Stuart (1984). There the social cost is taken as "the sum of tha t dollar, 
which is diverted from private use, plus the change in the total welfare cost 
of taxation caused by increasing tax revenue by the dollar" [Stuart (1984, 
p.352)]. The second component of the sum, usually called "marginal excess 
burden" may be thought of as a per dollar surcharge which must be borne 
whenever the public sector alters the allocation or distribution of resources 
through tax measures. Clearly the magnitude in question will depend on the 
tax measure. In our computat ions, we set the marginal excess burden at $1 
which may underest imate or overestimate the cost of the programs. It would 
be straight-forward, however, to repeat our calculations for other values of 
the marginal excess burden though we do not believe this to be very 
worthwhile because it is essentially captured through our parameter r. 
We assume that P is the potential output loss per unemployed for each 
period of unemployment. Assume also tha t the employment subsidy program 
has a direct job creation effect rather than just a reshuffling of the 
unemployment queue. The expected costs of subsidised employment training 
per worker is 
• > 
E{A^) = {B+P)(—) + Z{T^-T^) + (B+F){ } (7.8) 
/ OO *« 
/ |1-F (u)]du 
2 
where 
T 
d\ = f \ [ l - / ( u ) ] 
^ Jo 
du (7.9) 
171 
rco 
{u-T^)\\-F'[u]]du (7.10) 
and Ej* is mean elapsed unemployment duration given probabi l i ty function 
p ' ( u ) . 
T h e corresponding costs of benefits-only policy is 
E(A^) = + + (7.11) 
W i t h costs and benefits def ined, we now consider the policy maker's 
ob jec t i ve function which involves the choice of T^ and T2. It would be 
possible to choose T j and T^ by di f ferent criteria. For example , T j might be 
set so as to sort out ( i den t i f y ) virtual unemployables, for whatever reason, 
and T2 might be set suff iciently large to make them employable . Another 
example arises when there is a binding budget constraint on the size of the 
subsidy program and (T2 - T j ) has to be chosen to satisfy this constraint. 
Such criteria emphasise redistr ibutive and/or budget considerations. However , 
we wil l focus on cost-effectiveness considerations and assume here that the 
ob jec t i ve function is simply the dif ference between the expected cost of 
benefits-with-subsidy and benefits-only policies. 
There fore , the ob ject ive function is 
Mrn^^^^^^j E(A] = \E{A^)-E(A^)]/{B+P) (7.12) 
where r = Z/{B+F), k = d\e^/D^E*^ , and x = d'jd^. 
Minimisat ion of (7.12) may be carried out subject to additional 
constraints such as, for example, a minimum wait ing t ime constraint requiring 
T j greater than or equal to a posit ive integer n. Such constraints are 
discussed further in Section 7.4. 
W e shall treat k and x, respect ively, as measures of the disincentive 
ef fect and effectiveness of the subsidised training program. They are complete 
funct ions of T j and T j , so some discussion of their properties is useful. 
By the argument presented in Section 7.2, the disincentive effect of 
subsidised employment implies f ' ( t ) < f ( t ) , t e [0, T J and hence 
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d \ = / ^ u S \ u ) d u > D = I \ s ( u ) d u . 
^ Jo ^ Jo 
However , th is is not sufficient to establ ish the sign of (1 - k) which 
also depends on the ra t io Ej/E^*. We, therefore , make a s t ronger assumpt ion 
t h a t the disincentive effect of the subsidised t ra in ing p rogram will increase 
the probabi l i ty of observing elapsed du ra t ion u for all u e [0, T j . T h a t is, 
p \ u ) > p(u) u e [ o , r j ] 
and hence 
> D J E ^ 
which implies k > 1. The absence of a disincentive effect of the kind 
discussed here is implied by k == 0. 
T o establish the sign of (1 - x) we assume t h a t the uncondi t ional 
expected elapsed dura t ion in the pos t - t ra in ing period is smaller t han the 
corresponding expected elapsed dura t ion in the absence of a t ra in ing 
program.^ This implies 
.OO ^^  rco 
I up (u)du < I up(u)du 
We can then show t h a t x < 1. (See Appendix K) 
Clearly x < 1 implies t h a t the t ra in ing p rog ram is effective in reducing 
average pos t - t ra in ing unemployment dura t ion . x = 1 character ises a to ta l ly 
ineffective p rogram in the same sense. 
In the remainder of th is chapter we shall t r ea t k and x as func t ions of 
T j and T2. VVe argue (see Appendices L and M) t h a t it is reasonable to 
expect the following: 
dk 
dk 
- ^ > 
dx 
X . = > 0, and 
dT^ 
dx 
X,. = 2 dT < 0. 
If w e a s s u m e p (i i) < p ( u ) f o r a l l u > T 2 , t h e n it is d i f f i c u l t t o p r o v e t h a t x < 1 a s 
00 «« ,00 »• 00 
J t P d o e s n o t e q u a l u n i t y s i n c e / p ( u j t i u < / p{u)du < 1. 
2 2 
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These mean tha t a longer waiting period increases job acceptance probability 
but reduces the effectiveness of the subsidy program, possibly due to 
atrophying of work habits and skills, and a longer subsidy period also reduces 
the job acceptance probability but increases policy effectiveness. These 
restrictions will play a concrete role in the numerical optimisation exercise of 
Section 7.4. 
In deriving the optimal solution, there are a number of possible cases to 
consider. If E(zi) > 0 for all Tj ,T2 and does not have an interior minimum, 
then the policy cannot save money on average and the cost minimising 
solution is set to be T j = T2, i.e. to have no subsidy. If E(z\) > 0 for all 
T j , T , but an interior minimum exists, then the policy is also inferior in 
terms of cost but there does exist a cost-minimising solution. Finally if E(z\) 
< 0 for some T j and T2, then a cost-minimising policy superior to the 
benefits-only policy is available. If E(zi) does have a unique minimum it is 
given by the solution to the first-order conditions 
dE(A) 
dE(A) 
Economic interpretat ion of the first-order conditions is straight-forward. 
For given value of T j and r there is a value of T^, such tha t the cost of 
increased benefits-plus-subsidy due to the policy are exactly offset at the 
margin by reduction in the post-subsidy savings on benefits that would be 
payable in absence of the subsidy. If no interior minimum exists, then the 
cost of benefits-plus-subsidy is never recouped by a sufficient reduction in 
unemployment durat ion in the post-subsidy period. This may arise either 
f rom ineffectiveness of the policy in enhancing employability of the 
unemployed or f rom absence of duration dependence. 
The presence of possible disincentive effects on job 
acceptance in the 
pre-subsidy period require that the policy is more effective than would be 
required otherwise. If k = 1 so tha t there are no disincentive effects, the 
effect of adding say a week at the margin to the waiting period will save on 
subsidy costs but lead to an increase in the expected cost of pre-subsidy 
benefits and reduce the expected value of post-subsidy benefit savings; 
similarly adding a week to the subsidy period holding T j constant raises 
expected subsidy costs and would have to reduce expected post-subsidy 
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benefits sufficiently to make it wortiiwhile. It is therefore obvious that the 
superiority of benefits-plus-subsidy policy to the benefits-only policy rests 
jointly on the existence of negative duration dependence and on the ability of 
the subsidised employment training to reduce its effects sufficiently. 
Note that a general closed form solution of the first-order conditions in 
general can be expected to be difficult. The partials of dj, d^ and d^ depend 
upon the duration density function; the partials k^ and k^, depend upon the 
disincentive effect of subsidy policy on job acceptance and Xj and x^ depend 
upon the effectiveness of the policy. However, if specific parametric forms of 
the duration density are admitted and additional assumptions made about 
functions k(Tj, T J and x(Tj, T2), then Tj and T^ may be numerically 
determined. 
To specify functional forms relating to k and x to Tj and T2 is 
arbitrary and may lead to computational difficulties also. A possible way out 
of this difficulty is to fix numerical values of k and x and then solve the 
optimisation problem for Tj and T2. This possibility is tried in Section 7.4. 
Another alternative would be to determine values of (k, x) which lead 
to E(z\) < 0 for any given pair of values (Tj, T2). Such an exercise will 
throw light on the required degree of effectiveness of a subsidy program and 
the required lack of disincentive effects that would produce cost savings for 
any particular choice of Tj and T2. This is similar to an exercise reported 
in Brooks and Volker (1984) who, however, ignore any possible disincentive 
effects. 
Such numerical experiments are akin to microeconomic simulation 
exercises. Provided they are well-designed they can give one some feel for 
the nature of trade-offs implicit in the first order conditions at (7.13) and 
(7.14) which, as they stand, are somewhat complex. To be useful such 
simulation exercise should restrict attention to sub-spaces in the parameter 
space which are empirically interesting. However, this would require one to 
draw upon microeconometric studies on duration dependence, effectiveness of 
subsidised employment training, and on their possible disincentive effects. 
This is a tall order. Studies of duration dependence certainly exist but their 
findings are typically subject to many qualifications such as those noted by 
Heckman and Singer (1984). Analysis of effectiveness of training programs is 
also relatively new; see, for example, Ashenfelter (1978), Kiefer (1979), 
Cooley, McGuire and Prescott (1979) and Ridder (1984). Finally, we are 
unaware of any serious attempt to study the disincentive effects. 
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This s i tua t ion just i f ies a numerica l inves t iga t ion in which some of the 
p a r a m e t e r s as well as func t iona l forms are chosen by reference to empirical 
work and one exper imen t s wi th the remain ing p a r a m e t e r s to s tudy the 
sensi t ivi ty of the solut ions to their se t t ings . 
7.4 Some Numerica l Explorat ions 
Numerica l solut ions to the op t imisa t ion prob lem in (7.12) require specific 
func t iona l fo rm for the unemploymen t du ra t i on densi ty f ( t ) . T h e relatively 
flexible Weibull funct ion has been used in several s tudies , e.g. Lancaster 
(1979, 1985b), Heckman and Bor jas (1980). In th is case the hazard funct ion 
is 
h(t) = Xp(Xt)^-'^ A > 0, /? > 0. 
= 1 implies cons t an t hazard and hence no dura t ion dependence. 
Sui tab le es t imates of A and condi t ional on aggregat ion and omit ted 
heterogenei ty a s sumpt ions , can be ob ta ined f rom disaggregated gross flows 
d a t a as has been done, for example , by Brooks and Volker (1984). In our 
analys is we s u b s t i t u t e their es t imated values for A and fi, viz., A = 0.086 and 
/? = 0.671 which implies negat ive dura t ion dependence"^. This value of 
implies, for example , t h a t doubling u n e m p l o y m e n t dura t ion leads to a 20 per 
cent reduct ion in the hazard ra te . T h a t is, we assume t rue dura t ion 
dependence. E s t i m a t e d dura t ion dependence, of course, may be qui te spurious 
in the sense t h a t it may only reflect measu remen t problems. In pract ice, 
d is t inguishing between t rue and spurious du ra t i on dependence is an addi t ional 
problem for a policy whose desirabil i ty may sensitively depend on the extent 
of du ra t ion dependence. 
Explici t func t iona l forms for k and x canno t be easily derived f rom the 
j o b search model direct ly. The funct ional forms used in our analysis are 
therefore inevi tably ad hoc specifications bu t wi th the signs of par t ia l 
der iva t ives conforming wi th those derived f r o m the theoret ical j o b search 
model . Let 
k = l + 
X = T j ) 
where Q and 9 a re cons t an t s chosen to reflect the relat ive s t reng ths of 
" 'xhese are es t imates of hazard funct ion from unemploymen t to employment for males 15 to 24 
years , e s t imated using M a r c h - J u n e 1984 gross flows d a t a as repor ted in Brooks and Volker (1984). 
T h e corresponding es t imates for females are also of similar magn i tudes . 
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clisinrentive effect and the subsidised ernployriient program's effectiveness in 
improving employahii i ty in the post subsidy period. 
Subsidised employment training typically involve setting several 
parameters including wait ing time, period of subsidy and rate of subsidy. In 
problems involving moral hazard tyf)e considerations or binding budget 
constraints on the size of the program, some form of rationing or queueing 
can be expected and this in turn will require some rationing rules. Our 
solution to this is simple. Cost minimising values of T j and T^ were 
numerically determined® with values of a and 6 varying from 0.001 to 0.010, 
and® r = 0.3. In one variant of this exercise no specific functional form for 
k or X is used. Instead, it is assumed that the policy maker expects k and x 
to take certain fixed values and then determines cost minimising values of T j 
and T2. 
We do not report details on numerical computat ion such as the values 
of d j , d^, dg but concentrate instead on the period of subsidy. See Table 
7-1. Table 7-1 confirms that interior solutions to the optimising problem 
exist only when 9, the rate of increase of the policy effectiveness parameter x 
to changes in T^-Tp is large relative to q , the corresponding rate of increase 
of the disincentive effect parameter. The larger 9 is relative to Q the longer 
also will be the opt imal duration of subsidy. 
Table 7-1 also contains results from the exercise when k and x are 
given fixed values. The results indicate that for a given value of k, if the 
training produces lower values of x and hence is more successful in lowering 
elapsed unemployment duration in the post training period the opt imal 
subsidy period is longer. For a given value of x, the greater the disincentive 
effect, i.e., higher k values, the shorter is the opt imal wait ing period T^ and 
the period of the subsidy. 
The above exercise was repeated under the assumption of no duration 
dependence i.e. /? = 1.0. The outcome was that the opt imal wait ing t ime, 
T j , was always at its m i n imum value and the durat ion of subsidy was 
shorter and less sensitive to changes in q and 9. See Table 7-2. The 
absence of durat ion dependence substantially reduced the potential gains from 
®The numerical solutions were obtained using the N A G subrout ine E04UAF , D O I A J F and 
D O I A M F . 
^The value of r is determined as follows: we assume P = $200 which is the value of average 
weekly earnings for juniors in November 1984. W i t h Z = $75 and B = $50, we set r = Z / B + P 
= 0.3. 
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T a b l e 7-1: O p t i m a l T^ and T^ wi th Dura t i on Dependence (r—0.3) 
a e T , T , T -T I 2 J J k x E ( ^ ) 
0.002 0.001 17.5 72.7 55.2 1.11 0.95 -0.50 
0.001 0.001 8.3 57.9 49.6 1.20 0.95 -0.28 
0.008 0.001 5.0 51.7 46.7 1.37 0.95 -0.14 
0.001 0.002 13.3 79.-4 66.1 1.26 0.87 -2.55 
0.008 0.002 6.3 67.5 61.2 1.49 0.88 -2.19 
a 
- 13.0 58.3 45.3 1.10 0.90 -2.44 
- - 8.4 48.8 40.4 1.10 0.95 -0.56 
- - 5.0 44.9 39.9 1.20 0.90 -2.30 
_ _ 5.0 23.8 18.8 1.20 0.95 -0.08 
N o t e s 
a. The results from this row onwards are obta ined by f ixing the values 
of k and x. 
chang ing the d is t r ibu t ion of unemp loymen t through the subsidy. \\'hen 
dura t i on dependence exists, i.e., 3 < 1, the condi t ional elapsed dura t ion d^ 
increases with T^. However, when /3 = 1.0, d^ is independent of T^ and 
hence the op t ima l value of - T j can increase only when the incrementa l 
savings wi th subsidy (l-x)d2 can more than offset the marg ina l increase in 
subsidy payment . This occurs only when the rate of increase of x per un i t 
increase in subsidy dura t ion is sufficiently large. In compar ing the cost 
savings figures of fixed k and x, we see that where tliere is no durat ion 
dependence, the subsidy program will have to be more effective in increasing 
post subsidy emp loymen t probabi l i ty to achieve the same level of cost 
savings. 
The preceding analysis does not take in to account any budget constra int 
faced by the policy maker . The existence of a budget constra int wil l 
reinforce the ra t ion ing mechan ism and this could take the form of l im i ta t ion 
on the dura t ion of subsidy a nd / o r changes in the rate of subsidy. Wel fare 
considerat ions for the unemployed ind iv idua l wil l inf luence the choice of 
ra t ion ing scheme, bu t it seems reasonable tha t at least some of the remain ing 
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Table 7-2: Op t ima 1 Tj and T , with No Duration Dependence ( r 0 . 3 ) 
Q e T, T -T ' 2 ' 1 k X E ( ^ ) 
0.002 0.001 5.0 26.6 21.6 1.04 0.98 -0.18 
0.004 0.001 5.0 26.4 21.4 1.08 0.98 -0.14 
0.008 0.001 5.0 26.2 21.2 1.17 0.98 -0.07 
0.004 0.002 5.0 27.4 22.4 1.09 0.96 -0.40 
0.002 0.010 5.0 35.5 30.5 1.06 0.70 -2.92 
0.010 0.010 5.0 35.4 30.4 1.30 0.70 -2.72 
a 
- 5.0 25.7 20.7 1.10 0.78 -2.44 
- - 5.0 25.7 20.7 1.10 0.95 -0.47 
- - 5.0 25.7 20.7 1.20 0.78 -2.36 
- - 5.0 25.7 20.7 1.20 0.95 -0.39 
Notes 
a. The results from this row onw ards are obtained by fixing the values 
of k and X . 
parameters, e.g. wait ing time T j , would be chosen to minimise the 
incremental cost of the program. 
7.4.1 Evaluat ion of a S^'E'J'P-type Program 
In Austral ia, S Y E T P , which began in 1983, encompasses three schemes: 
(i) The 'standard S Y E T P ' which pays $75 per week subsidy to firms 
for 17 weeks to employ youths between 15 to 24 years who have been 
unemployed for at least 17 weeks; 
(ii) The 'extended S Y E T P ' which provides a total subsidy period of 34 
weeks at $100 per week for the first 17 weeks and $75 for the second half 
for youths who were unemployed for at least 8 months; and 
(iii) The 'Commonweal th S Y E T P ' which pays government departments 
the full wage costs of a participant's first 17 weeks of employment. 
The majority of recipients are found in the standard S Y E T P category. 
Since its inception, the standard S Y E T P subsidy rate has been estimated to 
be between 35% to 50% of average junior wages [see Smith (1983) and Smith 
(1984a)]. 
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The employer par t ic ipat ion in the program is voluntary . Therefore , the 
elastici ty of d e m a n d for labour ma t t e r s . Our numerical explora t ions ignore 
this fea ture and hence they are more relevant to pure t ra in ing programs. 
However, we shall indicate later how the basic f ramework can be adapted 
easily to take account of the elasticity of labour demand . 
If it is assumed t h a t the policy maker will a lways aim to achieve a cost 
effective policy, i.e. one where incrementa l costs of the subsidised program is 
negat ive, we can use equat ion (7.12) to eva lua te the existing S Y E T P scheme 
in t e rms of the ex ten t of disincentive effect t h a t may be accommoda ted and 
the min imum level of effectiveness required of the program in improving the 
employabi l i ty of the par t ic ipants . The impl icat ions of increasing the wai t ing 
period and the subsidy ra t io r can also be analysed. 
The analysis is performed under two different assumpt ions where: 
(i) Direct j ob creation effect in assumed, i.e. the subsidised job 
represents real net addi t ion to to ta l employment ; and 
(ii) Reshuffl ing of the unemployment queue is assumed, i.e. the creation 
of a subsidised j ob is a t the expense of non-subsidised jobs to o thers in the 
unemployment queue who do not meet the eligibility criteria,^ and hence does 
not lead to net value added. 
Each assumpt ion implies different values for the rat io r since in the 
second instance, no addi t ional increase to o u t p u t occurs under the subsidised 
Z+P _ Z 
employment p rogram so t ha t r — instead of . 
^ ^ ^ B + P B + P 
The results of th is analysis in Table 7-3 show t h a t under the s t anda rd 
S Y E T P - t y p e scheme, cost saving is una t t a inab l e if the policy is total ly 
ineffective (x = 1.0). If post t ra ining elapsed dura t ion d^ is expected to be 
reduced by half as a result of the t ra in ing (x = 0.5), a cost effective policy 
is achievable even in the face of a very s t rong disincentive effect (k < 5.18). 
Where no dis incent ive effect exists (k = 1.0), the p rogram mus t reduce post 
t ra in ing elapsed dura t ion by a t least 5%. If s t rong disincentive effect is 
an t i c ipa ted (k = 2.0) this f igure is raised to 16%. 
When the wai t ing t ime T j is doubled, the ex ten t of disincentive effect 
which can be accommoda ted within a cost effective policy is reduced bu t 
^ A n a l y s i s of t h e e f f ec t i venes s of S Y E T P j o b subs idy is f u r t h e r d i scussed by S m i t h (1984a , 
1984b) . 
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T a b l e 7-3: Evaluation of a SYETP-lype Schcriio witli Durat ion Dependence 
r 
Ti T -T ^ 2 ' } X- l.O'^ x-^O.O k -1.0 
0.3 17 16 n.f.^ k<9.80 x<0.84 x<0.95 
().;i 31 16 n . f k<4.96 x<0.71 x<0.95 
0.6 17 16 n . f k<8.52 x<0.70 x<0.81 
0.6 34 16 n . f k<4.42 x<0.58 x<0.82 
1.1 17 16 n . f k<6.36 x<0.47 x<0.58 
1.1 34 16 n . f k<3.50 x<0.36 x<0.60 
N o t e s : 
(a) Solution values of k indicating the max imum disincentive 
effect which can be accommodated to ensure E ( z i )<0 for 
the given fixed x values. 
(b) Solution values of x indicating the m in imum level of policy 
effectiveness necessary to ensure E ( ^ ) < ( ) for the given 
fixed k values. 
(c) n.f. indicates that the solution values of k or x are outside 
their feasible range, i.e. k<l . ( ) , x<().0. 
remains substantial (k < 4.96). In the presence of strong disincentive effect 
the required level of effectiveness of the program, in terms of the m in imum 
reduction in d^, is increased to 29%. Increasing the subsidy rate raises the 
m i n imum required level of effectiveness of the policy. In the case where 
reshuffling of the queue occurs (r — l- l ) , the m in imum level of effectiveness 
of the policy in the absence of any disincentive effect is 42%. 
Under the assumption of no duration dependence, the computat ions 
shown in Table 7-4 indicate that with direct job creation, the extent of 
disincentive effect which may be accommodated is substantially reduced and 
its influence on the effectiveness of the policy is more critical. When no 
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Tab le 7-4: Evaluation of a S\'ETP-ty[)e Scheme - No Duration Dependence 
r X 1.0^ X- 0.0 k--1.0 
0.3 17 16 n.f.^ k<3.30 x<0.56 x<0.99 
0.3 'M 16 n.f. k<2.25 x<0.20 x<0.99 
0.6 17 16 n.f. k<2.34 x<0.15 x<0.57 
0.6 34 16 n.f. k<1.73 n.f. x<0.57 
1.1 17 16 n.f. n.f. n.f. n.f. 
1.1 31 16 n.f. n.f. n.f. n.f. 
Notes: As in Table 7-3 
disincentive effect exists, cost savings can be achieved even if the policy is 
totally ineffective. However if k = 2.0 the policy must reduce d^ by at least 
50% and if waiting time is doubled, this increases to 80%. If reshuffling of 
the unemployment queue occurs, no feasible solution can be found which will 
ensure a cost effective policy with the given values of Tj, T^ and r. The 
absence of duration dependence has increased the importance of the 
disincentive effect and removed much of the flexibility otherwise available to 
the policy maker in the design of a cost effective policy. 
7.5 Fu r t h e r Extens ions of the Mode l 
The basic approach adopted in this chapter is capable of certain 
extensions of tlie kind that can be accommodated in a stationary job search 
model. For example, an implicit assumption of our analysis thus far is that 
the elasticity of demand for labour is sufficiently large to induce the 
neccessary increase in demand for labour or offers of jobs to the long term 
unemployed. Constraints in the form of a fixed government budget allocated 
to the scheme provide further rationale for this approach which treats the 
numbers of recipients of the subsidy as supply determined. However, if funds 
available for the scheme are not exhaustible and/or the elasticity of demand 
for labour from the targeted group is not sufficiently large, the probability of 
employers responding to the offers of subsidies must be taken into account in 
calculating the expected costs of the policy. The expected costs of the benefit-
plus-subsidy policy is 
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E(A^) = {B+P)kD^ + + + + 
where Pj is the probabiHty of employers responding to the subsidy offer 
and is a function of the elasticity of demand for labour.® 
Results from a survey of 1000 wage subsidy employers conducted by the 
Department of Employment and Industrial Relations in November 1983 
indicated that about 42% of subsidised workers would not have been hired in 
the absence of a subsidy. Using regressions over the period 1978 to 1983, 
Smi th (1984b) found that the corresponding estimate was 64%. This suggests 
that the value of p^ ranges from 0.42 to 0.62. Allowing for the influence of 
elasticity of demand for labour will also make k a function of this elasticity 
and the rale of subsidy Z. 
A further extension is to allow for partial completion of the training 
program. If rn is the ratio of the average duration of participation to the 
max imum duration of training, and if we assume the extent of skill 
enhancement varies with m , then this will make x a function of m. 
7.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have not aimed at a pronouncement on the ult imate 
merits and demerits of a SYETP-type targeted employment subsidy program. 
Tha t task would require far more reliable empirical information than we 
appear to have at present, even in terms of orders of magnitude. Rather, we 
have attempted to identify the kind of information required in order to reach 
a conclusion and the nature of trade-offs available to a policy maker wishing 
to design a cost-effective subsidy program. This analysis has identified four 
effects which play a crucial role in an economic evaluation of a targeted 
employment-training subsidy, viz. disincentive effect, substitution effect, 
durat ion dependence effect and the training effect. An extended analysis 
would also allow the demand for labour to play a role. Whi le the last two 
mechanisms have received considerable attention in recent empirical studies, 
the first two remain relatively under-investigated. Our results indicate that 
the assumption of negative duration dependence is extremely important in 
just i fying targeted employment-training subsidies from an efficiency viewpoint. 
Yet empirical results on this issue are not clear cut. It seems, therefore, that 
^Th is expression, of course, assumes that the unemployed person's expectation of part ic ipat ing in 
the subsidy scheme is not affected by the probabi l i ty of employers responding to the subsidy offer. 
It may be the case that the unemployed person is aware of the employment decisions of firms 
which cause a shift in the job offer probabil i ty at T j . In this case, we would expect k to be a 
funct ion of P j as well. 
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f rom an cinpir ical viewpoint the task confront ing the designers of policy is a 
cha l leng ing one. 
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APPENDIX K 
PROOF OF SIGN OF (1-X) 
W e want to sliow that x < 1. 
Proof : W e have assumed l l iat 
rco ^^ .CO 
j up {ii)du < I up{v)du 
JT • T 
2 2 
This implies tliat 
< 
F '* F 
Since p (u 
) - 0 for u < T this means that p " ( u ) d u = 1. 
There fore , we can write 
^ 3 ^ ^ 
„ , UJllO ll i l ,Cll lO UIICIU J 
2 
E j - ' j ^ p [u)du 
^ 3 
p oc 
< 
B u t p p{u]du < ]. 
Hence it must be true that 
^ 3 ^3 ^3 
< 
roc roc roc 
J \l-F*\u)]du eJ^ p(u)du J^ {l-F(u)}du 
<^3 < ^3 
X < 1. 
Q.E .D . 
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APPENDIX L 
PARTIAL DERIVATIVES OF K 
The restrictions on the partial derivatives of k are derived as follows* 
k is defined as 
k ^ . 
where d ^ is the expected elapsed unemployment duration in the period |0,TJ 
when the unemployed person ex[)ects to be participating in the subsidised 
employment program at T, . The expected elapsed unemployment durations 
are defined as: 
d — I up(u) du 
d = up ( i x ) du. 
^ Jo 
In the case where no subsidised employment program exists, any 
increase in T j leaves the reservation wage w* unchanged and will lead to an 
increase in unemployment duration dj . However, where the subsidised 
employment program is already in operation, the changes in expected 
unemployment duration d j will consist of : 
i. the increase in time period of say, Tj + ZiT, which increases d*j ; 
ii. the fall in reservation wages throughout the interval [O, T j which 
decreases p (u) and hence d j. 
The second component of changes follows from the predictions of our 
j o b search model in which the extent of any increase in w*[t], for a given 
Increase in V „ , will vary inversely with the distance of t from T 
Therefore, with only the expected t ime of participation in the employment 
program increased to Tj + ZiT, we would liave 
w\\t\ < w\\t] t e [ o , r j 
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where \v ^ and w ^ are, respectively, the reservation wage when the 
expected times of participation are Tj and Tj +Z\T. 
Since the offsetting change in (b) does not occur when there is no 
subsidised employment program, we would expect the percentage increase in 
d j to be greater than that of d ^ for a small increase in Tj . That is, 
dfjdT^ ddjdl\ 
: < 
or 
rfj dd j / a r j - d J dd^ dT^ < 0. 
But the partial derivative of k with respect to T^ is ,, d^dd d 
dk 
< 0. 
dT^ 
The partial derivative of k with respect to T^ follows readily from our 
assumption that the longer the period of subsidised employment, the greater 
will be the expected returns from search in all periods prior to the expected 
participation in the program, which consequently leads to a higher reservation 
wage and higher expected elapsed unemployment duration in the interval jO, 
T 1 
^ li-
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APPENDIX M 
PARTIAL DERIVATIVES OF X 
The restrictions on the partial derivatives of x are derived as follows. 
X is defined as 
where the definitions of d , and d ' , given in the text are 
[ (u-T)i-F{u)du 
= 
oo 
:\-F{u)]du 
and 
<^3 = 
(u-Tjl-F (u)du 
" • 
oo 
For the Weibul l distribution, the survivor function is 
5(w) = 1 - F{u) = exp[-(Au)^]. 
Therefore, 
r oo 
J^ {u-ycxp[-(Xu)^u 
= 
rOO 
/ exp\-{\u)^\du 
ad 3 
It is easy to show that —- < 0 and analogously —— < 0. This result 
dX r. « d\ 
dz dx 
is used below to establish the sign of — and 
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We assume that any lengthening of the duration of the employment 
subsidy will increase the hazard rate of the part icipant in the post-subsidy 
period. That is, 
dX 
> 0. 
diT^-T^ 
d\ 
In the case where no emplovrnent subsidy program exists, =0. 
Differentiating x with respect to the subsidy durat ion, we have 
-
d.dd\/dX . dX/d(T--T) 
-J Z 1 
< 0. 
Therefore, 
ax 
and 
ax 
dT^ • dT. 
< 0. 
> 0. 
Q.E .D . 
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CHAriER 8 
CONCLUSION 
In t h e p r eced ing c h a p t e r s , we h a v e e x a m i n e d s o m e issues r e l a t i ng t o t h e 
n a t u r e of u n e m p l o y m e n t a n d t h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m th i s s t a t e . E a c h c h a p t e r is 
a c c o m p a n i e d by i t s own i n t r o d u c t i o n a n d conc lus ion . Here , we shal l p r o v i d e a 
brief s u m m a r y of t h e c o n t e n t s of t h i s thes i s t o g e t h e r w i th s o m e s u g g e s t i o n s 
for poss ib le f u t u r e r e sea rch w o r k . 
C h a p t e r 1 of t h e thes i s deal t wi th t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e g r o w i n g 
n u m b e r s of h idden u n e m p l o y e d on m a c r o e c o n o m i c a n a l y s i s p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e 
u n e m p l o y m e n t - v a c a n c y r e l a t i o n s h i p . In do ing so. we h a v e a d o p t e d a 
s y s t e m a t i c a p p r o a c h t o t h e e s t i m a t i o n of t h e L \ c u r v e for A u s t r a l i a a n d 
p e r f o r m e d t e s t s which a f f i r m e d t h e basic c ausa l i t y r e l a t i o n s h i p u n d e r l y i n g t h e 
spec i f i ca t ion of t h e UV e q u a t i o n . T h e a prion p r e d i c t i o n s of t h e s imp le 
s tock- f low mode l were c o n f i r m e d by t h e empi r i ca l findings which i n d i c a t e d 
t h a t f a i l u re t o cons ide r t h e h idden u n e m p l o y m e n t f a c t o r wou ld lead to 
inco r rec t in fe rences c o n c e r n i n g the e x t e n t of s t r u c t u r a l i m b a l a n c e in t h e 
e c o n o m y . W e h a v e chosen only one top ic t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h e t h e p o t e n t i a l 
s ign i f i cance of h idden u n e m p l o y m e n t on m a c r o e c o n o m i c ana lys i s . T h e r e a re 
c e r t a in ly i m p l i c a t i o n s for o t h e r m a c r o issues such a s t h e Ph i l l ips c u r v e 
a n a l y s i s of u n e m p l o y m e n t - i n f l a t i o n t r a d e o f f s , which can be p u r s u e d in f u t u r e 
r e sea rch w o r k . 
C h a p t e r s 3 a n d 4 a re concerned wi th t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of su rv iva l 
m o d e l l i n g t e c h n i q u e s t o t h e i nves t iga t ion of t h e d e t e r m i n a n t s of t h e h a z a r d 
r a t e f r o m u n e m p l o y m e n t us ing d a t a f r o m t h e A u s t r a l i a n L o n g i t u d i n a l Su rvey 
w h i c h cons i s t s m a i n l y of o b s e r v a t i o n s on long t e r m u n e m p l o y e d y o u t h s . 
V a r i o u s a s p e c t s of t h e s t a t e d e p e n d e n c e h y p o t h e s i s i nc lud ing d u r a t i o n 
d e p e n d e n c e , lagged d u r a t i o n d e p e n d e n c e a n d o c c u r r e n c e d e p e n d e n c e were 
t e s t e d . T h e m a x i m u m likel ihood e s t i m a t e s of t h e h a z a r d f u n c t i o n s for 
i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h d i f f e r e n t u n e m p l o y m e n t spel ls did n o t revea l any s ign i f i can t 
l agged d u r a t i o n e f fec t s b u t t h e h y p o t h e s i s of no o c c u r r e n c e d e p e n d e n c e w a s 
r e j e c t e d . U n o b s e r v e d h e t e r o g e n i t y w a s found t o be s ign i f i can t a n d 
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substantial ly affected the magni tude of the durat ion dependence effects 
est imated. Various diagnostic checks for specification error were implemented. 
After correction was made for random effects arising from unobserved 
heterogeneity, our findings were that the experience of the typical unemployed 
youth in the Austral ian labour market was characterised by increasing 
probabi l i ty of escape from unemployment the longer he or she had been in 
unemployment . These results challenge the widely held view in Austral ia , 
deduced mainly from aggregative analyses, that the probabil ity of leaving 
unemployment tends to decline as the duration of unemployment increases. 
In Chapter 5, we proceeded with the structural estimation of the j ob 
search model. The estimation of the reservation wage function of the 
unemployed was done using modified two stage least squares and max imum 
likelihood procedures which allowed for sample selectivity bias. Most of the 
predictions of the theoretical j ob search model were affirmed by the 
est imation results. Reservation wage was found to decline with elapsed 
unemployment durat ion and positive duration dependence was implied by 
these structural estimates. 
The t iming of occurrences of mult iple unemployment spells and 
occurrence dependence were further pursued in Chapter 6. It was 
demonstrated how modell ing techniques based on the stochastic counting 
process theory can be successfully employed empirically using labour force 
history data such as those found in the ALS data set. \'arious forms of the 
fixed effects and random effects models were discussed and estimated. Our 
findings indicated that past occurrences of unemployment or employment 
spells tend to reduce the durations of the current and future unemployment 
spells. 
The economic justif ication and evaluation of targeted employment-
tra in ing subsidies were examined in Chapter 7. The efficient design of a 
subsidy policy was shown to depend upon four effects: the disincentive effect 
of the subsidy on job search, the substitution between subsidised and 
nonsubsidised workers, the nature of duration dependence and the effectiveness 
of training. Analyt ical ly, the problem is complex, and a numerical simulat ion 
was conducted to provide insights into the interactions between these effects. 
It was shown that from an efficiency point of view, justif ication for the 
targeted employment-training subsidies depends crucially on the assumption of 
negative duration dependence in unemployment . 
In this thesis several specific topics of interests which have received 
at tent ion in the literature were not examined. These include the following: 
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i. analysis of the effects of unemployment benefits and local demand 
effects on labour market transition behaviour at the micro-level ; 
ii. use of time varying covariates in the specification and estimation of 
the hazard functions and the intensity functions; 
iii. micro-level analysis of the transition from unemployment to out of 
the labour force using a three-state labour market transition model. 
These topics were not explored because of the limitations imposed by 
the nature of the longitudinal data set currently available. The future release 
of data from later phases of the Australian Longitudinal Survey should 
provide sufficiently rich data sets which, hopefully, will permit research on 
these aspects of labour market transition behaviour. 
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